Harry S. Truman and the Taft-Hartley Act / by Lee, R. Alton.
This  d is s e r ta t io n  has  been 62—2034 
m ic ro f i lm e d  exac tly  as re c e iv e d
L E E , R. Alton, 1931- 
HARRY S. TRUMAN AND THE TA FT-H A R TLEY  
ACT.
The U n iv ers ity  of Oklahom a, Ph .D ., 1962 
H is to ry ,  m odern




THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA 
GRADUATE COLLEGE
HARRY S. TRUMAN AND THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
A DISSERTATION 
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY




R. ALTON LEE 
Norman, Oklahoma
1962.




The author would like to recognize with profound 
gratitude the assistance of Research Professor Gilbert C.
Fite for his judicious counsel in directing this disser­
tation. Acknowledgment of indebtedness must also be 
extended to the other members of the doctoral committee. 
Professors Herbert J. Ellison, John S. Ezell, John H. Leek, 
Dean William E . Livezey, and to Dean Arthur H, Doerr, for 
their advice and counsel. Dr. Philip C. Brooks and his 
staff at the Harry S. Truman Library deserve special 
recognition for their services which facilitated the research 
as well as Dr. Kenneth LaBudde's library staff at the 
University of Kansas City and M r . Morris Rieger of the 
National Archives. Mrs. Starlin Powell should be commended 
for her excellent job of typing the manuscript. Finally, 
appreciation must be expressed to the Harry S. Truman Library 






I. INTRODUCTION .  ............................   1
II. THE SEARCH FOR A RECONVERSION LABOR
P R O G R A M ..........................................  23
III. THE EIGHTIETH CONGRESS REVERSES A NEW
DEAL P O L I C Y .............  58
IV. HARRY S. TRUMAN PROCURES A POLITICAL
N E M E S I S ..........................................  97
V. A 1948 MODEL PAUL R E V E R E ............................I36
VI. THE DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION FAILS TO
REDEEM A CAMPAIGN PLEDGE ........................  I78
VII. HARRY S. TRUMAN ALTERS NLRB
ADMINISTRATION .  ..................................212
VIII. THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT WANES AS A POLITICAL
I S S U E    . 246
IX. CONCLUSIONS . . . . ; . .  ............... . . . . . 280
B I B L I O G R A P H Y ......................................, . . . 293
iv
HARRY S. TRUMAN AND THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 aroused as much 
controversy and political contention as any domestic policy 
formulated by Congress in the period after World War II. This 
legislation, which altered the basic labor policy of the 
United States, is familiar to every American, at least by 
name although not necessarily by content. In fact this is 
one of the many curious features of the Taft-Hartley Act--in 
legal terms it is one of the most complicated acts that 
Congress ever passed and yet its name has become almost a 
household word. And, although nearly a decade and a half has 
passed since it became law, politicians as well as labor and 
management are stimulated to zealous denunciation or praise 
at the mention of its name. The same can be said of the 
average citizen, although not to the same degree as was true 
a decade ago. But even now the Taft-Hartley Act is regarded 
as all black oi-’ all white, depending upon one's background 
and experience or, more particularly, upon one's exposure to
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the pro or con propaganda relative to this policy that has 
flooded the country.
Public opinion concerning this Act becomes highly 
significant when one bears In mind the part which popular 
pressure played not only In Its formulation but also In the 
various attempts to repeal or amend It. Public opinion In a 
democracyj for good or 111, plays a vital role In the creation 
of congressional policy and In the administration of that 
program. Thus, In a democracy. It Is of the utmost Importance 
that public opinion be courted and won before a national 
policy can be effectuated. The Taft-Hartley Act Is an 
excellent contemporary example of the role that public 
opinion plays In national political life. The Act was 
conceived and adopted In the heat of appeals to popular 
support and has been used to Influence voters In political 
campaigns since Its passage. This, In turn, becomes more 
startling when It Is realized that only a few citizens who 
express an opinion about the law actually comprehend the 
various ramifications of Its far-reaching provisions.
The political history of the Taft-Hartley Act during 
the administrations of President Harry S. Truman Illustrates 
an outstanding American political phenomenon. As Professors 
Stephen K. Bailey and Howard D . Samuel have pointed out, the 
Congress and the President of the United States are not
elected by the same constituencies.^ Contemporary American 
political society is a dichotomy of two basic interests, an 
agricultural faction and an urban faction. While these in 
turn splinter into various groups, some of whose interests 
coincide and others conflict, the fundamental cleavage remains 
intact and is solidifying even more as the progression from 
an agrarian to a highly industrialized nation becomes more 
pronounced. The agrarian tradition of the United States is 
reflected and maintained in the composition of Congress, 
especially the House of Representatives. Since this nation 
has had a traditionally agricultural basis. Congress has 
remained the stronghold of the farm element and represents the 
middle class and business interests of the country as well. 
Congress has always been, and remains today, the citadel for 
these inherently conservative elements. To quote Bailey and 
Samuel, "Well over a majority of the members of the House of 
Representatives come from districts which have no city larger 
than 50,000 population."^ Thus on domestic policies. Congress 
tends to reflect the interests and desires .of the farm, 
middle class and business segments of the nation and, in 
regard to labor policy, its actions incline toward anti­
unionism. This does not hold true for the Senate as much as 
for the House of Representatives since Senators are elected
TStephen K. Bailey and Howard D . Samuel, Congress at 
Work (New York-: Henry Holt and Co., 1952), 4l4.
%bid.
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on a state-wide basis rather than by districts.
The President on the other hand represents.a 
different constituency. As election to this office is 
determined by the electoral majority of each state, the urban 
vote is decisive, particularly in the highly industrialized 
states. With the tremendous growth of labor unions during 
and since the New Deal, organized labor has become 
increasingly important in national politics. In 194? there 
were approximately 15,000,000 union members, with the AF of L 
accounting for about 7,000,000, the CIO some 6,000,000, 
and the unaffiliated unions 2,000,000. These numbers, 
representing roughly a potential 30,000,000 votes, counting 
the workers' wives, can be a tremendously decisive factor in 
a national election, if cohesively organized. Thus by 
contrast with the constituencies of Congress, the 
industrialized centers of the nation, where organized labor 
is stronger, make their political power felt by dominating 
the electoral vote of their state, and to a lesser degree, 
the election of Senators. In recent years, the President of 
the United States has increasingly relied upon the city 
worker for his election and subsequently, in domestic policies, 
tends to reflect and sympathize with the interests of labor.
This phenomenon of dual constituency is illustrated 
on the state level by the fact that many legislatures are 
controlled by the agricultural interests which predominated 
when states were first districted perhaps a century or more
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ago. Industrialization and the laborer have since come to 
predominance but are kept from full political power by the 
agricultural interests which refuse to redistrict and thus 
preserve their power. This dual constituency is illustrated 
in national politics, since the advent of the New Deal in 
particular, by increasing use of the presidential veto in 
the field of domestic affairs. Samuel Lubell, the noted 
political analyst, has pointed out that the current 
"President-Congress conflict" which began in 1938 is the 
longest such "duel" in American history and stems from the 
development of pro-New Deal elements being concentrated in 
the cities whereas anti-New Dealers are "rooted largely in 
agricultural constituencies." These opposing coalitions 
have "entrenched" themselves in the executive and legislative 
tranches of the national government respectively.^
One of the major aspects of the New Deal was the 
entrance of the federal government into the sphere of labor- 
management relations where it began, for the first time, to 
play an active, positive role. ' Corjgress had passed the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932--"Labor's Magna Carta"--which 
restricted the use of the injunction in labor disputes, thus 
more or less neutralizing the role of government in labor- 
management strife. The positive role of government in labor
-^Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics 
(New York: Harper, I956), 250.
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matters had Its inception in Section 7 (a) of the National
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 when, for the first time,
workers were given legal sanction to organize and bargain
collectively. When the Supreme Court declared the NIRA
unconstitutional in the Schechter Case in 1935, Section 7 (a)
was revived and enlarged, serving as the basis for the
National Labor Relations, or Wagner Act of 1935. This
statute placed the national government in the role of
encouraging organization of labor. It placed restrictions
upon employers in the form of prohibiting unfair labor
practices which had been used in the past to discourage
such organization. A three-man National Labor Relations
Board was established to administer the law. The purpose of
the Wagner Act, as declared in its statement of policy was
. . .to eliminate the causes of certain substantial 
obstructions to the free flow of commerce . . .  by 
encouraging the practice and procedure of collective 
bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers 
of full freedom of association, self-organization, and 
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for 
the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of 
their employment or other mutual aid or protection.^
After a rather stormy twelve year history this basic
national labor policy was altered by the Taft-Hartley Act.
In the elections of 1946 the Republican party gained 
control of both houses of Congress for the first time since 
the New Deal. The increased strength of the anti-New Deal 
coalition, combined with the postwar reaction against 
labor, enabled the Republican Eightieth Congress to pass the
^U. S. Statutes at Large, XLIX, Part 1, 449-50.
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Taft-Hartley Act over the forceful veto of President Truman,
heir to the Roosevelt, New Deal tradition. This Act, which
was to "equalize" the power between management and the ever-
increasing power of labor unions, fundamentally modified the
national labor policy. Now, instead of the federal
government playing an active role in stimulating union
growth, it was to play the "impartial" role of umpiring the
struggle between labor and management in order to protect the
paramount public interest. The new policy contained the
premise that labor unions were now strong enough--even too
strong--and that henceforth the public interest was to take
precedence over the interests of both labor and management.
The Taft-Hartley Act which amended the Wagner Act,
significantly inserted the following addition to the Wagner
Act's statement of policy:
Experience has further demonstrated that certain practices 
by some labor organizations, their officers, and members, 
have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or 
obstructing commerce by preventing the free flow of goods 
in such commerce through strikes and other forms of 
industrial unrest or through concerted activities which 
impair the interest of the public in the free flow of 
such commerce. The elimination of such practices is a 
necessary condition to the assurance of the rights herein 
guaranteed.5
The agricultural, business and middle class interests, having 
won control of Congress in 1$46, were able to reverse one of 
the basic New Deal tenets over the protest of the executive 
branch which reflected the concern of working men in the 
urban areas.
^U. S. Statutes at Large, LXI, Part 1, 137.
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The passage of the Taft-Hartley Act In 19^7 was the 
culmination of a long and sustained propaganda drive 
sponsored by the National Association of Manufacturers and 
the United States Chamber of Commerce, the two strongest 
business organizations In the country. These two associations 
and their satellite Institutions had always opposed, not 
necessarily the Interests of the working man as such, but 
the growing economic and political power of labor unions.
In fact the common Interest of Industry "In opposing organized 
labor has served to hold the membership together" In the NAM 
"and to provide a never-falling bond of opposition to 
liberal-social legislation of the New Deal variety."^ Led by 
the NAM, these groups began their campaign to destroy the 
Wagner Act as soon as It.was enacted. This concerted move was 
effected with typical propaganda methods of "appealing 
slogans, half-truths, misinterpretation and possibly known
Ymisrepresentation" In the attempt to discredit unions and 
remove the paternalistic protection of the national 
government. The NAM frankly admitted that Its "targets" In 
this drive were "The great, unorganized. Inarticulate, so-called 
middle class; The younger generation; and The oplnlon-makers 
of the nation."® Senator George Aiken, Republican from
^Robert A. Brady, Business as a System of Power 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), 213.
^Harry A.Mlllls and Emily Clark Brown, From the 
Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1950), 290-I.
^National Association of Manufacturers, The Challenge 
and the Answer (New York, September, 1947), as quoted In 
Ibid., 288.
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Vermont, estimated In May of 19^7 that the total spent by 
the NAM in this operation amounted to at least $100,000,000.
At the same time he referred to his statement delivered in 
the Senate a year previously that the NAM had spent $2,000,000 
in March of 1946 in an advertising campaign in newspapers 
against labor, declaring that this charge had "not been 
contradicted as yet.
That this campaign succeeded so well was due in part 
to the presentation of news by the press. The press tended 
to present labor news, although usually unintentional, in 
the worst possible light, thus helping to mold public opinion 
against unions. That this role could easily be unintentional 
and yet very effective stems from the nature of the press. 
Newspapers tend to print what will appeal to their readers 
and the reading public prefers sensationalism. The actions 
of a few extremely aggressive labor--leaders in this period were 
emphasized by the press, as they should have been, but the 
result tended to paint all union leaders with the same brush 
as these untypical few. When only the actions of immoderate 
leaders made the news and the much more common activities of 
the run-of-the-mill labor officials were omitted, the 
average reader soon pictured the more rash union leader as 
typical. Thus many critics regard John L. Lewis, whom
^Congressional Record, 8o Cong., 1 Sess., 194%, XCIII,
5015.
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President Truman referred to as a "headline hunter, 
as having damaged the cause of labor unions during this 
difficult period. His actions were such that they Invariably 
made headlines and, as presented by the press, did much to 
convince the public that labor "bosses" needed to be 
controlled.
On the other hand, legitimate claims were made that 
the press In general was unfriendly to labor. Most of the 
nation's newspapers opposed legislation favorable to labor 
during and after the New Deal and strongly supported the 
Taft-Hartley Act. In addition, labor spokesmen claimed that 
they did not have access to the "avenues of public opinion, 
through which to state their views In the labor-management 
conflict. This one-sided news coverage by the country's mass 
media kept organized labor constantly on the defensive.
Labor emerged from World War II with a good record 
and high In public esteem. Except for occasional wildcat 
strikes and minor disturbances labor faithfully remained on 
the job which won It praise on numerous occasions from 
government spokesmen. The maintenance of stable labor 
relations during the war was based on two factors: (l) the
no-strlke, no-lockout policy mutually agreed to by labor and 
management In the labor-management conference called by
^^Harry S. Truman, Press Conference, June 9, 1949, 
Truman Papers, 0R22, Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.
S. Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 81 Cong., 1 Sess., 19^9, Hearings, II, Arthur J. Goldberg,
435.
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President Roosevelt in December, 1941, and (2) the wage 
stabilization policy announced by President Roosevelt on 
April 27, 1942, and given statutory confirmation by Congress 
in the Economic Stabilization Act on October 2 of the same 
year. The War Labor Board, set up by Roosevelt on January 12, 
1942, administered the stabilization program. The WLB had 
its powers broadened by the War Labor Disputes, or Smith- 
Connally Act, passed over President Roosevelt's veto on 
June 25, 1943. This Act provided for a thirty-day "cooling- 
off" period and an ensuing worker vote before striking in a 
war plant. But the WLB, rooted in presidential war powers, 
ceased to exist with the conclusion of the war.
With the termination of hostilities the nation
entered into an era of reconversion. This transition from a
wartime to a peacetime economy, Newsweek warned, would not
"be a quick, easy trip over a well-paved, well-lighted 
12superhighway," and this admonition proved to be well 
calculated. The Truman program for the postwar economy called 
for the wonderful objectives of full employment and full 
production, but few concrete proposals were offered to 
implement such a program. Less than a month after the 
Japanese surrender President Truman reported to Congress that 
during the reconversion period production of civilian goods
^^"Relations with Labor will be Key to Truman's 
Economic Program," Newsweek, XXV (April 23, 1945), 72.
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must proceed "without Interruption" and that labor and
management should "cooperate to keep strikes and lockouts at
a minimum" during the transition. He then pointed out that
Those who have the responsibility.of labor relations 
must recognize that responsibility. This Is not the 
time for short-sighted management to seize upon the 
chance to reduce wages and try to Injure labor unions. 
Equally It Is not the time for labor leaders to shirk 
their responsibility and permit widespread Industrial
strife.13
This ringing call to duty simply amounted to a 
request for labor and Industry to resume peacefully the art 
of collective bargaining when wartime controls were lifted. 
But Truman seemed to overlook the fact that during the war 
period collective bargaining had fallen Into disuse. During 
the war many of the disputes handled by the War Labor Board, 
especially In defense Industries, were resolved by Board 
decrees with little or no mediation. Following the war, true 
collective bargaining had to be revived, and In many cases 
had to be relearned by labor and management. However, 
while both sides were oiling up collective bargaining 
machinery the country was swept by an Inundation of strikes 
during the reconversion period which In turn led to antllabor 
legislation culminating In the Taft-Hartley Act.
There Is a very close parallel In the reconversion 
periods following World War I and World War II In the field 
of labor relations. Basically the same pattern was followed
1 ■̂^Harry S. Truman, Message to Congress, September 6, 
1945, Truman Papers, FPF 200, Truman Library.
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in both eras--nationwlde strikes succeeded by public reaction 
and a crackdown on labor. The movement against labor after 
World War I took the form of the open-shop drive during which 
the AF of L, the largest federation of unions, lost about a 
quarter of its m e m b e r s . T o t a l  union membership was reduced 
from 5,000,000 in 1920 to 2,850,000 by 1933. The NAM led 
this drive, sometimes called the American Plan, of no trade 
unions and "free bargaining" between employer and employee. 
The reaction following World War II molded the Taft-Hartley 
Act, an attempt to curb and, many said, eventually to destroy 
labor power.
One of the major differences between the two periods 
was that labor unrest after World War II was more moderate 
than in the preceding span. Secretary of Labor Maurice J. 
Tobin emphasized this distinction during an attempt to repeal 
the Taft-Hartley Act. Comparing the percentage of workers on 
strike in relation to the total labor force for the first two 
years following the end of both wars, Tobin pointed out that 
the percentage in 1919 was 20.8, and 7.2 in 1920. But in 
1946 the percentage was 14.5, and in 1947 only 6.5, a 
considerable difference especially in the first-year
^^obert Rendiner, "What's in the Cards for Labor?" 
Nation, CLXII (April 6, 1945), 391.
l^Maurice J. Tobin, "Town Meeting of the Air,"
March 15, 1949, Secretary Tobin File (Speeches), R.G. 174, 
National Archives.
^^Brady, Business as a System, of Power, 196.
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c o m p a r i s o n . N o n e t h e l e s s ,  the strikes, particularly In the
basic Industries of coal, steel, automobile and transportation,
which Involved millions of workers directly and Indirectly
In 1946, presented a serious threat to reconversion and
economic progress In the minds of many people. Liberals and
moderates did their best to discourage antlunlon feeling, but
the move to "put labor In Its place" went forward. In fact
Truman later told William Green, President of the AF of L,
there was "little doubt"'In his mind
. . . that a definite plot was hatched at the close of 
the war to smash, or at least to cripple, our trade 
union movement In a period of postwar reaction. The 
conspiracy was developed by a little group of politicians, 
working with the representatives of our most reactionary 
employers. These men thought that history would repeat 
Itself and that they could do after World War II what had 
been done after the First World War when our trade 
unions were set upon by the so-called "open-shop 
movement" using the anti-labor devices of spies, finks, 
blacklists, and yellow dog contracts.
An underlying factor In the nationwide wave of strikes 
during the reconversion period was labor's apprehension that 
mass unemployment was Imminent. At the end of the war there 
were about twelve million people serving In the armed forces 
and another eight million directly engaged In war production. 
With the return to a peacetime economy this would mean, as at 
the end of every war, a tremendous displacement of labor and
S. Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 
81 Cong., 1 Sess., 1949, Hearings, II, 216.
l^Harry S. Truman to William Green, September 13, 1949, 
Truman Papers, PPF 89  ̂ Truman Library.
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at least temporary economic uncertainty until reconversion 
was effectuated. For example, between V-E and V-J days, 
unemployment Jumped from one-half million to one million.
After the Japanese surrender war contracts were cancelled and 
unemployment immediately t r i p l e d . I n  the last four and 
one-half months of 19^5 strikes created over 28,400,000 
man-days of idleness compared to the war-year high of 
13,500,000 in 1943.^^ The natural reaction of labor was to 
strike before mass unemployment curtailed its bargaining 
power.
Coinciding with this fear and magnifying the 
desperate situation of labor was the fact that during 
reconversion American workers found themselves in a wage-price 
squeeze. Wartime controls, which had stabilized wages and 
prices, were due to expire June 30, 1946.' When the Admini­
stration requested continuation of these controls. Congress 
replied with a bill so impotent that President Truman vetoed 
it and the country was without means of controlling prices. 
Immediate inflation took place and the price of some basic 
commodities rose as much as 25 per cent in two weeks. 
Frightened by this development. Congress passed a price
iq■^These unemployment figures are taken from Joseph G. 
Rayback, A History of American Labor (New York: Macmillan,
1959), 38BI
20joel Seidman, American Labor from Defense to 
Reconstruction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953),
221.
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control law, but with higher ceilings on many manufactured 
items than were maintained during the war, and the Admini-
PI
stration had to accept it as better than nothing.
In addition to higher prices, real wages were lowered
when wartime bonuses and overtime were reduced or abolished.
So, although wages were not actually cut, the net effect
was less take-home pay for the average worker. This wage-
price squeeze triggered the postwar strikes. These strikes
were unique in that they were more moderate than many people
expected at the time. Professor Joseph Rayback states that
in the month of January, 1946, "the number of man days of
idleness due to strikes reached a total of 20,000,000--
3 per cent of working time; in February, 1946, the figure
reached 23,000,000." And yet, "for all its size, there was
little violence; plants were closed in orderly fashion" and
both labor and management "appealed to the public with
pamphlets, press releases and radio talks. Statistical
evidence of industry's ability to pay higher wages became the
22focus of argument in all the controversies."
The War Labor Board, which had administered the Wage 
Stabilization Act, was abolished January 1, 1946, and was 
replaced on the same date with the National Wage Stabilization
^^Ibid., 239.
ppRayback, A History of American Labor, 390. For a 
thorough discussion of labor, strife during the reconversion 
period, see also Seidman, American Labor from Defense to 
Reconversion, 213-53.
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Board. This Board, functioning during the reconversion 
period, ruled only upon voluntary wage increases and 
compensatory price increases. The first round of postwar 
strikes began to dissipate in February, 1946, when the 
National Wage Stabilization Board granted United States 
Steel permission to increase the price of steel $5 per ton.
In turn, the company signed an agreement with its workers 
for an l8 1/2 cent per hour increase. At the same time 
President Truman issued an executive order permitting other 
industrial price increases to compensate for wage increases 
and this pattern of l8 1/2 cents was adopted by most 
industries.
When President Truman signed the new price control 
bill in June, 1946, he warned of its inadequacy, correctly 
predicting that inflation would not be checked. In the last 
half of 1946 consumer prices rose I5 per cent, with food 
prices rising 28 per cent, which more than cancelled the wage 
increases won by the 1945-1946 strikes. Based on 1935-1939 
prices, "real wages dropped from $32.50 a week in July to 
less than $30.00 per week in September, the lowest figure 
since American entry into the war."^^ The 1946 elections 
reflected a sharp political swing to the right. Under the 
circumstances, it seemed futile' to attempt to control prices, 
and on November 9, 1946, President Truman proclaimed the end
23ibld., 393.
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24of "all controls on wages and prices." Without any 
controls inflation increased and price squeezes in turn 
brought on the second series of strikes in 1946-1947.
To a population eager to shake off wartime 
restrictions and responsibilities, these waves of strikes 
irritated public nerves and helped to create increasing 
hostility toward labor. Labor's public relations were further 
damaged by the press constantly reiterating that wage 
increases were responsible for high prices and inflation. 
Secretary of Labor Lewis Schwellenbach attempted to counter­
act this idea by pointing out that for a two year period ■ •
"representatives of business, in the press and magazines, 
have dinned into the ears of the American people the claim 
that advances in prices were exclusively caused by advances 
in w a g e s W h i l e  he admitted wage raises were a factor, 
that did "not Justify any effort . . .  to place the whole 
blame" for rising prices upon labor alone. Previously he had 
referred to the "phenomenal increases in profits during the 
last year," saying that corporation profits for the first 
quarter of 194? were $875,000,000 as compared to $323,000,000
for the same period in the previous year, pointedly suggesting
— - - —  - - ■ ■-*- — - — -,   -
^^Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, II (Garden City, N. Y,: 
Doubleday and Co., 1955), 231
^^L. B. Schwellenbach, Address to the CIO National 
Convention, Boston, October l4, 1947, Schwellenbach Papers, 
Library of Congress.
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26this was a basic contribution to Inflation,
But the campaign to blame labor for higher prices 
succeeded. Letters and telegrams poured Into the White House 
referring to "union tyrants" and saying that "labor power 
should be restricted the same as any other monopoly," A 
Gallup Poll Illustrated labor's decline In public esteem 
during this period. In August, 19^5, 79 per cent of the 
people approved of the "law guaranteeing collective bargaining' 
and 75 per cent thought unions were "a good thing for the 
country," But by June, 1946, 95 per cent approved of a 
compulsory pre-strike vote and 90 per cent thought there 
should be a requirement of regular elections of union 
officials, giving some indication of a drop In union
27popularity and a growing desire to control union activities.
While President Truman agreed that reduction In
take-home pay was a factor In the strike situation, he had
earlier blamed the strikes on "reaction ', , , from the
tremendous war effort" similar to that following "every war
28we ever fought" when everyone felt like "letting down,"
His answer to the strike problem was to appoint fact-finding 
boards. And like Secretary Schwellenbach, Truman realized
^^Ibld., Radio Address on NBC, August 31^ 1947.
^'^Gallup Poll, Public Opinion on Case Bill, Truman 
Papers, OF 407-B, Truman Library,
20President Truman, Press Conference, Tlptonvllle, 
Tenn,, October 8 , 1945, Truman Papers, OR 20 Truman Library,
20
that labor was betrrg- tmjustly blamed for Inflation. On 
December 20, 1945, he issued a statement in which he said 
these fact-finding boards "should be empowered by Congress 
to examine employer's books if necessary to determine 
ability to pay, where ability to pay was- in question, 
provided that the detailed information so obtained should not 
be made public.
Harry S. Truman assumed the Presidency with a good
senatorial record in labor legislation. He had voted for
the Senate version of the Smith-Connally War Labor Disputes
Act. However, he did not vote for the House version of this
Act, which was more a n t i l a b o r , a n d  he voted to sustain
SIPresident Roosevelt's veto of the final Act. Thus, as far 
as labor was concerned his record was clean. Truman was a 
staunch party man which accounts largely for this consistent 
pro-labor attitude. Since the Democratic party sponsored 
legislation favorable to labor, he would follow the party 
line, few politicians having more party loyalty.
Although labor was certain he would be their friend 
as President, many union officials were also aware of his 
temper which would not allow his being pushed too far.
29 Press Release, Summary of Report to the President 
by Fact-Finding Board, General Motors Dispute, January 10, 
1946, Truman Papers, OF 407-B, Truman Library.




Daniel J. Tobin, President of the Teamsters Union, wrote 
an editorial soon after Truman became President, saying that 
Truman was
. . . for the working man In every way possible within
justice and reason, but even to get the Presidency In 
1948 he would not sacrifice his principles or make false 
promises to the workers of the nation. President Truman 
Is going to make history, and labor. In my Judgment, will 
have no better friend than Truman, even though he will 
have tt̂ e courage and honesty sometimes to disagree with 
labor.
President Truman proved particularly adamant on one
Issue regarding labor relations. He did not believe that
strikes against the government were legal, and he said If
they every came to be legal the government "would cease to
exist." Also, he felt that in a contest of power between
labor and Industry It would be necessary for the government
^4to "assert the fact that ^  Is the power of the people." 
Whenever labor leaders were completely In the wrong he would 
be one of the first to Indicate such, as he did when John L. 
Lewis violated the Lewls-Krug Agreement In 1946 and led his 
miners out on strike while the national government was 
operating the coal mines. In this situation the government 
brought suit and Judge Alan Goldsborough found the UMW and 
Lewis guilty of civil and criminal contempt, fining them
Daniel J . Tobin to Matthew J. Connelly, May 21, 
1945, Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
83presldent Truman, Press Conference, May 2, 1946, 
Truman Papers, OF 20, Truman Library.
^ h b l d . , January 24, 1946.
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$3,500,000 and $10,000 respectively.
But as President and titular head of the Democratic 
party, it was necessary for Harry S. Truman to continue the 
pro-labor policies of his predecessor. At times he agreed 
that certain labor leaders were abusing their power, 
especially when they thwarted the desires of Harry S. Truman, 
and he then admitted that corrective legislation was 
necessary. But in general, the President found it imperative 
to favor labor so as to continue the political coalition of 
the Democratic party formed during the New Deal. This became 
progressively more apparent with the approach of the 
presidential election of 1948. But also as President he 
opposed the growing postwar conservative reaction that was 
sweeping the nation and which culminated in the Republican- 
controlled Both Congress which was determined to reverse 
certain aspects of the New Deal. With the combination of 
circumstances resulting from the various manifestations of 
postwar reconversion difficulties, the scene was set for a 
political struggle. This would involve a Democratic 
President representing the urban masses and a Republican 
Congress, long out of power, representing the less numerous 
but powerful and well organized rural and business groups of 
the nation.
CHAPTER II
THE SEARCH FOR A RECONVERSION LABOR PROGRAM
In order to help guide the American economy through 
the delicate reconversion period President Truman summoned 
a National Labor-Management Conference to convene in 
Washington, D. C., on November 5, 19^5- Meanwhile, until the 
conference met, the President called upon labor and management 
to continue adherence to the no-strike, no-lockout pledge.
Any labor dispute that threatened "a substantial interference 
with the transition to a peacetime economy should be 
submitted to the War Labor Board" and both parties would be 
expected "to comply voluntarily with the determination" of 
that Board.^ The idea of such a meeting had been under 
consideration by the Administration and was given impetus 
when Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg sent a letter to Secretary 
Schwellenbach on July 30, 19^5. Vandenberg suggested such 
a conference to "lay the groundwork for peace with Justice 
on the home front," as the United Nations conference in
^Harry S. Truman, Message to Congress, September 6, 
1949, Truman Papers, PPF 200, Truman Library.
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San Francisco had been successful "in laying the groundwork
for external peace with Justice." This letter "crystallized"
2the Administration's decision to go ahead with Its plans.
William Green of the AF of L, Philip Murray of the 
CIO, Ira Mosher of the NAM and Eric Johnson of the United 
States Chamber of Commerce were designated as a committee to 
plan the agenda and nominate thlrty-slx delegates; or, 
eighteen from labor and eighteen from Industry. President 
Truman telegraphed Invitations to the nominees and the 
delegates assembled on schedule. Truman opened the assembly 
by reminding the delegates that It was a labor-management, 
not a government, conference. It was time, he said, for 
labor and management to handle their own affairs "In the 
traditional American, democratic way." He expressed the 
hope that he could soon give up his wartime powers and then 
It would be their responsibility to provide the necessary 
production "to safeguard our domestic economy and our 
leadership In International affairs." He reminded the 
delegates that for four years they had "performed a miracle 
of production" with a minimum of control, but that as soon 
as some of those controls were removed Industrial conflict 
had appeared. He did not ascribe any blame for this
2Report, National Labor-Management Conference to the 
President, December 31, 1945, Appendix B, Truman Papers,
OF 407-C, Truman Library.
■^William Green, Philip Murray, Ira Mosher and Eric 
Johnson to the President, October 23, 1945, Truman Papers,
OF 407-C, Truman Library.
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development, because he believed both sides were at fault. 
Labor was the cause for much strife through jurisdictional 
disputes, he said, but management had to share the blame 
because too often it used delaying tactics to the point where 
collective bargaining became a farce. The President 
concluded his message with the warning that "if the people 
do not find the answers here, they will find them someplace 
else. For these answers must and will be found. The whole 
system of private enterprise and individual opportunity 
depends on finding them.
Despite high expectations of success, the Conference 
produced few results and conferees reached agreement only 
on some nebulous generalities. It was agreed that 
grievances should be settled by arbitration, not by the use 
of economic power, and that such conferences should be 
continued. While this harmony indicated an acceptance of 
the basic principle of collective bargaining, nothing was 
achieved in regard to machinery for settling the immediate 
labor-relations problems of the country. The United States 
Conciliation Service was praised for the part it played in 
labor disputes and the meeting adjourned with no concrete 
proposals.^ Although the President emphasized that the
hPresident Truman, Opening the Labor-Management 
Conference in Washington, November 5, 19^5, Truman Papers,
OR, Truman Library.
'^Report, National Labor-Management Conference to 
The President, December 31, 19^5, Truman Papers, OF 407-C, 
Truman Library.
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government had absolutely nothing to do with the Conference 
beyond calling It, administration officials were afraid that 
Truman would be censured for Its collapse and failure. The, 
Publicity Director of the Conference pointed out that the 
delegates were not going to admit they had spent a fruitless 
three weeks, and that the press was planning to pitch the 
blame to the President.^
Immediately after the Conference President Truman 
■ took a weekend cruise down the Potomac during which he 
"spent several hours" with Samuel I. Rosenman and George E. 
Allen. The outcome of their discussions was a special 
message to Congress.^ In this message the President reminded 
the congressmen that the purpose In calling the Conference 
had been to work out a program by which wartime controls 
could be removed and thus "labor relations would be turned 
back to those Involved." He emphasized that the responsibility 
for failure lay with the delegates and that government 
representatives participated only as observers. The 
government had made no suggestion to the delegates as to 
machinery but only pointed out "the objective which the 
American people expected It to attaln"--lndustrlal peace.
"Now that the conference has adjourned without any
^Fred Smith to Matthew J. Connally, November 27, 1945, 
Truman Papers, OF 407-C, Truman Library.
'^"Historic Truman Labor Curbs Aimed at Strikes 
. Against Peace," Newsweek, XXVI (December 10, 194-5), 31.
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recommendation on the subject/' he continued, "it becomes the 
duty of the Government to act on its own initiative." He 
then recommended that Congress enact labor legislation 
covering nationwide industries based on the principles of 
the Railway Labor Act.
Specifically, he requested that Congress set up a 
program of "fact-finding" boards. These would be appointed 
by the President upon certification by the Secretary of Labor 
that a labor dispute required such action. The board would 
be appointed within five days of such certification and 
during this period and the time of the panel's deliberations, 
plus five days thereafter, it would "be unlawful to call a 
strike or lockout, or to make any changes in rates of pay, 
hours, or working conditions . . .  in effect prior to the 
time the dispute arose." A report should be made within 
twenty days, but the parties to the dispute would not be 
bound by the Fact-Finding Board's recommendations. How 
would the dispute be settled? Settlement would follow 
similar to railway labor disputes, Truman said, because the 
public would then "know all the facts" and the resulting 
public pressure would force the two parties to accept the 
Board's suggestions. He then cautioned Congress not to adopt 
"repressive or coercive measures against either side" which 
would "stifle full freedom of collective bargaining" because 
this "would be a backward step which the American people
28
8would not tolerate."
In the light of subsequent events this plan was an 
Ineffectual, half-hearted gesture. Apparently the Admini­
stration did not know what to do and suggested this approach 
as better than nothing. At a time when the country needed 
vigorous leadership to work out an effective program for 
peacetime labor relations in anticipation of repressive 
antilabor legislation, the Administration appears to have 
fumbled the ball. To call for voluntary cooperation when 
the country was being convulsed by labor strife seems 
ingenuous to say the least. Was this a complete misreading 
of the attitude of labor and management, and the temper of 
the public and Congress? When one recalls the caliber of 
the politician in the White House this interpretation seems 
inadequate. The election of 1948 proved conclusively that 
Harry S. Truman was a grass roots politican par excellence. 
Or was this the sincere effort of a President, deeply 
convinced that a voluntary program could minimize the impact 
of the industrial strife sweeping the country, to ask for 
tolerance during this difficult period and allow those 
involved every opportunity to find the answers? Regardless 
of the motive, Truman's call for voluntary cooperation from 
labor and management failed and the country became 
increasingly impatient with what it considered the arrogant
O
Harry S. Truman, Message to Congress, December 3, 
1945, Truman Papers, OF 407-C, Truman Library.
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attitude of labor. Congress was already moving toward 
"putting labor In Its place," and utilized this public 
sentiment to advantage.
Even before the end of the war Congress seriously 
considered revision of the national labor law. The Wagner 
Act, the basis of the national labor policy, had been 
created as a result of public reaction to the treatment of 
labor during the depression of the 1930's and as the 
culmination of a long drive by labor and liberals to place 
unions In a legal position to bargain on an equal basis with 
management. The Wagner Act thus Imposed restrictions upon 
employers to curtail certain practices they had been utilizing 
In checking union organization. With this governmental 
assistance unions Increased rapidly In membership and 
strength, with the result that labor could meet management 
at the bargaining table on a basis of equality. But along 
with this growth In union power came a corresponding 
Increase In what the public viewed as union "Irresponsibility." 
This "abuse" of labor's newly acquired potency led the 
general public to believe that It needed protection from 
labor "abuses" that were reaching "dangerous proportions,"^ 
and, as the President of General Electric said, "to save 
labor from Its own excesses--excesses which If unrestrained
^Albert S. Goss to the President, Telegram, May 30, 
1949, Truman Papers, OF 407-B, Truman Library.
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will in the long run be injurious to labor itself.
The so-called labor abuses that drew criticism, in 
addition to public irritation with the wartime and postwar 
strikes, were to a large degree the result of growing pains. 
Following the passage of the Wagner Act, organized labor was 
in the process of maturing, and both management and labor 
were learning to accept the principle of collective 
bargaining. But in learning these lessons by experience, 
unions were criticized at times for not bargaining in good 
faith. Although management was also reproved for "stalling," 
by President Truman and others, labor received a greater 
share of public censure. Another criticism leveled at 
unions was the closed shop, which made it necessary for a 
worker to belong to a union before he could take a Job. To 
many this union-security device seemed contrary to the 
American tradition of equality of opportunity and resulted 
in a successful drive in many states to outlaw the closed 
shop by statute or constitutional amendment. Coinciding with 
this abuse, or what many considered an abuse, was the 
excessive initiation fees charged by some unions and the 
check-off clause in contracts which many unions forced 
management to accept, whereby the employer withheld the 
employee's membership dues and remitted, the sum to the union.
^^Charles E. Wilson to Harry S. Truman, June 5, 19^5, 
Truman Papers, OF 407-B, Truman Library.
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Undemocratic union practices' such as not holding regular 
elections, allowing union officials to determine whether 
or not to strike, denial of membership to Negroes in some 
cases, and refusal to report finances, drew their share of 
criticism.
Another source of friction came from Jurisdictional 
disputes and raiding between unions. When the CIO withdrew 
from the AF of L to organize the industrial and non-craft
workers, this in turn stimulated the older unions to greater
activity, resulting in more numerous organizational 
campaigns. As will be noted later, this intra-labor 
division, was one of the major problems delaying labor unity. 
Union rivalry was intensified by the use of secondary boycotts 
and picketing in an attempt to persuade workers to change 
their affiliation or force an employer to extend recognition. 
Secondary boycotts were unusually effective for certain types 
of unions such as the Teamsters who could thus tie up many 
subsidiary industries, and of course the more successful 
the boycott, the more the public raged against union "tyrants.'
To intensify this union "irresponsibility," labor
made little apparent effort to clean house. Indeed, instead 
of giving some indication of reforming offensive behavior, 
union leaders attacked all legislative reformatory measures 
with vehemence. And Just as "employers' callous and brutal 
treatment of their employees crystallized public sentiment 
behind the principles of the Wagner Act, so union
32
Indifference to public reactions , . . helped to create a
climate of public opinion in which the Taft-Hartley Act was 
p o s s i b l e . B u t  this antiunion drive must also be 
considered in the light of the postwar wave of strikes.
One of the most serious setbacks to labor resulting 
from antiunion sentiment in this period came in the field of 
state labor laws. Afer Congress passed the Wagner Act many 
states imitated the federal action by setting up "Baby 
Wagner Act" programs. Some of these states soon reversed 
themselves and set the new pattern of restricting union 
activities, a policy later followed by Congress. The crusade 
against unions in state legislatures reached a climax during 
the postwar period. Professor Rayback maintains that in 19^7 
state legislatures passed more antiunion laws than at any 
time since the Haymarket Riot. Twenty-one states provided for 
strike notices and cooling-off periods, sixteen outlawed the 
closed shop or other union security provisions, twelve 
prohibited secondary boycotts, eleven restricted picketing, 
ten forced unions to file financial statements, and six
12permitted a restricted use of injunctions in labor disputes.
^^Joel Seidman, American Labor from Defense to 
Reconversion, 2^4. For a brief discussion of union practices 
during this period and their stimulation of anti-union 
feeling in public opinion, see Millis and Brown, From the 
Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley, 274-81.
l^Rayback, A History of American Labor, 395-6.
33
Harry A. Millis and Emily Clark Brown point out that 
there were three main arguments used for changing both 
federal and state labor laws after 1939: (1) unions had
become too powerful and a new balance had to be struck,
(2) many unions lacked the necessary sense of responsibility 
to industry, the public, and individual union members, and
(3) unions should have the equivalent limitations and
11responsibilities of employers. These writers also state 
that in the ten-year period from 1937 to 19^7 a total of 
169 amendments to the national labor policy were proposed 
in Congress. The changes were concerned only with national 
labor policy and did not include other labor proposals 
dealing with wages, hours, social security and similar 
matters. The.se various proposals largely fell into one of 
four groups: (l) regulation of internal union affairs in the
areas of elections and finance reporting, (2) strikes 
limitations such as cooling-off periods, (3) union activities 
like picketing and boycotting, and (4) union security 
arrangements such as the closed shop and maintenance of 
membership.
Philip Murray presented a study to President Truman 
which showed that in this same, ten-year period 109 bills in




Congress dealt with these four subjects.^5 is interesting
to note that category two, dealing with strike limitations, 
had the largest number with 31 proposed bills, closely 
followed by group four with 28, and yet union security did not 
become an Issue In Congress until 1941. The fact, that 50 of 
the 109 bills were proposed In the 77th Congress Is 
Indicative of the activities of the Smith Committee of 1939- 
1940 which made the first major attempt to rewrite the 
Wagner Act. Murray complained In this letter that whenever 
the country faced a serious problem, such as war production, 
new bills were proposed which "mechanically repeat the same 
chant of hate, 'Regulate labor, curb labor, destroy labor,'" 
the basic aim of which was a means of smearing "labor and of 
artificially stimulating resentment against trade unions.
When Congress convened In January, 1946, President 
Truman renewed his appeal for new labor legislation based on 
the Railway Labor Act. In a message from the White House he 
again requested the program he had asked for on December 3, 
1945. There was nothing harmful to labor or management In
45in the breakdown of the study It was shown that In 
the first category the 75th Congress proposed 2 bills, the 
76th Congress 3, the 77th Congress 10, the 78th Congress 6, 
and the 79th Congress 4; In category two the 75th Congress 
had 3j the 76th Congress 3, the 77th Congress 16, the 78th 
Congress 7, and the 79th Congress 2; In category three the 
75th Congress had 1, the 76th Congress 1, the 77th Congress 
10, the 78th Congress 7, and the 79th Congress 6; and In 
group four the 77th Congress proposed 16 bills, the 78th 
Congress 10, and the 79th Congress two.
l8phlllp Murray to the President, May 31, 1956,
Truman Papers, OF 407-B, Truman Library.
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his proposal, he said, because "there Is no reason why a 
strike cannot be postponed for thirty days," nor was the 
detailed Information he sought from company books to be 
revealed. He then reiterated his opposition to the anti- 
labor bills pending In Congress which were aimed at 
depriving "labor of the right to bargain collectively" or of 
"Its ultimate right to s t r i k e . B u t  the temper of Congress 
supported much more drastic legislation as reflected In a 
bill Introduced by Representative Francis Case, Republican 
from South Dakota.
The New Republic termed the Case bill, H.R. 4go8,
"an unashamed and hateful attempt to emasculate organized 
1 ftlabor." In Its final form the bill proposed setting up a 
tripartite Federal Mediation Board to assume jurisdiction of 
labor disputes Involving Interstate commerce with provisions 
quite similar to the Railway Labor Act. In addition, the 
bill had an antl-racketeerlng clause and an antitrust 
section. It also would have restricted employers In making 
payments to unions, as In the form of welfare funds, and 
would have made unions suable for breach of contract.
Finally, It contained miscellaneous provisions such as 
excluding supervisors from the Wagner Act. The major
^^Harry S. Truman, Address from the White House, 
January 3, 19^6, Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
^®"Congress and Strikes," New Republic, CXIV 
(February 11, 19^6), 174.
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feature of the Case bill was a cooling-off provision. This 
required a five-day strike or lockout notice and maintenance 
of the status quo for thirty days after such notice if the 
Board assumed jurisdiction.
No one had an opportunity to testify before the 
House Labor Committee on the Case bill because no public 
hearings were held. This was a highly unusual congressional 
procedure. The Nation stated that no hearings were called 
because the bill had the "secret blessing of the Republican 
high command." According to the writer for the Nation, the 
Indiana Republican Charles Halleck was "a prime mover" in 
that committee's decision to rush the bill to the House floor 
without benefit of public h e a r i n g s . T h a t  Halleck was 
Chairman of the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee 
at this time contributes to an explanation of this irregular 
procedure. The House approved the Case bill 258 to I55 on 
February 7 and sent it to the Senate for consideration.
Secretary of Labor Schwellenbach testified before
the. Senate Labor Committee on February 25 in opposition to
the bill, maintaining that it would reverse the progress of
20fifteen years and flood the courts with litigation. The 
bill came up for final action in the Senate during a 
prolonged coal strike and at the height of a railroad strike.
^9"Labor in Wanderland," Nation, CLXII (February 16, 
1946), 184.
20L. B. Schwellenbach to the President, March 8 ,
1946, Truman Papers, OF 419-B, Truman Library.
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To say the least, these strikes did not help the cause of
labor at this inopportune time. As United States News and
World Report charged, "Once again John L. Lewis has inspired
a stampede in Congress to do something about strikes,"
drawing a parallel between this and his strike in 19^3 which
21helped bring about the Smith-Connally Act.
John L. Lewis had begun negotiations early in 19^6 
for a new contract which would provide for a welfare fund to 
come from royalties on coal mined and to be administered by 
himself. The usual breakdown in negotiations came and Lewis 
called a strike of the bituminous coal miners for April 1, 
19^6. The nation went into a "brown-out" to conserve coal 
and industry began to slow down for lack of fuel. Truman 
held six conferences, from March to May, with Lewis and the 
operators' representatives and finally seized the mines in 
May. On May 29 Lewis accepted the Lewis-Krug Agreement 
whereby a welfare fund and a retirement fund were established 
to be Jointly administered by the union and the operators. 
However, this coal strike was not finally settled for 
several months. In October, 19^6, Lewis announced another 
strike to begin the following month because of an alleged 
violation by the government of the Lewis-Krug Agreement.
This call resulted in the famous injunction against the 
strike and the eventual fining of Lewis and the UMW in
1946), 43.
21United States News and World Report, XX (May 17,
oo
December, 1946, by Judge Alan Goldsborough, But the crisis
of the strike in May helped convince Truman of the need for
emergency legislation "to safeguard the nation against
precipitous strikes" and contributed to his request to draft
22workers striking against the government.
It was the railroad strike that brought unforeseen 
political consequences and that illustrated the lengths to 
which President Truman might go when opposed by recalcitrant 
labor leaders. Negotiations over wages had been in progress 
for some time between railroad operators and twenty railroad 
unions. President Truman had invoked the Railway Labor 
Disputes Act under which the parties were attempting, 
unsuccessfully, to arbitrate their differences. Truman had 
begun conferring with the union officials in February, 1946, 
and when negotiations under the Emergency Board deadlocked, 
he submitted a compromise. The Board had recommended a l6 
cents per hour wage increase but the unions also wanted 
certain rules changed. Truman proposed that they accept the 
l6 cents, which the operators were willing to give, plus 
2 1/2 cents per hour in lieu of the rules' changes, which the 
operators also were willing to concede.
Eighteen of the unions accepted the compromise. 
However, Alvanley Johnston, President of the Locomotive
^^Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, I, 502.
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Engineers, and AL F. Whitney, President of the Trainmen, 
refused to arbitrate the rules changes for their unions. 
Instead they asked for a strike vote and a strike of some 
300,000 union members from most of the major lines was 
ultimately called for May 23, 19^6. A strike had previously 
been announced for May 18, but at Truman's request it had been 
postponed for five days while a compromise was sought. In the 
meantime, on May 17; 19^6, President Truman seized the rail­
roads. Truman had held three conferences with Johnston and 
Whitney and decided that this was "no contest between labor 
and management but one between a small group of men and their 
government." He informed Johnston and Whitney that they
were "not going to tie up the country. . . .  If this is the
2 ̂way you want it," he said, "we'll stop you."
On May 24 Truman took the issue to the people in a 
nationwide radio address. He summarized the dispute and the 
negotiations, describing the compromise as "eminently fair" 
since it would raise the take-home pay above the highest 
war year and yet stay within the wage stabilization formula.
He felt it "inconceivable" that the rank and file of these 
two unions realized "the terrifying situation created by the 
action of these two men." He reviewed his labor record in 
the Senate, pointing out that he had always been and always 
would be a friend of labor and would continue to oppose
23lbid., 500-1.
4o
restrictive labor legislation. He reminded the nation that
since the railroads were under government operation as a
result of the strike, the men were striking against their
government. He issued a call to the men to return to work
as a "duty" to their country. If they did not return he
would have no alternative but to call in the Army to assist
24in operating the trains to overcome the "acute" emergency.
On May 25 Truman appeared before a Joint session of 
Congress requesting "strong emergency legislation" which 
would permit drafting the strikers. In a memorandum of the 
previous day Robert Patterson, Secretary of War, suggested 
that the president ask Congress to amend the Selective 
Service Act so as to broaden the age brackets from 20 to 
45 instead of the current limits of 20 and 30. This 
would "enable the military forces to get the men with 
railroad experiences" necessary to operate the trains, 
and from this came Truman's strike draft proposal. At the 
same time government representatives were conferring with 
union officials in an attempt to reach a settlement, and 
Truman was interrupted in his speech with a message stating 
that the recalcitrant unions had accepted the offer and the 
strike was called off. The President then continued his
ohPresident Truman, Radio Address, May 24, 1946, 
Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
^^Robert P. Patterson to the President, May 24, 1946, 
Truman Papers, OF 407-B, Truman Library.
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speech in apparent disregard of the note in what Republican 
Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon called "ham acting." Truman, 
Morse charged, already knew what the railroaders' position was 
when he began his a d d r e s s . H o w e v e r ,  as Professor Seidman 
points out, John R. Steelmàn, the President's negotiator.
reached the agreement with the unions only three minutes
in 5 
28
P7before Truman began his message.“ Truma said Morse later
apologized to him when he knew the facts.
That he continued his message even after the strike 
was called off indicated Truman's deep disgust with what he 
considered the unreasonable actions of union officials. He 
fully appreciated the resentful attitude of Congress and the 
country in this situation, he said. Therefore, he wanted to 
"urge speedy action to meet the immediate crisis," as well 
as deliberate and weighty consideration on legislation 
affecting the basic rights of labor. He drew this distinction 
by pointing out that the benefits labor had gained in the 
past thirteen years had to be preserved but that in this 
case a "handfull of men" had the power "to cripple the entire 
economy of the Nation," necessitating emergency legislation 
to circumvent the immediate crisis. This temporary legislation 
should be in effect for six months after cessation of
^^Congressional Record, 79 Cong., 1 Sess. (19^5- 
1946), XCII, 5601.
^Tgeidman, American Labor from Defense to Reconversion,
236. 28Truman, Memoirs, I, 50I.
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hostilities and would affect only those industries that 
had been or would be taken over by. the government. His 
proposal would authorize injunctive proceedings against union 
officials if they encouraged or incited a strike in a 
government-operated industry; deprive workers of seniority 
rights if they persisted "without good cause" in striking 
against the government; provide for criminal penalties for 
violation of this strike clause; and subject such workers to 
be drafted into the armed forces. When President Truman 
requested the drafting of strikers, he received "prolonged 
cheers and applause," indicating the mood of Congress. He 
was then handed the above note and announced the end of the 
strike, an announcement which was followed y "great and 
prolonged cheers and applause."
Truman admitted that his proposal was "drastic" and
that was why he wanted it to be temporary. He then went on
to say that the right to strike against private employers
had to be preserved but that it was time to adopt "a
comprehensive labor policy" to reduce strikes. This permanent
long-range policy, however, should be studied "afresh." He
recommended the creation of a committee to make such a study
and to propose recommendations within six months for a program
29which would be fair to labor, industry and the public.
^ % a r r y  S. Truman, Message to Congress, May 25, 1946,
Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
In the meantime the Case bill, which had been passed 
by the House on February 7, was being rewritten into its 
final form in the Senate. The Senate had been debating the 
amended Case bill for a week prior to Truman's message and 
was ready to take action. Answering the President's clarion 
call for immediate legislation, the Senate passed the Case 
bill a few hours after he spoke by a vote of 49 to 29.^^
The measure, however, did not include the labor draft 
proposal. Also it was to be permanent legislation. On
SIMay 29 the House accepted the Senate version 320 to 106, 
and the Federal Mediation Bill of 1946 was presented to 
President Truman on May 31. The antiunion feeling of many 
congressmen, combined with public indignation over the two 
current major strikes, enabled Congress to pass the first 
postwar restrictive labor legislation.
United States News and World Report, in reviewing 
this fast legislative action, pointed out that "public 
reaction to strikes" was great enough to cause a majority 
in the Senate to impose restrictions on union leaders in 
spite of the fact that the Senate was "normally responsive 
to the slightest wish of labor leaders." Truman’s reversal 
of his pro-labor attitude. United States News and World Report




explained, was "politically necessary" In order to end the
32paralyzing strikes. Newsweek described the week as a
"trial by fire for Harry S, Truman," because he was "faced
with anger that burned across the nation" on the one hand,
and had to ask-labor for Its "cooperation" In ending the
strike on the other. But, Newsweek pointed out. President
Truman got more than he asked for because the "temporary"
legislation was also the long-range program for which he had
requested a comprehensive study of six months by a committee
preceding any congressional action.
Reaction to the Case bill was Immediate and
vociferous. Public opinion mall poured Into the White House
In an attempt to Influence the President's decision. The
President of General Electric urged Truman to continue his
record of "friend and champion" of organized labor by signing
34the bill and thus "save labor from Its own excesses."
The Chairman of the Board of the National Association of 
Manufacturers pointed out that the American people were 
"demanding action" and that Truman should take the "courageous 
and constructive action" of signing the bill thus saving the
32"what's Ahead for Labor--Era of Limiting Strikers," 
United States News a.nd World Report, XX (May 31, 1946),
: ■■ .
33"strlkes: Mr. Truman Cries 'Haiti' to Labor at
Zero Hour of Nation's Creeping Paralysis," Newsweek, XXVII 
(June 3, 1946), 19-22.
3^Charles E. Wilson to Harry S. Truman, June 5, 1946, 
Truman Papers, OF 407-B,,Truman Library.
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nation from "economic disaster." The bill was not anti­
labor as chargedj the Chairman said, but was pro-public 
because it would protect millions of laborers from the 
"ill-advised and misguided acts" of their leaders.
The President of the United States Chamber of Commerce 
urged presidential approval because the bill was in the 
public interest and reflected "a strong public demand" for 
such legislation.^ The President of the Southern States 
Industrial Council, a stronghold of antiunionism, declared 
that the large majorities in Congress for the bill reflected 
the "overwhelming favoritism" which led to "dictatorial 
powers" of labor l e a d e r s . M o s t  of the pro-Case bill mail 
referred to the need of protecting the public from 
"monopolistic excesses" of "labor overlords" and to restore 
the "balance" between labor and management.
Even the agricultural groups voiced strong opinions. 
The heads of two of the three leading farm organizations, 
the National Grange and the American Farm Bureau, sent 
telegrams urging Truman's signature. The bill "would protect
35ira Mosher to President Truman, June 6, 1946,
Truman Papers, OF 407-B, Truman Library.
3^William K. Jackson to the President, June 3, 1946, 
Truman Papers, OF 407-B, Truman Library.
'demmie Arnold to Harry S. Truman, Telegram, May 31, 
1946, Truman Papers, OF 407-B, Truman Library.
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the public from labor abuses"-^ and the "overwhelming 
majority of the American people" favored it, they said.^^
But the third leading agricultural organization, the 
National Farmers Union, urged a veto on the grounds that if 
this or "similar throttling legislation" was passed, in 
the future no group, including farmers, would be safe from 
comparable "legislative encirclement."^^
Labor leaders sent frantic appeals to President 
Truman to save them with a veto. Philip Murray wrote a 
nine-page letter analyzing proposed antilabor legislation 
since the enactment of the Wagner Act. He said that the 
Case bill was "not merely ill-considered and injurious to 
labor," but it also posed an "exceeding grave danger" to 
the public because it would increase rather than diminish
illlabor disputes. Sidney Hillman said Murray's analysis
and prediction of resulting "evils," if the bill became law,
42needed no elaboration from him. The mail opposing the 
Case bill included letters and telegrams not only from local
S^Albert S. Goss to-the President, Telegram, May 30, 
1946, Truman Papers, OF 407-B, Truman Library.
•^^Board of Directors of American Farm Bureau to 
Harry S. Truman, Telegram, May 30, 1946, Truman Papers,
OF 407-B, Truman Library.
^^James G. Patton to the President, Telegram, June 3, 
1946, Truman Papers, OF 407-B, Truman Library.
^Iphilip Murray to the President, May 31, 1946,
Truman Papers, OF 407-B, Truman Library.
^^Sidney Hillman to the President, Telegram, June 5, 
1946, Truman Papers, OF 407-B, Truman Library.
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unions but from individuals who requested a veto of the
"antilabor" measure which was a "vicious shackle" leading
to "Fascism" and eventual "enslavement" of American labor.
Urgent appeals also came from congressmen. Case
called the President's attention to the fact that his bill
sought "to achieve many of the objectives" which the
President himself had r e q u e s t e d . ^3 Another Representative
thought it would be "a wise policy" to let the bill become
law and then the President could again request his "careful
study" of national labor p o l i c y . O n e  Democratic
congressman expressed the fear that a veto would cause the
Democrats to lose the House in the 1946 elections. He
pointedly added that no administration ever lost the House in
4bmidterm elections and won the Presidency two years later.
When questioned by the press about the unusual amount of 
lobbying on the Case bill, the President replied that it was 
"the usual amount on a piece of legislation of that kind" and 
that it did not have any effect on him because he was "used 
to it."46
Il -n^^Francis Case to Harry S, Truman, May 30, 1946, 
Truman Papers, OF 407-B, Truman Library.
4 4 j , Percy Priest to Harry S. Truman, May 30, 1946, 
Truman Papers, OF 407-B, Truman Library.
45j , E. Rankin to Harry S., Truman, June 8, 1946, 
Truman Papers, OF 407-B, Truman Library.
46president Truman, Press Conference, June 6, 1946, 
•Truman Papers, OR 20, Truman Library.
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In the meantime Truman was consulting and gathering
opinions from department heads and advisors on what he
should do. He had asked William R. Thom, Democratic
Congressman from Ohio, to summarize his views In written
form concerning the provision for suability of unions. Thom
replied that unions were already suable In most states for
breach of contract. The reason for erroneous public opinion
to the contrary, he said, resulted from editors of "the
foremost papers" continually telling their readers that unions
47were Immune from such suits. Of the administration reports 
received by the President on the Case bill, only one 
approved of It. John Snyder, ex-Dlrector of War Mobilization 
and Reconversion, stated that the bill was "In the public 
Interest" and "most emphatically" did not deprive labor 
unions or employees of any basic rights. These amendments 
to the national labor law, Snyder said, were limited to 
"demonstrated abuses," many of which labor Itself thought
Q
would be "desirable and fair" to correct.
Julius Krug, Secretary of Interior, urged a veto 
on the grounds that the bill had been "drastically revised" 
on the floor of the Senate during a time when It was difficult 
to give It "the mature and deliberate Judgment" which the
^^Wllllam R . Thom to Harry S. Truman, June 7, 1946, 
Truman Papers, OF 407-B, Truman Library.
^®John Snyder, Analysis of Case Bill, n.d., Truman 
Papers, Rosenman File, OF 407-B, Truman Library.
49
provisions d e m a n d e d . The Chairman of the Labor Policy
Committee of the Department of Commerce wrote the Secretary
of Commerce that the bill vjas a good start in limiting abuses
bOand urged approval. Despite this recommendation. Secretary 
of Commerce Henry Wallace submitted a four-page proposed 
veto message based on the idea that "upon calm, deliberate 
and analytical consideration" the bill was basically 
antilabor and would foment "additional labor u n r e s t . T h e  
Attorney-General, Tom Clark, also offered a proposed veto 
message. He objected to the provision extending the criminal 
penalties, the treble damages provisions and the injunctive 
sanctions of the antitrust laws applying to union activities. 
He also repeated President Truman's May 25 request for a
52study committee before enacting permanent labor legislation. 
Lewis Schwellenbach, Secretary of Labor, was the most 
specific in his objections. He disliked the provision for 
replacing the United States Conciliation Service with the 
new Federal Mediation Board which would be outside of his 
jurisdiction. He felt that the problem of excluding 
supervisors as employees in the national labor law was
^9julius Krug to the President, Memorandum, June 4, 
1946, Truman Papers, OF 407-B, Truman Library.
50charles R. Hook to Henry A. Wallace, June 3, 19^6, 
Truman Papers, OF 407-B, Truman Library.
^^Henry A. Wallace to the President, June 5, 1946, 
Truman Papers, OF 407-B, Truman Library.
^^Tom Clark to the President, June J, 1946, Truman 
Papers, OF 407-B, Truman Library.
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"complicated" and needed more study. Schwellenbach objected 
to the Indefiniteness of the language in the clause covering 
damage suits against labor unions. He also felt that such 
permanent legislation needed more detailed study before 
Congress acted. Then, in an interesting sidelight, he 
mentioned the complaint that the Senate and House Labor 
committees were "loaded in favor of organized labor." He 
doubted if this charge were true, but was certain that both 
committees had "some of the most ardent anti-labor members" 
in C o n g r e s s . T h e  other department heads offered no 
written comment on the bill except that it was outside the 
jurisdiction of their departments.
After "careful consideration" Truman decided against 
the bill and sent his veto message to Congress on June 11.
In his message Truman said his primary consideration had 
been whether the bill would benefit the public by reducing 
industrial strife and he had concluded that it would not.
He reiterated his May 25th appeal for temporary emergency 
legislation, pointing out that the request dealt with strikes 
against the government and not private employers covered in 
the Case bill. His specific objections to the bill included 
the formation of a new Mediation Board. He believed that the 
Conciliation Service had done a good job since its creation
b . Schwellenbach to the President, June 4, 1946, 
Truman Papers, OF 407-B, Truman Library.
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in 1913 and the new Mediation Board would not have affected 
the outcome of any of the recent major disputes if it had 
then been in existence.
Truman then went on to point out that the Case bill
itself confirmed the need for careful study from a long-range
viewpoint; it demonstrated the necessity of "painstaking 
and exhaustive consideration" before drafting permanent 
legislation, "H.R. 4908 strikes at symptoms and ignores 
underlying causes," he said. The issues must be considered 
against the broad background "of inflationary pressures, of 
problems of full employment, of economic security" and only 
then would such legislation be workable.^ That same day the 
House of Representatives sustained his veto by a vote of 
255 to 135 or five votes less than the two-thirds necessary 
to override.
While Congress was unsuccessful in this major drive 
of 1946 to check union power by amending the national labor 
policy, it was successful in halting some of the specific 
abuses. In April of 1946 Congress passed, and Truman signed, 
the Lea Act or "Anti-Petrillo Act," aimed at curbing 
feather-bedding practices in the musicians' union. The law
set up criminal penalties for compelling or coercing radio
r 4Harry S. Truman, Veto Message to House of 
Representatives, June 11, 1946, Truman Papers, OF 407-B, 
Truman Library.
^^Congressional Record, 79 Cong., 1 Sess. (1945- 
1946), XCII, bbfH;
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broadcasters to hire more employees than needed or to pay 
for services not actually rendered such as rebroadcasting a 
tape recording. And in July of 19^6, Congress passed the 
Hobbs Anti-Racketeering Act which had been a clause in the 
vanquished Case bill. This.measure amended the 193^ law, 
making it a criminal offense to delay or interfere with the 
flow of interstate commerce by extortion. It was directed 
at the Teamsters Union practice of compelling the hiring of 
union drivers or paying to the union the equivalent of a 
union driver's wage in addition to the regular operator's pay. 
President Truman signed the Hobbs bill, stating that when he 
vetoed the Case proposal on June 11 he was in "full accord 
with the objectives of that provision of the Case bill."
At the same time during 19^6 the drive to curb unions was 
gathering momentum in the state governments.
The congressional elections of 19^6 resulted in a 
sharp swing to the right and the election of several 
conservatives. John L. Lewis had stepped into the national 
spotlight again by threatening a new coal strike because the 
government, he maintained, had violated the welfare fund 
agreement reached the previous May. This new threat came just 
before the elections were held and, in Truman's opinion, 
helped produce the conservative results. President Truman
5 % a r r y  S. Truman, Message to Congress, July 3, 19^6, 
Secretary Schwellenbach Pile (House Bills, Misc.), Record 
Group 174, National Archives.
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believed that Lewis deliberately threatened a strike at this 
Inopportune time In order to bring about a "turnover" In 
Congress, but his plan backfired. Instead of a sympathetic 
Congress, Lewis faced a "reactionary-controlled group" which 
passed the Taft-Hartley Act.
When the miners struck on November 21, In defiance 
of Judge Goldsborough's Injunction, It was suggested that a 
special session of Congress be called to deal with the 
situation. But the Administration decided to fight It out In 
the courts. In an editorial survey of 225 newspapers on this 
question, the Government Information Service evaluated public 
opinion as being against the special session. The Service 
concluded that editors felt that any change In labor laws 
should be made by the newly-elected Congress because the ' 
electorate failed to give the 79th Congress a vote of 
confidence "mainly for Its lack of foresightedness In labor 
matters and Its willingness to allow labor unions to escape 
responsibility on a par with management. A December 
survey made by the Government Information Service Indicated 
an Increasing desire among editors for the next Congress 
not only to restrict the miners' power to "paralyze our 
economy again, but also to prevent the excessive use of power
^^Truman, Memoirs, I, 505.
5®"Edltorlal Reaction to Current Issues; Bituminous 
Coal Crisis," Division of Press Intelligence, Government 
Information Service, November 25, 1946, Truman Papers,
OF 4G7j Truman Library.
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by any labor group." The new Congress, these editors felt, 
would take away labor's "unwarranted gains" made under the 
New Deal, and most of them blamed the "despotic ambitions" 
of John L. Lewis for this threat to organized l a b o r . O n e  
commentator wrote that "a veritable typhoon of public 
opinion" was removing control of the situation from the 
moderates. , "Senators and Congressmen are hearing from the 
country," he warned, and what they heard was an "upsurge 
of public feeling" sweeping across the country against 
unions. "The stampede Is on," he concluded, "and there Is 
little that labor, either the AF of L or CIO, can do to halt
I t ."60
When the 80th Congress met In January, 19^7,
President Truman presented It with a labor legislation program 
In his State of the Union Message. He asked Congress to 
work on five major domestic policies and first on his list 
was labor-management relations. In this passage he dealt at 
length with the Issue of labor disputes, emphasizing that 
much of the problem consisted of price Increases which had 
swept away the value of wage Increases. Although the past 
year had been marred by Industrial strife, he did not want 
Congress to pass "punitive legislation" In order to punish a
^^Ibld., December 7, 1946.
^^"Interpreting the Labor News," Robert MalslI 
Associates, New York, Bulletin #10, December 11, 1946,
Truman Papers, OP 407, Truman Library.
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few obstinate labor leaders "under the stress of emotion." 
Rather, the nation should continue the national policy 
established by the Wagner Act and provide additional 
legislation to correct certain abuses.
Truman's attempt to circumvent drastic legislation 
consisted of a four-point program to reduce Industrial 
strife. Point one called for curtailing Improper union 
practices such as jurisdictional disputes Involving both 
representation and work tasks, secondary boycotts In pursuit 
of unjustifiable objectives, and use of economic force to 
decide Interpretation of existing contracts. The second 
point asked for expansion of the Department of Labor to 
provide additional facilities In assisting collective 
bargaining; facilities consisting of Integrated governmental 
machinery for mediation and voluntary arbitration. Point 
three requested social legislation to alleviate the causes 
of labor Insecurity, such as broader social security 
coverage, better housing, a higher minimum wage and a compre­
hensive national health program. Finally, he called for his 
often requested study committee. He proposed a joint 
committee consisting of twenty members, twelve of whom 
Congress would choose from both Democrats and Republicans In 
the House and Senate, and eight representing labor, management 
and the public to be chosen by the President. This 
commission should study and make recommendations not later 
than March 15, 19^7, upon three major problems: nationwide
56
strikes in vital industries, the best procedures for carrying 
out collective bargaining, and the underlying causes of 
labor-management disputes.
But this program proved much too moderate for the 
80th Congress. As a result of the 1$46 elections in which 
industrial strife was a key issue, the Republicans controlled 
both houses of Congress for the first time since 1931. Only 
34,000,000 people voted in these elections and a light vote 
is believed to favor the Republican party in recent years. 
Truman later told labor that it got what it deserved by 
staying away from the polls in 1946. Many Republicans 
looked upon this victory as an opportunity to reverse much of 
the New Deal social legislation and one of their first 
objectives would be the national labor policy, a keystone 
in the New Deal program. The. post-war waves of strikes 
which inflamed public opinion, and especially the seemingly 
senseless and arbitrary actions of a few labor leaders gave 
this new Congress the public fulcrum to carry out a program 
of curtailing union power. With apparently overwhelming 
support from the nation the new Congress proceeded to dredge 
up old restrictive labor bills, give them new furbishings 
and combine them into an omnibus measure that represented a 
new tangent in federal labor legislation. By 1947 both
^Harry S. Truman, State of the Union Message to 
Congress, January 6, 1947, Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
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Congress and the country were ready to draw up a new balance 
In labor-management power as a result of what appeared to be 
a flagrant abuse of power by organized labor. This time a 
Democratic administration would find Itself powerless to 
halt a campaign directed against Its urban constituency.
CHAPTER III
THE EIGHTIETH CONGRESS REVERSES A NEW DEAL POLICY
When the 8oth Congress met in January, 19^7, there 
was little doubt that some sort of legislation dealing with 
the national labor policy would be enacted. A campaign to 
amend the Wagner Act had been building in intensity since 
the activities of the Smith Committee in 1939. In addition, 
the big majorities given to the Case bill by the previous • 
Congress, and the "mandate from the people" received in the 
1946 elections, assured action in this area. Then, too, the 
antilabor drive in the states reached its peak in 19^7 when
some thirty states restricted the rights of organized labor.
One authority observed that "this tremendous outpouring of 
antiunion legislation in the states went hand-in-hand with 
the legislative drive in Washington" by the 8oth Congress.^ 
Also, the fact that President Truman gave primary consideration 
to labor legislation in his State of the Union Message 
further emphasized its importance to Congress.




That the Administration was expecting changes which
would be more drastic than Truman's proposals is indicated in
an intra-departmental memorandum. Before the 8oth Congress
met, Paul Herzog, Chairman of the NLRB, drew up a list of
probable changes that Congress would make in its attempt to
"equalize" the Wagner Act. Herzog's predicted changes were:
separation of Judicial and prosecutory functions of the
NLRB;'deprive supervisors of NLRB rights; confer the right
on employers to petition for an election in some "one-union"
cases; expand employers' right to "free speech"; list unfair
practices of unions; increase the reviewability of NLRB
decisions in the courts and; penalize employees for "illegal" 
2strikes --a prediction that was amazingly accurate, being 
inadequate only in its scope.
Professor Henry Steele Commager forecast that this 
first session of the 80th Congress would, almost without 
doubt, pass some bill to curb labor's power.^ Raymond Moley, 
in contemplating the situation, could not see any hope for 
real cooperation between the Administration and Congress. 
Although the Administration seemed unaware that the country 
faced a labor problem, Moley observed, the public was 
aware of it and did not want "to go through another year like
pDavid A. Morse to Secretary Schwellenbach, 
Memorandum, November l4, 1946, Secretary Schwellenbach File 
(Legislation, 1946), Record Group 174, National Archives.
^Henry Steele Commager, "A Turning Point for Labor," 
Senior Scholastic, L (May 12, 1947), J.
6o
ig46.'' The country expected Congress to provide effective 
reforms, he said, and unless the Administration woke up to 
this fact the remedies might be "overdrastic. The 
Congressional Digest reported early in 19^7 that labor- 
management relations were providing the "most lively domestic 
drama of the day" and that the labor question made front­
page news almost daily in the nation's newspapers. This 
report added that among congressional committees, the two 
labor committees were drawing the largest public crowds 
for their h e a r i n g s . ^ Throughout the country the atmosphere 
was charged with an air of expectancy that at last Congress 
would "put labor in its place.".
This public reaction intensified a similar feeling 
in Congress. When describing the congressional atmosphere 
later. Representative John McCormack, Democrat from 
Massachusetts, claimed that it was so "intense" that labor 
legislation could not receive rational consideration.^ 
Senator Wayne Morse, Republican from Oregon, echoed this 
sentiment, saying that in 19^7 Congress "yielded to public 
heat, not to public reason." The country was mad at labor's 
"excesses" and as a result, was not thinking clearly on
^Raymond Moley, "Suggestions for a Labor Program," 
Newsweek, XXIX (February 10, 19^7), 100.
^Congressional Digest, XXVI (March, 1947), 69.
xcv, 51347
^Congressional Record, 8l Cong., 1 Sess., 1949,
6i
7labor legislation, Morse claimed. When Secretary of Labor 
Tobin charged during Senate Labor Committee hearings in the 
8lst Congress, that the Taft-Hartley Act was passed in "a 
period of great emotional stress," Senator Robert A. Taft, 
Republican from Ohio and co-author of the bill, denied it. 
Compared to the emotion aroused by the Case bill and the 
President's labor draft proposal, Taft countered, the Taft- 
Hartley Act was passed "with the greatest care and 
consideration" of any legislation of a Congress he had ever
O
served in. Despite this protest, all evidence indicates
that the Taft-Hartley Act was passed at a time when the
nation was fully aroused against organized labor. Only with
an overwhelming public demand could a Republican Congress
carry a majority of Democrats against a Democratic
Administration and drastically amend, for the first and to
date only time, an established New Deal policy.
In the first day's session of the 80th Congress
seventeen bills dealing with national labor policy were
introduced in the House of Representatives. By mid-March
there were over 65 such bills introducted in Congress and
gthey were still coming in. Altogether the two congressional
Tfbid., 7430.
^Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 8l 
Cong., 1 Sess., 1949, Hearings, Part II, February 2, 1§49,
259.
9john A. Fitch, "The New Congress and the Unions," 
Survey Graphic, XXXVI (1947), 231.
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labor committees had over one hundred bills to consider.
These two committees were chaired by Fred A. Hartley, Jr., 
Republican from New Jersey, and Senator Robert A. Taft.
Taft had first been elected to the United States Senate in 
1938. The son of a former President, Taft personified the 
Republican party of. the post-war period, capping his political 
career by being designated "Mr. Republican" by the nation.
When a Republican majority was returned to the United States 
Congress in 19^6 he was convinced that "the popular mandate 
was to cast out a great many chapters of the New Deal, if 
not the whole book."^^ As chairman of the Republican Policy 
Committee he was now in a position to do just that. Expanding 
and cultivating the already growing alliance of Republicans 
and conservative southern Democrats who opposed many of the 
New Deal policies, he was able to create the "masterwork 
of his life," the Taft-Hartley Act.^^
One of his biographers, William S. White, was a 
reporter who covered the congressional debates on the Taft- 
Hartley Act and thus saw Taft "nearly every day." White is 
convinced that Taft's purpose in fashioning the Act was not 
to hurt labor, but stemmed from the sincere conviction that 
the rank and file of laboring men were in the grip of labor




"bosses." "He never to my knowledge said a word or .took an
action that indicated any contempt or under-appreciation for
1 Plabor/' reports White. Taft's views on labor legislation 
were his own, gathered without any "apparent deep bias,"
White says, and any employer was very mistaken if he "thought 
that in Taft he was dealing with a captive." ^ However, as 
will be shown later, Taft admitted that his bill contained 
many proposals desired by employers.
When the Republicans organized in Congress in 19^1, 
Taft had a choice of being the chairman of either the Finance 
or Labor and Public Welfare committees as he was the ranking 
Republican member on both. He chose the Labor committee 
assignment to the disappointment of Senator George Aiken, 
Republican from Vermont, who wanted the position but "was 
considered much too liberal by the G. 0. P. leadership.
Taft's right-hand man on this committee was Joseph Ball, 
Republican from Minnesota, who "made no secret of his 
antipathy for many of the leaders and practices of organized 
l a b o r . "^5 There were thirteen Senators on this committee, 
eight of whom were Republicans. Other outstanding 
Republicans, besides Taft, Aiken and Ball, were Wayne Morse
12lbid., 102. 
l^Ibid., 70.
l^Bailey and Samuels, Congress at Work, 417.
15ibid., 419.
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and Irving Ives, Republican from New York. Morse and Ives 
had accumulated considerable labor relations experience In 
their states before coming to the Senate. Experlencewlse, 
these Republican Senators had served a total of twenty-five 
years on the Labor Committee, Taft himself contributing seven 
of these years. The Democratic members Included Elbert D. 
Thomas, Democrat from Utah, the ranking Democrat who was to 
lead the fight to repeal the Taft-Hartley Act In 1949. The 
five Democratic members had served a total of forty-nine 
years on this c o m m i t t e e . T h e  amount of experience of the 
Senators on this committee Is In marked contrast to the lack 
of such experience on the part of the members of the House 
Committee on Education and Labor.
On the other side of the Capitol, Taft's counterpart 
was Fred A. Hartley, Jr., Chairman of the House Committee on 
Education and Labor. Hartley had first been elected to the 
House of Representatives In 1928, prior to the advent of 
the New Deal. It Is paradoxical that Hartley sponsored one 
of the strictest antlunlon bills In United States history 
and yet at one time was heartily endorsed by a labor union 
In an election. One of the alms of the Smith Committee of 
1939-19^0 had been "to protect the craft unions against the 
overwhelming numerical superiority of the horizontal or
16These figures are from Mlllls and Brown, From the 
Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley, 374.
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Industrial u n i o n . I t  was felt by critics that the NLRB 
was pro-CIO during this period, so Hartley fought for 
amendments to the Wagner Act In 1939, the Smith Act, which 
would have revamped the NLRB. Hartley was the first
congressman to testify before the Smith Committee In favor
1 Rof these "AFL amendments." As a reward, William Green
Issued a letter to the union locals In the Tenth Congressional
District of New Jersey prior to the 19^0 elections stating
that by his votes and general attitude Hartley had "proven
himself to be an outstanding friend of labor." Green
requested that AF of L members therefore support him In this
e l e c t i o n . T h e  CIO on the other hand opposed Hartley and In
the 1946 election fought him "bitterly" but he was elected
by a "comfortable m a r g i n . H a r t l e y  was to serve In Congress
only through the creation of his "masterpiece," having decided
before the sessions of the 80th Congress to retire from 
21Congress.
When the House of Representatives was organized,
^^Fred A. Hartley, Jr., Our New National Labor 
Policy (New York: ' Funk and Wagnalls, 1948), I5I
l^ibid., 13-14.
^^Wllllam Green to City Central Bodies and Local 
Labor Unions of the Tenth Congressional District of New 
Jersey, April 26, 1940, Congressional Record, 80 Cong.,
1 Sess., 1947, XCIII, 3432.
^̂ Congressional Digest, XXVI (March, 1947), 77.
^^Hartley, Our New National Labor Policy, I7I.
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Richard Welch, Republican from California and ranking 
Republican member of the Labor Committee, was persuaded to 
take the chairmanship of the Committee on Public Lands since
22he "had seldom seen eye to eye with his fellow party members." 
This gave Hartley the chairmanship. Hartley's appointment 
induced Mrs. Mary Norton from New Jersey, the ranking 
Democrat and former Chairman, to resign from the committee.
Mrs. Norton resigned because she had "no respect for the 
present chairman" and thus could not serve with him. In the 
ten years she had served as Chairman of the House I,abor 
Committee, Hartley had attended "exactly six meetings" and 
yet talked "about labor as if he knew something about i t .
Hartley did not refute this charge, but decided that 
Mrs. Norton's resignation was due to her being "a bad 
loser.
The House Committee was composed of fifteen 
Republicans and ten Democrats. Included were two newcomers 
to Congress, Richard M. Nixon, Republican from California, 
and John F. Kennedy, Democrat from Massachusetts. The House 
committee had much less experience in labor matters than its 
Senate counterpart. Ten of the fifteen Republicans had no 
prior service, and the remaining five had a total of only
^^Bailey and Samuel, Congress at Work, 4l7.
^^Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 1' Sess., 194y,
XCIII, 3432.
^^Hartley, Our New National Labor Policy, 26,
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twenty years since the enactment of the Wagner Act. Hartley 
accounted for over ten of these years, and according to 
Mrs. Norton, did not pick up too much experience In.that time. 
Four of the Democrats had not seen prior service on the 
Labor Committee but the other six had acquired thirty years
25experience since 1935-
Beginning February 5 and ending on March I5, the 
House Committee on Education and Labor held hearings for six 
weeks on various bills to amend the Wagner Act. During this 
period the committee accumulated five volumes of testimony. 
Including letters and statements, -from over I30 witnesses. 
Both the majority and minority members agreed that this 
aspect of the committee's work was ably conducted; a good 
representation of public and private viewpoints was made.
The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare also held 
hearings for six weeks from January 23 to March 8 on the 
labor bills Introduced In the Senate. This committee 
accumulated four volumes of testimony. Including letters and 
statements, from almost 100 witnesses. Senator Morse 
complimented the Senate committee on Its fine work, saying 
he was "deeply moved" by the "fine spirit that characterized 
all of the deliberations."^^
^^Mlllls and Brown, From the Wagner Act to Taft- 
Hartley, 365-6 .
^^Ibld., 367.
^^Congressional Record, 00 Cong., 1 Sess., 1947,
XCIII, 3614.
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Much of the testimony of witnesses who favored 
amending the Wagner Act was directed toward criticisms of 
the NLRB In regard to Its administration and Interpretation 
of the Act. Chairman Paul Herzog attempted to answer these 
charges on,behalf of the Board before both the Senate and 
House committees. In testifying before the Senate committee 
on March 6, Herzog declared that the policy the Board had 
been administering for twelve years was a "wise one" and any 
changes In that fundamental policy would bring "unhappy 
consequences." The critics of the Act or Its administration 
were In many cases those who had lost power under the Wagner 
Act because of the resulting growth of collective bargaining 
and thus, said Herzog, their testimony should be assessed 
accordingly. He pointed to the prodigious growth of union 
membership under the Act, from 4,000,000 to 15,000,000, 
saying that while It was not the function of the Board to 
help union organization, one of the A c t ’s purposes was to 
make It "less hazardous" for workers to Join unions. He 
pithily added that the Board assumed that Congress looked 
upon the resulting growth as a desirable trend.. He pointed 
out that under the Wagner Act work stoppages caused by 
organizational strikes had dropped from about 6o per cent 
In 1937 to around 8 per cent In 1946. The postwar waves of 
strikes were caused by wage disputes fought between "strong 
unions and strong employers." The present need, Herzog 
declared, was not to "turn the clock back" by amending the
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basic policy, but to encourage industry and labor "to sit 
down and reason together." And he pointedly called attention 
to the fact that the efficacy of the Act had never been 
tried in normal times; the creation of the Act was followed 
by five years of "heated litigation" and then the abnormal 
six years of war and reconversion.
Herzog then explained why the Board opposed certain 
changes under consideration by the committee. The Board 
opposed excluding supervisors from the Act because under a 
broad interpretation an employer could convert almost all 
employees into "supervisors." The NLRB doubted the value of 
making it an unfair labor practice for unions to refuse to 
bargain because this would merely impose an obligation "to 
perform the very function they were created to perform."
The Board also opposed the amendment providing penalties for 
violation of a no-strike, no-lockout pledge during a 
"cooling-off" period because it realized from experience how 
difficult it could be to interpret this since employers 
frequently locked out employees and claimed a strike was in 
progress, and vice versa. Splitting up the Board's 
administrative powers by creating an "Assistant Attorney 
General" was opposed because good administration could be 
accomplished best by a single agency; and it did not favor 
changes in the Board's proceedings of requiring Board 
findings to be supported "by the weight of evidence" since 
this would be contrary to the basic principle of administrative
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law which allows the specialist to appraise evidence and 
determine facts with discretion. He concluded the Board's 
testimony by saying that, if these substantive and procedural 
changes were made, the result, at best, would be years of 
court litigation and uncertainty and, at worst, workers 
would be so resentful that "work stoppages would sweep the
28country." Herzog gave the same testimony before the House 
committee, but added that the Board would not resist 
"attempts to eliminate abuses." The problem with the House 
proposals, he said, was that "their impact falls alike upon
OQthe just and the unjust."
The only other major administrative official that 
testified before these committees was Secretary of Labor 
Lewis Schwellenbach. In reviewing the industrial strife of 
the reconversion period, Schwellenbach emphasized that 
conditions had changed since V-J Day. He maintained that 
the postwar strife was caused by the fear of workers in 
regard to loss of jobs and pay cuts, and that they were tired 
from long work weeks of the war period. On the other side 
employers wanted price relief and also some employers were
pQ Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
80 Cong., 1 Sess., 1947, Hearings, Statement of NLRB by Paul 
Herzog, March 6, 194-7, Truman Papers, OP 407-B, Truman 
Library.
. ^ ^ o u s e  of Representatives, Committee on Education 
and Labor, 80 Cong., 1 Sess., 1947, Hearings, Statement of 
NLRB by Paul Herzog, March 11, 1947, Truman Papers, OF 407-B, 
Truman Library.
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using the reconversion conditions in an attempt to destroy 
the effectiveness of unions. When these two forces met, 
strife resulted. Both sides, he said, had forgotten the 
art of collective bargaining during the war which intensified 
the problem. But there was a different attitude on the part 
of both sides now, and to prove this, 1946 saw American 
production reach the highest point of any peacetime year.
In regard to specific proposals under consideration, 
Schwellenbach had slightly mixed views. The Secretary 
explained the uselessness of making unions subject to suit. 
Since the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
there were only thirteen states in which an unincorporated 
association could not be sued and enacting such a provision 
would be futile. Schwellenbach also opposed the amendments 
which would restrict union security provisions. The 
check-off system had been in existence for a long time and 
he could see nothing "immoral" about it. He reminded the 
committee members that as of April, 194?, 77 per cent of 
all organized workers had contracts which contained union 
security provisions. The figures he gave were: closed
shop, 30 per cent; maintenance of membership, 29 per cent; 
union shop, 15 per cent; and preferential hiring, 3 per cent. 
If Congress were to outlaw such provisions, he warned, the 
result would be "industrial chaos." He emphasized that many 
employers, as well as employees, would object to this move
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as they had discovered that when they granted such concessions 
"the Industrial stability which resulted was to their 
advantage," He said that with respect to secondary 
boycotts. Congress was going "far beyond the President's 
recommendation." But In regard to banning Industry-wide 
bargaining, Schwellenbach had reservations. His experience 
had shown that this type of bargaining was desirable In some 
cases and undesirable In others. He pointed out that this 
problem was complicated by the fact that many local union 
committees were untrained and sometimes dominated by 
radicals In contrast to their International organizations, 
so the answer to this had to be taken from each situation.
Schwellenbach later referred to the bans on union
security provisions as opening "a veritable Pandora's box of
labor troubles" when taken In connection with the other
71restrictive measures proposed. Also, he later reiterated 
his views against making labor unions subject to suit In 
federal courts. Since they were already liable for violation 
of contract In most state courts, this would set them apart 
from all other organizations as there was no limit to the
S^House of Representatives, Committee on Education 
and Labor, 80 Cong., 1 Sess., 1947, Hearings, Statement of 
L. B. Schwellenbach, March 11, 1947, Truman Papers, OF 15, 
Truman Library.
34p. B. Schwellenbach, Address to the National Textile 
Seminar, Shawnee-on-Delaware, Pennsylvania, May 15, 1947, 
Schwellenbach Papers, Library of Congress.
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amount In controversy or no diversity of citizenship in
h?such private suits as proposed by Congress. Since 
Schwellenbach was a federal judge from 19^0 to 194$, before 
becoming Secretary of Labor, his opinion in regard to 
federal law should have carried weight.
Although the House committee finished its hearings 
last, it was the first to produce a bill in Congress. Hartley 
had maintained that he was not in a race with the Senate 
committee to see who could devise the first measure and that 
he had talked the situation over with Taft. But soon after 
the House hearings began. Hartley decided that the final 
proposal would have to be written in conference. Therefore 
it would strengthen Taft's hand at that time if he had 
available a House bill with "sterner provisions." Taft 
himself admitted that the two houses worked together "to 
some extent" but that the connection was "a loose one." 
Hartley's first major decision in regard to producing labor 
legislation was to work out an omnibus bill and then "put the 
entire weight of the Republican Party and the Southern 
Democrats behind it." The Senate committee was considering
B. Schwellenbach, Address at the University of 
California, March, 194%, Schwellenbach Papers, Library of 
Congress.
33"Labor Bill Monitor," United States News and World 
Report, XXII (February l4, 194%), b5.
•^^obert A. Taft, Foreword to Hartley, Our New 
National Labor Policy, X I .
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a series of bills at this time. When the House thus forced 
the omnibus approach. Hartley felt it "made its greatest 
single contribution to the rapidly developing labor 
legislation.
Hartley's committee used a unique method of writing 
his bill, H.R. 3020. The bill was being written before 
hearings were concluded, strongly suggesting that the ideas 
were already germinated and the usual collection of evidence 
was not necessary. This serious charge was brought by 
Representative Arthur G. Klein, Democrat from New York, who 
stated that the bill was being written before the hearings 
b e g a n . S u p p o r t  for this accusation can be found from 
Hartley himself. Although this is not conclusive proof, on 
January 29, a week before the House hearings commenced. 
Hartley was reported to have said that his committee would 
have an omnibus bill ready by March I5 and the issues he
37said the committee would handle were contained in his bill.
The House Minority Report complained that H.R. 3020 
was not a committee bill since no general committee meetings 
were held to consider it. It was introduced on the floor of 
the House on April 10, the same day the minority members were
■^^Hartley, Our New National Labor Policy, 35.
 ̂ Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 1 Sess., 1947,
xciii, 3420.
^^New York Times, January 30, 1947.
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first given a copy of it with a request to have their report
O
ready April 12. John Lesinski, the ranking minority member, 
said the bill was presented to the minority members on 
Thursday morning, April 10. The full committee convened 
Thursday and Friday afternoons to sit through the reading of 
the bill and met on Saturday afternoon to vote to report out 
the measure. The minority then had to file its report that 
n i g h t . R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  John Kennedy charged that the 
committee spent one day and covered a 67-page bill, to which 
Graham A,. Barden, Democrat from North Carolina, replied 
"If you can do a job in one day why work the second?
In the House debates, the reproach was also made 
that the committee itself did not write the bill. While 
committees and individual congressmen have services available 
for writing their bills and seldom personally draw up their 
own legislation, this assistance usually takes the form of 
putting into technical and legal language the ideas that the 
Congressman wishes to enact. Philip Philbin, Democrat from 
Massachusetts, stated that it had been "conclusively shown 
that this punitive legislation" was the brainchild of the
nOHouse of Representatives Committee on Education 
and Labor, 80 Cong., 1 Sess., 1947, Labor-Management Relations 
Act, 1947, Report No. 243, April 11, 1947.
^^Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 1 Sess., 1947,
XCIII, 3427.
^°Ibid., 81 Cong., 1 Sess., 1949, XCV, 5144.
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National Association of Manufacturers and big business.
Adolph Sabath, Democrat from Illinois, accused the "Chamber
of Commerce, the National Association of Manufacturers, and
their lesser but even more virulent satellites" of writing
-the bill and "ramming it through" the House. Sabath warned
the Republicans that the interests who were forcing them to
adopt H.R. 3020 would not be able to spend enough money to
reelect them because their money could not buy the American 
42people.
Representative Klein also charged that the bill was 
written with the help of industry representatives and lawyers 
from the National Association of Manufacturers and the United 
States Chamber of Commerce. Some of the most valuable 
assistance, he insisted, came from William Ingles who 
reported a yearly salary of $24,000 as a lobbyist for Allis- 
Chalmers, Fruehauf Trailer, J. I. Case, the Falk Corporation, 
and Inland Steel. Other aid came from Theodore Iserman who 
"put aside his rich Chrysler law practice for two weeks" to 
help the committee. Finally, another "volunteer in the 
antilabor cause" was Gerald Morgan who had a law office in
ilWashington with large corporations for clients. Adam 
Clayton Powell, Jr., Democrat from New York, said the bill
^^Ibid., 80 Cong., 1 Sess., 1947, XCIII, 6391.
^% b i d ., 6388.
43lbid., 3421.
77
"was written on the fifth floor of the Old House Office 
Building" by "over a score of corporation lawyers . . . paid 
by big business. To substantiate these Indictments, ,
John Blatnlk, Democrat from Minnesota, made a polnt-by-polnt 
comparison between H.R. 3020 and the 1946 legislative 
recommendations of the NAM which were quite similar. Blatnlk 
stated that he received, and Intimated that all congressmen 
received, a leather-bound booklet from the NAM early In the 
session. Its title was Now Let's Build America, and contained 
the NAM'-S 1946 legislative proposals to Congress from which 
he drew his c o m p a r i s o n . ^5 The NAM later denied these charges 
by Issuing a statement "Who Wrote the Taft-Hartley Bill?", on 
January 13^ 1948.^^
In amazingly candid testimony, Gerald Morgan, 
referred to by Klein, later revealed how the Taft-Hartley Act 
was written In the committees. Morgan had been a legislative 
counsel for the House from 1935 to 19^5 and, according to 
his statement, had a "major part" In drafting the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, the 1940 Smith amendments to the Wagner Act, 
the War Labor Disputes Act, and the Case bill. Early In 19^7 
Morgan was requested by Chairman Hartley to serve as a 
special counsel to the majority members of the Committee on
^̂ Ibld., 3525. 
45ibld., 3541-2.
^^Mlllls and Brown, From the Wagner Act to Taft- 
Hartley, f.n., pp. 37O-I.
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Education and Labor. Previously he had been approached by 
Charles Halleck, Republican from Indiana, who talked to him 
"at some length" on this same matter and suggested that he 
start to work on a proposed draft of labor legislation. 
Halleck, as mentioned previously, was the Majority Leader 
In the House but was not even on the Labor Committee.
Following this suggestion Morgan took the defeated 
Smith amendments of 1940 and the Case bill, combined them, 
and threw In "a number of additional Ideas that Mr. Halleck 
thought would be appropriate." This working draft was given 
to Hartley who called a series of conferences of a fev; 
congressmen to discuss the policy Issues contained In Morgan's 
proposal and "substantially revised" his document. Hartley 
then hired Morgan to continue his work. Morgan submitted a 
second draft and the majority members of the committee met 
with him dally for three weeks. Out of these discussions 
emerged a "tentative draft of a bill" embodying policy 
decisions made by these congressmen. The draft was then 
submitted to the Republican Steering Committee for Its 
consideration and later read to the full Labor Committee.
The Labor Committee then added various amendments and It was 
Introduced In the House.
During this time Morgan attended every meeting on 
the bill, working on.lt "morning, noon, and night." To aid 
him In this work, Morgan called upon the technical assistance 
of two other lawyers. One was.Gerard Reilly, a former
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member of the NLRB and who incidentally was greatly resented 
by the AF of L and CIO. At that time Reilly was serving as 
special counsel to the Senate Labor Committee which was 
working on the Taft bill. The second man was Theodore Iserman, 
a labor law attorney who had written a book in 1946 entitled 
The Wagner Act and Industrial Peace. According to Morgan's 
testimony the "technical assistance" these two men rendered 
concerned NLRB policies, practices, and decisions, and court 
decisions.
Morgan stated that Hartley originally asked him to ■ 
go on the professional staff but that he had refused because 
he would not give up his regular- practice. When he was hired, 
and during the period of his work, Morgan received no 
compensation. Then "several months" after the passage of 
the Act, "through the good offices of Mr. Halleck," Morgan 
was paid $7,500 by the Republican National Committee for his 
services. Morgan had previously declared that he was revealing 
all this because of the misinformation concerning who wrote 
the Taft-Hartley Act and that he had received permission from 
Hartley and Halleck to do so. When asked if he felt he had 
worked for the Republican National Committee or if the 
majority committee members had been his clients, he replied 
that he had been working for the committee. But he could not 
explain why he had asked Hartley and Halleck to disregard 
his lawyer's "ethical seal of secrecy" in giving this 
testimony and not the Labor Committee members he had
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considered as his clients.
Morgan was asked if he had contacted any agents or
representatives of the NAM during his work on the Taft-Hartley
Act. He replied that he had spoken only to Raymond Smethurst,
the NAM counsel, about an antitrust provision but that
47particular section was not included in the final act.
Three days after these hearings Morgan submitted a letter to
the committee chairman. In this letter Morgan remembered
that he had talked to employer representatives while working
on the Hartley bill, although not on his own "responsibility."
This was done, he said, because he was requested to do so by
congressmen in connection with proposals these groups wanted
inserted into the law. He had merely consulted these
representatives to find out what they proposed in terms of
4ftthe requests they had made to individual congressmen.
This testimony was apparently designed to clear the 
NAM of any direct participation in writing the Taft-Hartley 
Act. However, the fact that there had been a profuse amount 
of publicity connecting the NAM with the writing of the bill 
and the NAM had subsequently sought to exonerate itself from 
blame, plus the consideration that this revelation came some 
two years later, suggests a guilty conscience. Also the
47House of Representatives Sub-Committee on Education 
and Labor, 8l Cong., 1 Sess., 19^9, Hearings (H.R. 2032, 
Lesinski bill), March l8, 1$49, pp. II60-78.
48ibid., March 21, 1949, p. II85.
81
business connections of these lawyers leads to the conclusion 
that they would not be prone to insert anything into the 
Act which the NAM opposed. Ingles' and Iserman's lobbyist 
connections, and Morgan's lucrative corporation law practice 
were pointed out by Democratic congressmen. Gerard Reilly 
was serving as the legislative representative for General 
Motors, General Electric, and the printing industry in 19^9.^^ 
One must arrive at the inescapable conclusion that, in the 
case of the Taft-Hartley Act, the minds of the Republican 
congressmen and the NAM were certainly running in the same 
channels in regard to restrictive labor legislation.
Chairman Hartley introduced the 67-page measure on
April 10. Five days later, when general debate commenced, the
House voted to limit debate to a total of six hours with the
bill being left open for amendment on the floor. Hartley
opened the discussion by declaring that his committee had
made "the most exhaustive study" and held the most complete
hearings on this complicated matter that had ever been held
50by any Labor Committee in the history of Congress.^ With 
the imposed limitation, debate on such a long and complicated 
measure was much too brief. The majority members hinged 
their defense of the bill on two major factors--this proposal 
was a "labor bill of rights" designed to help the individual
49lbid., 1172.
^^Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 1 Sess., 19^7,
XCIII, 3423.
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worker and to "equalize" the Wagner Act and, they had 
received a "mandate from the people" demanding such legis­
lation. The minority argument was basically that this one­
sided bill was written by the NAM and that the 1946 election 
results stemmed from public dissatisfaction over inflation, 
housing, and other similar issues. In reading these brief 
debates, they leave the impression that from the beginning 
the majority was quite confident of victory and the minority 
quite certain of defeat.
The final vote was taken April 17 and the Hartley
bill passed by the tremendous majority of 308 to 107--nearly
3 to 1. A majority of 93 Democrats joined the Republicans In
voting for the bill with only 84 against the proposal. Of
these 93 Democrats, all but 11 came from the South or
Southwest. Only 22 Republicans and 1 American Labor
congressman voted against it while 215 Republicans, or a
51majority of those voting, favored the measure. The 
New York Times reported the House as passing with "exultant 
shouts . . .  a bill embodying the sharpest restrictions on 
labor unions" that had ever been attempted.
On the same day, April 17, Senator Taft introduced 
his committee's bill, S. 1126, in the Senate. The technical 
work on the Senate bill had been performed by its counsel
5̂ Ibid., 3670-1.
6^New York Times, April 18, 1947.
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Thomas Shroyer who had formerly served with the NLRB in
Taft's home city of Cincinnati. Shroyer was assisted by
Gerard Reilly. When Reilly was appointed special counsel for
the Senate Labor Committee, he temporarily gave up cases and
retainers from corporations subject to the Wagner Act but
resumed his lobbying activities soon after the passage of
the Taft-Hartley Act. Shroyer also received some assistance
from Robert N. Denham, an NLRB trial examiner whose anti-
Wagner views were well known and of which more will be said
later. Denham testified that he had given Senator
Forest C. Donnell, Democrat from Missouri, a memorandum of
desired Wagner Act changes, the "major portion" of which
HRappeared in the Taft-Hartley Act.^^ However, two years later 
Shroyer denied using the memorandum in preparing the Taft 
bill, saying that he had received it after the committee 
bill was substantially in its final form.
One of the major problems the Senate committee 
faced was the decision of whether to use the omnibus approach 
as the House was doing or to report separate bills. Taft 
favored the omnibus plan and on April 12 the G.G.P. Senate 
Conference Committee approved this arrangement.^^ Senator
5-^Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 8o 
Cong., 1 Sess., 19^7, Hearings (Confirmation of Nominees for 
NLRB), July 23, 1947, p. 5.
^^House of Representatives Sub-Committee on Education 
and Labor, 8l Cong., 1 Sess., 19^9, Hearings (H.R. 2032),
Part III, February 9, 1949, pp. 1124-5.
55Bailey and Samuel, Congress at Work, 426.
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Morse, who opposed this, revealed what he considered to be 
the major reason for this decision. Morse said that during 
this conference there was a great deal of discussion . 
concerning a possible veto and It was decided that an omnibus 
bill would have a better opportunity of gaining support to 
override a veto,^ Taft himself was quoted as saying that 
he expected a veto and the Senate would sustain the veto.
If this occurred the Republicans could then place the 
responsibility on the President for failure to enact labor 
l e g i s l a t i o n . 57 During the course of Senate debate Morse 
offered a motion to recommit the bill to committee with 
Instructions to report four separate bills Instead. He 
argued that the Senate and House could then "pass those bills 
that can be passed," whereas an omnibus bill might be 
defeated because of certain objectionable f e a t u r e s .5®
Morse was more Interested In getting workable labor legis­
lation In this Instance than he was In the politics of the 
matter. However, his motion was defeated 35 to 59-^^
On April 17 Taft Introduced his 68-page bill and 
general debate began April 23- In contrast to the House 
debates, the Senate had no time limitation and discussion was
^^Congressional Record, 8o Cong., 1 Sess., 1$47, 
XCIII, 4147.
57Hew York Times, April 6, 1947.




on a much higher level. There were less personal exchanges, 
compared with those in the House, and the arguments followed 
more closely the real issues involved. The principle 
majority argument in the Senate revolved around the fact that 
the Wagner Act was an experiment and experience had indicated 
the necessity for certain changes. The minority answered with 
the claim that an effective labor relations program had been 
built up over the years and this bill would increase, not 
decrease, industrial conflict.
In contrast to House action, the minority in the 
Senate introduced a substitute measure. Senator James 
Murray, Democrat from Montana, introduced a bill on May 9 
which would have provided seven major amendments to the 
Wagner Act. His bill would: (1) give the President seizure
powers similar to those in the Smith-Connally Act when a 
strike endangered public safety, (2) strengthen the federal 
mediation and conciliation services, (3) make illegal 
secondary boycotts in furtherance of Jurisdictional disputes, 
(4) permit supervisory employees to organize if no rank and 
file workers were included, (5 ) provide industry-wide 
bargaining only on a voluntary basis, (6) allow employers to 
request an election when an unrecognized union or two 
competing unions claimed representation rights, and (7 ) appoint 
a Temporary,Joint Committee composed of six Senators, six 
Representatives and eight people representing labor, 
management and the public. This committee would study the
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labor problem and make a preliminary report to Congress by
January 8, 1948, and a final report by April 15, 1948, in
regard to further legislation. However, these provisions
were much too mild to suit the temper of the Senate and
Murray's proposal was defeated 73 to 19 on May 13. On the
same day, a final vote was taken on H.R. 3020 as amended by
the Senate. The Senate amendment to H.R. 3020 struck out
everything following the enacting clause of Hartley's bill
and inserted the provisions of S. 1126 in lieu thereof.
The Senate vote was 68 to 24 in favor--more than the two-
thirds majority necessary to override a veto. Twenty-one
Democrats voted for the bill and only three Republicans voted
against it. The New York Times reported that this Senate
action followed "three weeks of the greatest debate on
domestic affairs in the Eightieth Congress.
After this vote Taft moved to request a conference
with the House to work out a compromise bill. His motion was
agreed to and Senators Taft, Ball, Ives, Murray and Ellender
62were appointed to represent the Senate. The next day.
May 14, the House disagreed with the Senate amendment of 
H.R. 3020 and agreed to a conference. Representatives 
Hartley, Landis, Hoffman, Lesinski, and Barden were appointed
GOlbid., 5117.
^^New York Times, May l4, 1947.
^^Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 1 Sess., 1947, 
XCIII, 51131
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conferees for the House. The legal counsel that assisted 
this conference committee in drafting the compromise bill 
consisted of Gerald Morgan, Gerard Reilly, Thomas Shroyer, 
and Senator Ives' counsel, Dwyer Shugrue.
One of the primary concerns of the conference was 
the threat of a veto. Although President Truman had made no 
public statement in this regard while the Hartley and Taft 
bills were being debated, it was well understood that, 
politics permitting, his views concerning labor would not 
allow him to accept a bill that was too restrictive. Taft 
was aware of a veto possibility, and Hartley, referring to 
the conference work, said he knew they "had to write a final 
bill that would be enacted over a veto."^^ Part of the 
strategy to accomplish this was to create the general 
impression that the House bill was "tough" and "harsh" while 
the Senate measure was "fair" and "mild." This was part 
of Hartley's "master plan"--to make everyone, especially 
congressmen, believe that the harsher provisions of the 
Hartley bill were discarded in conference "in favor of the 
so-called milder provisions of Taft's bill." He complimented 
the press for the "excellent Job" it did in contrasting the
Gjibid., 5275.
^^House of Representatives Sub-Committee of Committee 
on Education and Labor, 8l Cong., 1 Sess., 1949, Hearings 
(H.R. 2032), Part II, March 18, 1949, p. II63.
f^Hartley. Our New National Labor Policy, 70
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two bills. He felt that the press contributed a great deal 
to the generally accepted view that the Senate measure was 
"weak, confused, and inadequate. Congressman Ray J. 
Madden, Democrat from Indiana, called attention to this in 
the House. Madden noted that "columns of misleading 
propaganda" were put out by newspapers and commentators to 
the effect that the conference bill was much "milder" than 
Hartley's bill in order "to confuse the Members of Congress 
and the p u b l i c . S e n a t o r  Taft denied this, saying that 
the Senate conferees had "conceded nothing . . .  of 
importance."^® However, inadvertently Taft had previously 
given weight to the argument that his bill was not "mild," 
when he was quoted as saying his bill was "not a milk- 
toast bill." At this time he emphasized that S. 1126 covered 
about three-fourths of the objectives "pressed on us very 
strenuously by employers."®^
Whether Hartley created his "master plan" before or 
after the accomplished, fact is immaterial. Hartley 
"deliberately put everything" he could into the House bill so 
he would "have something to concede and still get an adequate
®®lbid., 75. .
^^Congressional Record, 8o Cong., 1 Sess., 19^7, 
..Jill, 6385.
®®lbid., 6534.
^9"Back to McKinley," Nation, CLXIV (May 3, 1947),
507.
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70bill in the end." His method of getting "everything" 
possible into his bill was what Congressman Hartley termed 
"legislative psychology." This maneuver consists of inserting 
additional provisions in a measure that a congressman wants 
enacted that are "obviously undesirable, unworkable, or 
unconstitutional" which will draw the fire of the opposition. 
These obnoxious features are brought up for a vote, defeated, 
and the opposition is so relieved over this triumph that the 
amended measure can then be passed. This method was utilized 
by Hartley on H.R. 3020 by simply putting in several remedies 
for the same offense. The most offensive ones were stricken
out but in the end the bill contained the desired provisions
71and sufficient remedies to carry them out.' Hartley's 
"legislative psychology" also triumphed with.the 
congressional conference.
In comparing the major features of the two bills 
when they went to conference, a great similarity in goals can 
be noted. The House bill was "harsher" in listing forbidden 
union practices with respect to union members since the 
Senate bill had no such provisions. But both bills outlawed 
secondary boycotts. Jurisdictional strikes, the closed shop, 
and denied employee status under the law to supervisors. 
Hartley's measure also prohibited mass picketing, feather­
bedding and brought unions under the antitrust laws. The
T^New York Times, May 30, 19^7.
T^Hartley, Our New National Labor Policy, 67-8 .
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House bill prohibited industry-wide bargaining unless the 
employers were within 50 miles of each other while the Senate 
bill only made it an unfair practice for a union to compel 
choice of employer representative. Both bills removed the 
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service from the 
Department of Labor and created a new agency. The House 
bill limited economic strikes with a 75-day "cooling-off" 
period and a strike-vote requirement in contrast to the 
Senate bill requiring a 60-day notice of contract termi­
nation and banned strikes during the notice period. Both 
bills provided for government injunction in "National 
Emergency" strikes and the Hartley bill forbade strikes by 
government employees.
The House measure permitted welfare funds only when 
the union did not participate in administration and the 
Senate bill provided for Joint employee-employer admini­
stration. Both proposals opened the federal courts for 
damage suits against unions for unlawful concerted activities 
and violation of contract. Both the House and Senate would 
have denied bargaining rights to unions whose officers 
refused to sign a non-Communist affidavit. The House bill 
banned union political expenditures in national elections and 
required unions to submit annual reports of their finances 
to the Department of Labor. Hartley's bill increased NLRB 
membership and provided for two agencies with separate 
functions, while the Senate merely wanted to increase NLRB
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membership. The Senate bill permitted employees to file 
petitions for new union elections and employers to file 
petitions for union decertification elections. Finally, the 
Taft bill proposed a joint committee to study labor- 
management relations.
Thus Taft's proposal was "mild" only when compared 
to Hartley's bill. The major distinctions between the two 
bills were the NLRB changes, mass picketing and feather­
bedding, industry-wide bargaining, welfare funds, strike 
votes, government employee strikes, union political 
activities and finance reporting, union elections and the 
joint committee. With these differences,, the House bill was 
"harsher," but the Senate bill was certainly not a "milk- 
toast" measure.
The conference committee met for two weeks, from 
May 15 to May 29, and thrashed out their differences. The 
Taft-Hartley bill they reported to their respective chambers 
was reputed to be a victory on the part of the Senate 
managers.
The major changes the Taft-Hartley Act made in 
amending the Wagner Act are: (1) NLRB membership increased
from three to five and Board findings of fact have to be 
supported by "substantial" evidence; an independent General
T^An outstanding detailed analysis is made of both 
Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts by experts with much practical 
experience in Millis and Brown, From the Wagner Act to 
Taft-Hartley.
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Counsel was created who would assume the prosecutory 
functions of the Board, (2) the closed shop was outlawed-- 
the union shop was permitted on petition of 30 per cent of 
the workers and an ensuing election, (3) unfair labor 
practices--it was made unfair for unions to refuse to bargain, 
use an illegal secondary boycott, try to force an employer to 
bargain with a union other than the recognized bargaining 
agent, engage in Jurisdictional strikes in violation of 
Board rulings, require exorbitant initiation fees, force 
employers to pay for services not actually rendered, and 
protection of employer "free speech," (4) supervisors were 
excluded as employees under the Act, (5) a new independent 
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service was created to 
replace the United States Conciliation Service, (6) "National 
Emergencies"--when a threatened strike endangered a whole 
industry or a substantial portion thereof, in the 
President's opinion, he would appoint a board of inquiry to 
investigate and then direct the Attorney General to seek an 
injunction forbidding such strike. If a settlement was not 
reached within sixty days after this injunction, the board of 
inquiry would make another report and fifteen days after this 
report, the NLRB would hold an election on the employer's 
"last offer." If the final offer was rejected the injunction 
would be dissolved and the right to strike revived. This 
section thus set up the famous "80-day cooling-off period" 
for national emergency strikes, (7) welfare funds were
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outlawed except when jointly adrnini s'tered by labor and 
managementJ (8) unions were made suable in federal courts for 
violation of contract and made liable for acts of their 
agents, (9) unions were required to make annual financial 
reports to the Department of Labor and to their individual 
members, (10) the check-off was prohibited except on a 
voluntary basis, (11) union officials had to sign a non- 
Communist affidavit annually or their union forfeited its 
rights under the Act, (12) unions were forbidden to make 
expenditures or contributions in any national primary or 
general election, (13) federal government employees could 
not strike, (l4) employees could petition for a new union 
election and employers for a decertification election, and 
(15) a joint congressional committee was set up to study labor- 
management relations and determine how well the new Act 
operated.
In analyzing these major provisions it can be seen 
that if there were any "victory" it was largely on the part 
of the House. The House conferees gave up the ban on 
industry-wide bargaining, restrictions on non-emergency 
strikes, bringing unions under the antitrust acts, and 
welfare funds. They also agreed to the Senate's joint 
committee. On the other hand, in the final bill the Senate 
agreed to the House's much harsher provisions in regard to 
the NLRB, a cooling-off period before striking, specific 
union activities like featherbedding, certain internal
94
union practices, government employees striking, union 
political activities, and union finance reporting. If the 
deleted House provisions had been included in the final Act, 
the Taft-Hartley Act would have been much harsher, but the 
inclusion of the House measures made the Taft bill much more 
antilabor than originally drawn. It is true that the Taft 
bill was "softer" than the Hartley bill, but the claim that 
the Taft-Hartley Act was much "softer" as a result of the 
Senate victory in the conference must be challenged. In 
commenting on the "mildness" of the Taft bill Senator Harley 
Kilgore, Democrat from West Virginia, drew the analogy of a 
25 per cent solution of carbolic acid being "mild" compared 
to a 100 per cent solution.
On June 3 the conference report was submitted to the 
House and the next day, following a one-hour debate, the 
House passed the Taft-Hartley Act by a vote of 320 to 79.^^ 
Senate debate on the conference report began on June 5 and 
the next day this body approved the Act 57 to 17.^5 Both 
houses passed the Taft-Hartley Act by more than the two-thirds 
majority necessary to override a veto. The bill was sent to 
President Truman on June 9 for his consideration.^^






Thus the first time the Republican party recaptured 
both houses of Congress following the New Deal It was able to 
pass, by huge majorities, a bill which would basically alter 
a New Deal policy. Using the antilabor feeling generated by 
union abuses of power and the public reaction against the 
postwar strikes, the drive which began Immediately after the 
Supreme Court validation of the Wagner Act culminated In the 
passage of legislation, the ostensible purpose of which was 
to restore the balance of power lost by the Wagner Act.
The Republican 8oth Congress revived restrictive labor 
measures that had previously failed of enactment, due either 
to the defection of one of the houses or a Presidential veto, 
added some new Items created by the strife of the war and 
reconversion period and amended the Wagner Act, creating a 
new national labor policy designed to "equalize" bargaining 
power In the "public Interest."
The provisions to create a new five-man National 
Labor Relations Board and to separate NLRB Judicial and 
prosecutory functions and changes In rules of evidence In 
NLRB procedures, and employer requests for union elections 
were taken from the Smith Committee proposals of 1939-40.
The provisions for a new Independent agency for 
conciliation, the cooling-off period before striking, 
suability of unions, exclusion of supervisors, and restricting 
the use of secondary boycotts came from the vetoed Case 
bill of 1946. To these were added other NAM and employer
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proposals to curb union power and activities and to 
curtail industrial conflict. With the impending threat of 
a presidential veto, these provisions were combined into an 
Omnibus bill so that the executive branch would have to 
accept all of the proposed changes or none. If the bill were 
accepted by President Truman it would mean complete victory 
for the antilabor forces, and if he vetoed it he would 
receive the onus of having defeated labor legislation demanded 
by the public. Thus the Truman Administration received one 
of the hottest political domestic issues it was to face.
The attention and pressure of the nation was now directed 
toward the White House for the decision of Harry S. Truman.
CHAPTER IV
HARRY S. TRUMAN PROCURES A POLITICAL NEMESIS
A tremendous amount of lobbying and political 
pressure had been exerted upon Congress during the passage of 
the Taft-Hartley Act. When Congress sent the approved bill 
to the President for his consideration on June 9j 19^7, this 
political pressure was then transferred to the White House.
With ten days time, Sundays excluded, in which to make the 
decision to sign or veto, individuals and organizations 
utilized their political power in an effort to influence the 
President's decision. Letters, telegrams and postcards 
poured into the White House from the nation, almost all viewing 
the measure as either completely good or completely bad. The 
Taft-Hartley Act evoked one of the greatest public opinion 
mail responses that the administrative branch ever endured 
on a domestic issue. Eben Ayers, a White House Assistant 
Press Secretary, reported that this "volume of mail was the 
greatest ever received at the White House on any legislative 
issue or any other controversy."^
^New York Times, June 19, 19^7*
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By June l4 the White House had received over half a
million messages--l4o,000 letters, 460,000 postcards, and
20,000 telegrams--"a vast majority" of which, according to
2Ayers, urged a veto. The final total of communications 
numbered over 750,000 and occupied some 300 cubic feet of 
space in the White House files. Unfortunately, selections 
were made from this public opinion mail and the rest was 
destroyed. Much of this correspondence was "inspired" by 
labor organizations in an effort to have the bill vetoed, and 
a majority of the mail retained in the files favored a veto. 
Whether the items retained were truly representative of the 
public opinion mail received remains unanswerable. But 
according to Ayers' estimate, it is an illustrative 
selection since it shows a preponderance of unfavorable 
attitude toward the bill.
Many union representatives were already in 
Washington lobbying against the bill and more arrived after 
its passage. The labor lobby in the Capitol at this time 
was compared to "a swarm of locusts" by one newspaper.^ The 
White House staff found it impossible to arrange the desired
^New York Herald Tribune, June 15j 1947.
^William D . Hassett to Secretary of Labor Tobin, 
Memorandum, September 9, 1949, Truman Papers, OP 15, Truman 
Library.
h
Washington Evening Star, June 14, 1947-
99
presidential interview for many such delegations because of
5their numbers.
Huge labor rallies were held throughout the country 
to protest against what labor immediately dubbed the "Slave 
Labor Bill." For example, a mass meeting of "thousands" 
of Rochester, New York, workers "unanimously" condemned the
bill, urging a veto and demanding that Democratic congressmen
■ 6uphold the veto. A petition with 115,000 signatures 
requesting a veto, gathered in 45 minutes in New York City,
7was presented to President Truman. Sixty thousand CIO 
workers paraded down Eighth Avenue to a rally in Madison 
Square Garden on June 11 demanding that President Truman veto 
the measure and that Congress sustain the veto. This 
followed a similar parade and rally of "35,000 to 50,000"
g
AF of L members a week previously on June 4.
The Mayor of New York City supported the attitude of 
these workers. In a radio address of June 3 he condemned 
the Taft-Hartley bill as being "pushed" by the NAM and the 
Chamber of Commerce "whose representatives admittedly wrote
5john R. Steelman, Office Memorandum, May 20, 1947, 
Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
^Hugh A. Harley to President Truman, June 10, 1947, 
Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
^Kenneth Sherbell to President Truman, June 9, 1947,
Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
g
New York Times, June 11, 1947.
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most of the legislation." He said this was part of the 
reason why the Republicans now wanted a "thorough-going 
system of regulation for labor," after fourteen years of 
opposition to any and all forms of regulation. Also, he 
declared, the Republican party feared the working man and
Qwanted to restrict his organizations. The Mayor of Detroit 
proclaimed June l6 as Veto Day. The Taft-Hartley bill, he 
said, was "inimical" to the interests of organized labor, and 
the public, and would generate "more not less" industrial 
s t r i f e . T h e  general reaction of the rank and file workers, 
toward the bill, although probably unrecognized by themselves, 
was summed up best by the Federal Reserve Board which stated 
that it had "symbolic significance to l a b o r . W h i l e  the 
rank and file complained of abuses at the hands of their 
leaders, psychologically they resented legislation designed 
to restrict labor and would close ranks against such an 
outside attack, as they did to a large extent in the election 
of 1948.
Unions and union officials were most vociferous in 
denouncing the Taft-Hartley Act. Walter Reuther, President
^Mayor 0 'Dwyer, ABC, 8:15 p.m., June 3, 194?, Radio 
Forums, Office of Government Reports, Division of Press 
Intelligence, June 5, 194%, Truman Papers, Misc. File, White 
House Central Files, Truman Library.
lOgeorge Edward to the President, telegram, June l6, 
1947, Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
^^M. S. Eccles to Harry S. Truman, June 18, 1947, 
Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
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of the UAW-CIO with almost 1,000,000 members,,requested a
presidential veto because its enactment would "set off a whole
new era of industrial strife and friction since its provisions
gave "encouragement and new weapons to anti-labor 
12employers." Reuther soon telegraphed another veto request 
on behalf of the UAW-CIO Executive Board. He declared that 
the bill, by weakening unions, would subsequently concentrate
even more control "of our way of life in the hands of the
1small number of giant monopolistic corporations." James 0. 
Petrillo, President of the American Federation of Musicians 
with over 200,000 members, wired Truman that at its annual 
convention the delegates had "unanimously adopted" a resolution 
urging a veto as the bill was an employers' bill and would 
make "slaves" of w o r k e r s . T h e  International Typographical 
Union, one of the nation's oldest trade unions, was somewhat 
less emotional in its condemnation. This union felt the bill 
should be vetoed on the grounds that, in addition to the 
current .arguments, it would lead to "inevitable contempt for 
law and courts" by the country's 15,000,000 organized 
workers when subjected to the bill's "senseless legal manipu­
lation and litigation." Also, the Typographical Union said, 
totalitarian countries could use the enactment of such a
12Walter P. Reuther to the President, telegram,
June 6, 1947, Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
l^Ibid., June 12, 1947.
^^James C. Petrillo, to the President, telegram,
June 19, 1947, Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
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"repressive" law as an example of the weakness of democracy 
In contrast to their own systems which would at least be 
"consistent with their philosophies" where "the dictators 
are politically honest" with their people.^5 philip Murray 
told the President that the bill not only must be vetoed, but 
that it must not become law. If it did, it would "engulf not 
only the labor movement but the entire nation in tragic 
consequences" since it was the "keystone in a program to 
legislate a new depression.
Letters and telegrams flooded the White House from 
hundreds of local unions, state labor councils and smaller 
national unions. Most of these messages described the bill 
as a "Slave Labor Bill" and denounced it as being "class 
legislation." The foundry workers union, a branch of the 
UAW-CIO, was alarmed by the current drive of antilabor 
manufacturers to create "the kind of lynch labor hysteria" 
which led to the passage of the bill.^^ A group of board 
members of Illinois CIO locals feared a depression as a 
consequence of the enactment of this legislation. The 
measure was sponsored by the NAM, they said, and was designed 
eventually to destroy the American labor movement. The
^^International Typographical Union to John R. 
Steelman, telegram, June 9, 19^7, Truman Papers, OP 407, 
Truman Library.
^^New York Times, June 11, 1947.
ITjerry Maxey to Harry S. Truman, June 6, 1947,
Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
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next step, If it became law, would be a campaign to cut wages
1 Q
which in turn would lead "headlong into another depression."
The President of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America
claimed that the results of the Taft-Hartley bill were "too
terrible to contemplate," maintaining that labor relations
would be thrust back 100 years by it.^^ The Foreman's
Association of America charged that if the bill became law,
it would deprive some 3,500,000 supervisory employees of
employee status under the national labor policy. They were
engaged in a "bitter struggle against organized employers"
to gain union recognition and this bill would deprive them
POof peaceful methods of gaining that objective.
Individuals and groups, other than organized labor,
strongly urged a veto. A veteran of the Conciliation
Service living the Sabine industrial area of Texas reported
that sentiment in his vicinity was strongly against the bill
and the President would increase his stature as the working
21man's friend if he vetoed it. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., 
called it "class legislation in the worst sense," describing
l^Executive Board Members, CIO Locals, Peoria, 
Illinois, to the President, telegram. May l6, 19^7, Truman 
Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
l^jacob S. Potofsky to the President, telegram,
June 10, 1947, Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
20Robert S. Keys to Harry S. Truman, June 9, 1947, 
Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
^^Earl White to John R. Steelman, June 14, 1947,
Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
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It as the "opening wedge" in a campaign to destroy the
PPeconomic and social advances of the previous fourteen years. 
Mrs. Gifford Plnchot felt that the multitude of technical 
and procedural provisions of the hill created weapons by
which antilabor employers could "weaken and disrupt trade
2 ̂unions." One citizen, confused as to who vetoes federal 
legislation, sent his Senator a note on a piece of brown 
paper torn from a grocery bag which simply said, "Please
Pilveto Taft-Hartley labor measueer [sic ]. "
Even some of the religious bodies of the nation
expressed disapproval of this legislation. A delegation
representing the National Clergymen's Committee on the -Taft-
Hartley Bill called on the President to request a veto.^^
The National Catholic Welfare Conference took an official
26stand In opposition to the bill. The national conference 
of the Presbyterian Church "unanimously adopted" suggestions 
for Improving labor relations "along Christian principles" 
and urged a veto on the grounds that the "dangerous phases"
PPFranklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., to the President,
June 11, 1947, Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
2 ̂■^Cornelia Bryce Plnchot to the President, June 6, 
1947, Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
^^Arthur V. Watkins to the President, June 19, 1947, 
Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
^^wiiiiam D. Simmons to Matthew Connelly, Memorandum, 
June 17, 1947, Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
2^Reverend R . A. McGowan to Harry S. Truman, June 11,
1947, Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
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27of the Taft-Hartley proposal far outweighed its good points.
The National Council of Jewish Women asked the President to
veto the bill because it would "produce the strikes and lock-
28outs that it seeks to eliminate."
The liberal Americans for Democratic Action wanted
the measure vetoed on the grounds that, among other things,
it violated sound administrative principles by creating an
independent General Counsel and changing the rules of 
2Qevidence. ^ The ADA recommended vetoing both the tax and
labor bills since they were elements of "a design for 
80depression." The American Veterans Committee called for a 
veto message as "dynamic" as the State of the Union Message 
of the previous J a n u a r y . T h e  Union Labor Legionaires even 
more forcibly demanded a veto because the Taft-Hartley bill 
would set collective bargaining back 50 years. "Certainly 
the 3 1/2 million paid up members of organized labor who 
fought in World War 2 did not fight and die for this attempted
^'^Fern M. Colborn to the President, June 12, 19^7, 
Truman-Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
^^Mrs. Joseph M. Welt, to the President, June 6, 1947, 
Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
^9pavid D. Lloyd to the President, June 6, 1947,
Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
^Owew York Times, June 11, 1947.
•^^Charles G. Bolte to the President, June 6, 1947, 
Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
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act of American Fascism/' they declared. Even Southerners, 
where antiunionism was strongest, found a reason for 
opposition. The Committee for the Preservation of Southern 
Traditions objected to the proposal because it would help 
abolish "Jim Crow" employment. All members of that 
organization were requested to wire or write Southern 
Congressmen and Senators who had voted for the bill, 
expressing their objections to this "Negro "Republican
trick.
The three'leading agricultural organizations took 
the same stand they had taken on the Case bill of the previous 
year. The National Farmers Union opposed the Taft-Hartley 
bill on the grounds that it would create additional labor 
unrest. This, added to the current inflationary problem, 
would mean more work stoppages and less production. What was 
more urgently needed, the Union felt, was legislation to 
control prices,- But the American Farm Bureau asked Truman 
to sign the bill because it had "the overwhelming support of 
the American p e o p l e , A l t h o u g h  the measure was not
F2Harry Geise to the President, June 11, 1947, Truman 
Papers, OF 407, Truman Library,
^•^Committee for the Preservation of Southern 
Traditions to Harry S. Truman, File date June l4, 1947,
Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library,
3^james G. Patton to the President, June 9, 1947, 
Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
•^^Edward A, O'Neal to Harry Truman, June 7, 1947, 
Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
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"exactly” what it preferred, the National Grange recommended 
approval because it was the best that could be "reasonably" 
expected from Congress at this time and, in addition, the 
American people demanded the protection the bill would 
provide.
Other organizations recommended approval on the 
basis that it was in the "best interests" of the nation.
The American Association of Small Businesses took a poll of 
its members which represented "a good cross section of the 
nation's industry." and found that 97 per cent favored 
approval of this or "similar legislation."^ Samuel Goldwyn, 
who had suffered union difficulties in his movie studios and 
had testified accordingly before the two congressional labor 
committees in their hearings on the Taft and Hartley bills, 
urged the President to sign the bill in order to stabilize 
labor relations. Goldwyn felt that the "overwhelming" 
majorities in Congress in favor of the measure were "an 
expression of the equally overwhelming will of the American 
people.
3^A. S. Goss to the President, June l6, 1947, Truman 
Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
3Tiyiorris Bailey to President Truman, June 10, 1947, 
Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
n O•^°Calvin H. Weiser to the President, June 9, 1947, 
Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
-"^Samuel Goldwyn to Harry S. Truman, June 12, 1947, 
Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
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Several newspaper editors expressed approval of the
bill in messages to the White House. The editor of the
Livingston (California) Chronicle, who classified himself as .
a liberal, thought the legislation should be approved, not
from the standpoint of politics but "good government.
The publisher of the Portland (Oregon) Dally Sun, In speaking
for his "part of the country," felt the Taft-Hartley bill was
what the people wanted because It would provide protection
against union a b u s e s . T h e  editor of the American (New York
City) Press wrote that when the Both Congress convened his
paper polled a cross section of country editors as to which
type of legislation they wanted taken up first. The
"overwhelming demand was for LABOR LEGISLATION," he declared.
He felt the bill should be approved since the opinion of
these editors was much more representative of the people than
42"sound-truck orators In New York."
The President also received advice from political 
groups and Individuals. John N. Garner, former Vice
il APresident, advised Truman to sign the bill. - The Democratic 
members of the Massachusetts legislature urged a veto on
G . Adams to Harry S. Truman, June 1, 1947,
Truman Papers, OP 407, Truman Library.
^^Thomas H. Coughlin to Harry S. Truman, June 5,
1947, Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
h pDon Robinson to Harry S. Truman, June 2, 1947, 
Truman Papers, OP 407, Truman Library.
ho^^John N. Garner to the President, telegram,
June 16, 1947, Truman Papers, OP 407, Truman Library.
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the basis of loyalty to party traditions. The Democratic
party represented the common people, they said, whereas the
Republican party represented "Big Business, High Finance
and Monopoly." Since the Taft-Hartley bill was "admittedly
written by the lawyers of Big Business" the Democratic
President should veto It.^^ The Governor of Arizona pointed
out that his state legislature had passed three bills In
19^7 with provisions similar to those In the Taft-Hartley
measure and he had vetoed them. Truman should likewise veto
the Taft-Hartley bill, he said, because If It became law
It would curtail liberty and "serve as a drag on human
progress. ^ A Utah state senator, who was also a
newspaperman, believed that the "mandate" from the people
In 19^6 was not a true mandate but the result of "confusion
of an after-war nature promoted quite pronouncedly by an
anti-labor p r e s s . A  Utah state representative expressed
the conviction that a veto would return labor's support,
"Including Lewis and Whitney," to the Democratic party from
47which It had been straying. The Mayor of Kansas City,
^^Democratlc Members of the Massachusetts Legislature 
to Harry S. Truman, June 5^ 19^7, Truman Papers, OF 407, 
Truman Library.
^5sydney P. Osborn to the President, June 13, 1947, 
Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
^ ^ a l  H. Cowles to Harry Truman, June 33 1947,
Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
^^Frank Bonaccl to President Harry S. Truman,
June 19, 1947, Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
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Kansas, wrote that there was an "undercurrent of feeling of
resentment" in his city against the legislation. He was not
sure what was happening but felt that labor believed the bill,
if it became law, would create conditions similar to the
depression of the 1930's.
Of more importance in influencing the decision of
whether or not to veto, politically speaking, were the
sentiments expressed by the state Democratic party workers--
the grass roots of the party. A national committeeman from
Indiana stated the belief that signing the bill would serve
the best interests of the country and the p a r t y . H o w e v e r ,
the Indiana State Chairman said it was the opinion of his
state committee that Truman should veto the bill.^^ A
New Jersey national committeeman wrote that in his state,
of which Hartley represented a district, sentiment prevailed
51against the proposal.
The Vice-Chairman of the California State Central 
Committee believed this legislation, if law, would present a
^®Carl Tucker to the President, telegram, June 13, 
19^7, Truman Papers, OP 407, Truman Library.
^9prank McHale to Harry S. Truman, telegram, June 5, 
1947, Truman Papers, OP 407, Truman Library.
50pieas Greenlee to President Harry S. Truman,
June 2, 1947, Truman Papers, OP 407, Truman Library.
^^Prank Hague to the President, June 2, 1947,
Truman Papers, OP 407, Truman Library.
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threat to "the orderly conduct" of the national economy.
The Chairman of this same committee, James Roosevelt, 
requested a veto on behalf of all Democrats in California.
In addition, Roosevelt recommended a radio address in which 
President Truman should present "the vicious attitude of the 
Republican leadership" to the people and thus secure the 
support of "all liberal, progressive and fair minded 
citizens.
The Chairman of the Rhode Island state committee 
felt that certain aspects of the proposal met approval but 
since "the wheat cannot be separated from the chaff" he 
suggested a veto.^ The Chairman of the Massachusetts state 
committee pressed for a veto because the bill would "cause 
industrial strife instead of p e a c e . A  Washington state 
national committeeman said that a survey of his state 
showed that a veto was necessary if the Democrats were to 
remain a, "party of the p e o p l e . M a n y  county and precinct 
Democratic clubs also submitted resolutions urging President
^^John McEnery to the President, June 7, 194?,
Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
5-^James Roosevelt to the President, telegram,
June J, 1947, Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
5^john E. Malien to the President, June 11, 1947, 
Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
55john F . Cahill to the President, telegram,
June 13, 1947, Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
^^Clarence J. Coleman to the President, telegram,
June 17, 1947, Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
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Truman to veto the bill.
Soon after the bill was passed the Democratic 
National Committee polled the national committeemen to 
ascertain their views on the advisability of a veto. Of the 
committeemen polled, 103 favored a veto, 66 wanted Truman 
to sign the bill, and 4 recommended allowing It to become 
law without his signature. Of the 66 who urged approval,
40 were from southern s t a t e s . I n  surveying the opinions 
of the Democratic party workers of the country from the 
available public opinion mall, the vast majority, excluding 
the South, recommended a veto of the Taft-Hartley bill.
The White House staff was busy evaluating this 
public opinion, studying the proposal Itself, and trying to 
reach a decision on the best course of action. Even before 
the final measure was written by the conference committee. 
Business Week claimed that President Truman would soon have 
to face "the most Important political decision" that he had 
been confronted with since he became President. Business Week 
reported White House sources at this time as saying that the 
decision lay between allowing the bill to become law without 
a signature or writing a veto message that would become "one 
of 1948's hottest campaign documents.
^̂ New York Times, June 20, 1947.
5^"W111 the Majority Hold?," Business Week, May 17,
1947, p. 70.
113
As previously discussed, the threat of a veto had 
been one of the considerations weighed by the majority 
Senators and Representatives when the two bills were In their 
respective chambers and during the conference. Represenatlve 
Frank W. Boykin, Democrat from Alabama, had early complained 
to the President that the feeling was common among labor 
leaders who were lobbying on the Hill that no matter what 
kind of a labor proposal Congress produced Truman would veto 
It, Boykin was concerned over this because he had overheard 
some "staunch party members" saying In the Democratic 
Cloakroom that If Truman did not sign the labor bill the
RQparty was "sunk so far as the next election Is concerned,"^
The threat of a veto was brought up several times 
during congressional debate. Congressman Emanuel Celler, 
Democrat from New York, speaking on the same day that the 
Hartley bill passed the House, referred to all the effort 
put In on the bill going to "naught" because, like the Case 
bill, this one would also "earn the veto and Justifiably so." 
Celler had Just returned from a White House visit and when 
Charles Halleck asked If he were speaking for the Admini­
stration, Celler replied that he was not speaking "officially" 
but that he could put two and two t o g e t h e r . U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,
59prank W. Boykin to the President, May 2, 19^7,
Truman Papers, OF 407-B, Truman Library.
^^Congressional Record, 8o Cong., 1 Sess., 194%,
xciii, 3619-20.
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the press took this up and quoted Celler as speaking for
Truman. The New Yorker immediately wrote Truman explaining
how the misunderstanding had come about and apologized for 
6lit. Congressman Henderson Lanham, Democrat from Georgia, 
in referring to Senate concurrence in this "evil bill," was 
thankful that there was a man in the White House with 
sufficient courage "in the face of the Nation-wide hysteria
62to veto such an infamous bill as this." Wayne Morse on 
the Senate side stated that he was not only going to vote 
against sending the Taft bill to conference, but would also 
vote to sustain a veto if Truman had "the good judgment to 
veto i t .
It was apparent then, that a veto was commonly 
expected. Labor itself was fairly confident of it and the 
two authors of the legislation, as noted earlier, expected 
Truman to veto their work. So their strategy was to make 
the Taft bill appear "mild" in comparison to the Hartley 
bill and give the impression that the harsher measure was 
moderated in conference. Thus the chances would be greater 
of Truman accepting the final version and, if he vetoed it, 
the general impression in Congress that the compromise bill 
was mild would win enough support to override the veto. And
^^Emanuel Celler to Harry S. Truman, April I8 ,
1947, Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library. ■




the press, as Hartley noted, was quite helpful In creating 
this impression. The Nation expressed the earnest hope 
that President Truman would not allow himself to be taken 
in by this "brazen campaign now raging in the press to 
make the bad look good by contrast with the worst.
Truman himself gave no indication of his intentions 
until the last minute. Thus, although the general 
impression was current that he would veto, a certain amount 
of suspense was created because of the uncertainty and 
because of the importance of his decision. Even before the 
bill reached the President's desk, the New York Times 
reported a "close associate" of Truman as saying that the 
President "was leaning toward a veto" but that he would not 
make up his mind definitely, of course, until he had fully 
studied it. This same news item reported Truman's "inner 
circle of advisers" as "about evenly split" between those 
favoring a veto and those urging signature.
Even after the bill had been in his possession for 
eight days, Sunday excepted, Truman told reporters that he 
did not yet know whether he would veto it. However, a 
memorandum written by Truman this same day gave an indication 
of which way he was leaning. George Harrison of the
G^Nation, CLXIV (May 31, 1947), 645.
65New York Times, June 8, 1947. 
^^Ibid., June I8, 1947.
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Railroad Brotherhood had sent the President a roster of 
the Senators and indicated what he believed to be the 
position of each in regard to overriding a veto. Harrison 
thought that 29 Senators would uphold a veto, which 
would not be sufficient if all 96 voted, three would 
possibly support a veto, and eight the President "must see." 
Truman turned this list over to one of his assistants,
Charles Murphy, with instructions to discuss it with Clark 
Clifford and then make a personal check on the Senators to 
see how they "really" s t o o d . A l s o ,  the next day, June 19, 
a delegation of southern Democrats called upon Truman to 
request his signature on the bill. Truman was reported as 
telling them that in making his decision he had not listened
to any labor leaders or "economic royalists" and he did not
68want to listen to any Democrats either. But by this time 
the decision had been undoubtedly made even if the veto 
message had not been drafted.
The Taft-Hartley bill was submitted to the President 
on June 9 which meant that June 20 would be the final date 
on which he could make his decision before the bill became 
law without his signature. In the meantime he had an 
official visit to Canada scheduled and Congress had sent him 
the tax reduction bill which was considered as being almost
^^Harry S. Truman to Charles S. Murphy, Memorandum, 
June 18, 1947, Truman Papers, OP 407, Truman Library.
^^New York Times, June 20, 1947.
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as Important as the labor measure. Truman decided to veto
the tax bill because he believed it favored the wealthy over
the lower income groups and submitted this veto message to
Congress on June l6. Because of these important matters the
President could not give his personal attention to the labor
bill until the last minute. But in the meantime the spadework
of studying the bill was being done for him.
The task of analyzing the Taft-Hartley bill was given
to John R. Steelman, who by this time was Truman's top
labor adviser. Steelman in turn set the White House staff
to work studying the bill and coordinating advisory reports.
After this had been completed, a White House official stated
that the final report submitted to Truman was "the most
detailed analysis he had ever received relating to a bill."^^
In a letter to Dr. Steelman, Sumner H. Slichter,
one of the nation's leading industrial relations experts,
expressed the conviction that a veto would be as unfortunate
as acceptance. It was easy to find fault with the bill, he
said, because it covered too many things. But on the other
hand he believed it would deal with certain labor abuses
that needed elimination which labor itself had shown no
70signs of correcting.' The Federal Reserve Board was one of 
the few government agencies that favored it. The Board
^^Ibid.
T^Sumner H. Slichter to John R. Steelman, June 10, 
1947, Truman Papers, OP 407, Truman Library.
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decided that it was a choice "between this bill and nothing" 
and the Taft-Hartley bill would provide increased 
protection to the public and the workers themselves against
71"abuses and shortsighted practices" of management and labor.
Steelman's personal legal adviser, Aaron Lewittes, 
submitted a sixteen-page description of the bill's provisions 
and concluded that although there were some desirable 
features, it contained too many seriously objectionable 
features. Lewittes decided that if it became law it would 
serious disturb labor relations. Unions would be weakened 
by "tremendously intensified anti-union activities by 
employers, material slowing down of Board operations, 
litigation, cease-and-desist orders, injunctions and damage
suits."72
The NLRB Chairman, Paul Herzog, turned in a report 
denouncing the bill. Herzog claimed that the Taft-Hartley 
amendments would transform the Wagner Act from "a shield for 
the working man" into a "sword" to be used against unions.
He felt that although the individual modifications, when 
considered separately, seemed "innocent," it was t h e ■ 
"cumulative impact" of the bill which made it an "anti­
labor measure." He maintained that the proposal was 
"unworkable" because it placed the Board in a "rigid
71m. s. Eccles to Harry S. Truman, June I8, 1$47, 
Truman Papers, OF 407,- Truman Library. ■
72A. Lewittes to John R. Steelman, June 11, 1947, 
Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
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procedural strait-jacket" and it was "deliberately calculated" 
to "encourage litigation" and "stimulate procrastination." 
Senator Joseph Ball, Taft's right-hand man In the Labor 
Committee, protested against Herzog's report because It had 
circulated In the Cabinet and among "various Interested 
persons." Ball argued that this document was a "tissue of 
distortions" that was "apparently based upon a memorandum
7kwritten by Lee Pressman."' Pressman was at that time CIO 
General Counsel and was later removed from his job because of 
admitted Communist activities.
The Council of Economic Advisors tendered a 
penetrating analysis of the overall effects of the Taft- 
Hartley bill. This Council, composed of Edwin G. Nourse,
Leon H. Keyserllng and John D. Clark, recommended disapproval 
of the bill based on two major objections. First of all the 
bill provided no real solution to Industrial conflicts.
Instead of setting up workable procedures or machinery to 
settle paralyzing strikes. It merely required delay In 
concerted action. Secondly, It would Inject the national 
government too completely Into Internal union affairs. The 
general Impression of labor that this was a punitive measure 
would breed resentment rather than moderation and cooperation
77'-Taul M. Herzog to Harry S. Truman, Memorandum,
June 11, 19^7, Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
^Joseph H. Ball to Harry S. Truman, June l6, 194%, 
Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
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in collective bargaining. Also, in this regard, the bill 
was so complicated and ambiguous that labor-management 
relations would be unstable for years before returning to 
normal. The Council summed up its objections by saying that 
the bill would encourage industrial strife and thus would 
run counter to the objectives of the Full Employment Act of 
1946.75
There are conflicting reports of the position of the
Cabinet in regard to a veto. The New York Times reported
76unanimity among Cabinet members in favor of a veto.
However, Robert S. Allen and William V. Shannon state in
The Truman Merry-Go-Round that only Postmaster General
77Hannegan and Secretary Schwellenbach favored a veto. ' In 
the face of such an apparently irresistible public demand 
for such legislation it seems.quite likely that many 
department heads would favor following the popular demand and 
recommend approval rather than risk political reprisal in 
the coming election.
Several quite important political factors indicated 
that signing the measure would be the wisest course. The 
manifest desire of the nation for remedial labor legislation,
75council of Economic Advisors to the President,
June 16, 1947, John D. Clark Papers, Truman Library,
T^'New York Times, June 22, 1947.
77pobert S. Allen and William V. Shannon, The Truman 
Merry-Go-Round (New York: Vanguard Press, 1950), 27.
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plus the large majorities given the bill by Congress, made 
it fairly obvious that a veto would be overridden. Thus 
Truman would be placed in the embarrassing position of 
having tried to withhold legislation that the people 
demanded. Then too, there was the President's personal 
feeling that some labor leaders were acting too arrogantly. 
Only a year previously he had requested authority to draft 
•strikers, and mail was being received from rank and file 
union members complaining of union abuses. Also, Truman had 
to consider holding the Democratic party together. The 
fact that so many Democrats, most of them from the South, 
had supported the bill in Congress rendered his decision 
more difficult since the Democratic party would need united 
support in the national election a year hence. And although 
union officials were issuing frenzied demands for a veto, 
there was little that labor could do except remain in the 
Democratic party, regardless of what happened. Finally, one 
of the major arguments in favor of signing the bill was the 
impending coal strike. The government was still operating 
the coal mines but was scheduled to return them to the 
operators on June 30. It was generally conceded that 
John L. Lewis would then call the miners out on strike. If 
this happened and the Taft-Hartley bill were vetoed Truman 
would have no ready weapon to contend with the strike. One 
presidential adviser expressed the opinion that there was 
"little doubt" that Truman would have rejected the bill if
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the coal strike threat had not arisen.
But there were strong factors Impelling a veto. 
Signing the proposal would be Inconsistent with the Case bill 
veto of the previous year and the requests made In the State 
of the Union Message. Also the tax reduction measure had 
just been vetoed as favoring the wealthy, so a veto of the 
Taft-Hartley bill would place the President even more on the 
side of the common man. Then there was the apparently 
honest conviction that the bill would actually Increase 
Industrial strife. Reports of various competent advisers, 
such as Paul Herzog, Indicated that the legislation was 
fundamentally unworkable and would create not only endless 
court litigation but resentment on the part of labor Itself. 
While labor had been traditionally Democratic there were 
obvious signs that It was moving away from the party. After 
the strike draft proposal In the 1946 railroad strike,
A. F. Whitney pledged his union's entire treasury to the 
defeat of Truman In 1948. The rift between the President 
and John L. Lewis was widening as a result of the tense coal 
situation. So al.nough labor had no Immediate political 
party to turn to, there was the possibility of a liberal 
third party arising which would draw some labor votes away 
from the Democratic party. Finally, there was the danger 
that labor might prove apathetic In voting In 1948. Labor
78New York Times, June 8, 1947.
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had stayed home to a large extent In 1946 and the result, 
as Truman pointed out, was a Republican Congress and the 
Taft-Hartley bill. A veto might prove extremely stimulating 
to labor voters in the coming election.
With all these factors in mind and the extremely 
thorough report prepared by Steelman's staff. President 
Truman undertook to study the "incomprehensible Taft- 
Hartley bill" on June l8 .^^ Forty-eight hours later he 
came up with a veto message. This message was composed with 
the assistance of John Steelman, Charles Ross, Paul Herzog 
and Clark Clifford. Clifford was very perceptive 
politically and at this time was one of Truman's top, if
not the principal, adviser. Clifford was reported to have
80favored a veto from the beginning, and undoubtedly had a 
great deal of influence in shaping the final decision. The 
message was presented to Congress June 20, the final day 
before the bill would become law with or without presidential 
action. Wayne Morse described the 5500-word message as 
"one of the most powerful vetoes in all our history."®^ The 
New York Times reported that Truman castigated the bill with 
twenty-four different adjectives that had harsh connotations,
T^Harry S. Truman to Carl A. Hatch, June 23, 1947, 
Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
^^New York Times, June 8, 1947.
Gllbid., June 21, 1947.
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such as dangerous, unworkable, arbitrary, discriminatory,
82impossible and drastic.
President Truman began his veto message by saying 
that the bill would result in greater industrial strife, it 
was a "dangerous stride" toward a "totally managed economy,” 
and it contained "seeds of discord" that would plague the 
country for years. Truman then stated that, in analyzing 
the bill, he had subjected it to four major tests and found 
it wanting in each case. First, it would result in more 
government intervention, contrary to the national policy of 
economic freedom, by making the government an "unwarranted 
participant at every bargaining table." Secondly, it would 
not improve labor relations because "cooperation cannot be 
achieved by law." Instead, it would encourage distrust and 
suspicion and lead to differences being settled in the 
courts. Congress, he said, had paid too much attention to 
the "inevitable frictions" of the reconversion period when 
the bill was drafted and "ignored the unmistakable evidence" 
that labor-management cooperation had improved in recent 
months. Thirdly, the bill was unworkable because the NLRB 
would have its tasks greatly expanded and at the same time 
be restricted in its procedures. This would result in a 
greatly increased backlog of unsettled cases, a problem 
which already confronted the Board. Also, the national
82lbid.
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emergency strike provisions would require an Immense amount 
of government work and yet result "almost Inevitably In 
failure." Fourthly, the bill was unfair In prescribing 
unequal penalties for the same offense. Truman pointed out 
that much had been made of the claim that the bill was 
Intended to "equalize" bargaining power but that In the case 
of conflicting charges of unfair labor practices the NLRB 
would have to give priority to employer claims.
The President then stated his specific objections to 
the bill. He believed It would Increase strikes because 
unions would be less willing to accept a "no-strlke" clause 
In contracts since they would be subject to suit In federal 
courts for breach of contract. Also unions would be forced 
to strike or boycott to settle jurisdictional disputes as 
that would be the only way they could force the NLRB to 
assume jurisdiction. The bill would limit the area of 
voluntary agreement by restricting union security provisions 
and welfare funds, and such items as safety and rest-period 
rules might be construed as "featherbedding." Truman felt 
that employers would be hampered by Increasing the number 
of union elections which would disturb plant production. 
Inviting employees to sue employers for thousands of minor 
grievances, and prohibiting the granting of a union shop 
even If desired by the employer. Truman was convinced that 
several provisions were unworkable. These Included 
separating the General Counsel from the Board, setting up
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procedures contrary to the Administrative Procedures Act of 
1946, requiring endless government supervised elections, and 
necessitating Board determination of which employees were 
entitled to reinstatement and voting privileges after a 
strike. He also considered the national emergency provisions 
ineffective and discriminatory since the board of inquiry 
could only investigate and not even offer its informed 
Judgment after the investigation.
If the proposal became law, Truman said,, it would 
deprive workers of vital protection as the employer would be 
able to initiate an election at a time advantageous to 
himself and it would force workers to compete with sweatshop 
goods by halting all types of secondary boycotts. It would 
make union's liable for agents' actions whereas, in contrast 
to employers, unions cannot always control the actions of 
their "agents" or members. Also, in regard to its effect 
on labor, Truman was convinced that the bill was 
discriminatory. If an existing agreement were violated the 
employer would only have to restore the previous conditions 
while the employee could be discharged for violation. It 
permitted employers to seek restraining orders on the 
pretext that the workers were using illegal boycotts or 
jurisdictional strikes and it imposed burdensome reporting 
requirements on unions only. The President declared that 
certain convictions of the 194-5 National Labor-Management 
Conference were discredited in this proposal--that the
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government should withdraw from the collective bargaining
process, and that the United States Conciliation Service
should be strengthened within the Department of Labor.
Finally, Truman objected to the measure as it raised serious ■
issues of public policy. These issues included the
restriction of political contributions and activities of
unions, prevention of union certification of an entire
national union if one official refused to sign a non-
Communist affidavit, and giving priority to state laws in
regard to union security provisions. The message ended by
stating that, in reverse of the State of the Union
recommendations, the bill made drastic changes in the
national labor policy and provided for investigation after-
8 Sward by the Joint Committee.
That same evening President Truman explained his 
action to the American people in a nationwide radio address. 
He had vetoed the Taft-Hartley bill, he said, because it was 
"bad for labor, bad for management, and bad for the country." 
He reiterated his State of the Union requests, stating that 
he believed those proposals had been accepted as "fair and 
Just" by the great majority of the people. Instead of 
following his recommendations. Congress had produced a 
"shocking" piece of legislation which he could not have
O n
-"Harry S. Truman, Veto Message to the House of 
Representatives, June 20, 1947, Truman Papers, Press 
Releases, Truman Library.
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signed under any circumstances. He informed the people that 
they had been misled in regard to the bill, quoting Hartley's 
statement, "You are going to find there is more in this bill 
than may meet the eye." Truman had found no truth in the 
claim that the Senate had taken the "harsh" House proposal 
and made it "moderate." He enumerated the various ways in 
which the bill would weaken labor unions, maintaining that 
legislation was needed to correct abuses and not to take 
away the fundamental rights of labor. His address ended with 
the hope that the bill would not become law "for the sake 
of the future of this nation.
That same evening Robert Taft answered the 
President. In a nationwide radio broadcast Taft characterized 
the veto message as "a complete misrepresentation of both 
the general character of the bill and of most of its detailed
Q  p-
provisions." Hartley maintained that the President did 
not write the veto message because he was an "honest man."
The message. Hartley charged, was "studded with misrepre­
sentations, half truths and distortions" much too similar 
to those that "Left-Wing lawyers for the CIO and Left-Wing 
lawyers for the labor board have been circulating for weeks.
RUHarry S. Truman, Radio Address, June 20, 194%,
Truman Papers, OF 407-B, Truman Library.
^ % e w  York Times, June 21, 19^7-
G Glbid., June 22, 1947.
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The reaction of the press to the veto was not too 
surprising. The New York Times declared that the President 
had never made any move to cooperate with Congress. Labor- 
management relations under his Administration had been "far 
and away the worst in the nation's history," the Times 
stated, and in two years he had shown no evidence of having
a labor policy of his own or of trying to develop one. Yet
he "figuratively slapped the Congress in the face" with a 
veto message that was "a catch-all for every discredited 
argument advanced against the bill over the past several
87weeks." The Washington Times Herald emphasized that the
1946 elections signified that a majority of the voters wanted
such labor legislation. Against this recent expression of
the popular will, Truman had to trace his mandate back to
Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1944 wartime election. "Yet the
President now puts his mouldy second-hand mandate of 1944 ■
against the 1946 Congressional mandate," the Times Herald
00
snapped, "and vetoes this labor bill."
The veto message was read to the House of Repre­
sentatives at 12:05 p.m. Forty-three minutes after the 
reading commenced, the House of Representatives began a roll 
call vote which was completed by 1:17 p.m. The House
GTlbid., June 21, 1947.
^^Washington Times Herald, June 21, 194?.
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overrode the veto 331 to 83 with I5 not v o t i n g . T h i s  
vote of 331, or four to one. Hartley states, is the largest 
ever recorded in the House to override a Presidential 
veto,^^ Of the 331 voting to override, 106 were Democrats 
and all but eight of these were from the South or Southwest.
Action in the Senate was less hasty than that of the 
House due to a filibuster. Three Democratic Senators,
Claude Pepper of Florida, Glen Taylor of Idaho, and Harley 
Kilgore, and one Republican, Wayne Morse, decided to 
filibuster through the weekend so that the reaction of the 
nation to the veto could reach 'the Senate and be assessed. 
These Senators began at 2:20 p.m. on June 20, after the 
veto message was read, and held the Senate in continuous 
session until 4:30 p.m. the next day, which was Saturday.
At that time the Senate agreed to vote at 3:00 p.m. the 
following Monday. On Monday the President made a final 
effort to sway Senate voting. He sent a letter to Senate 
Leader Alben Barkley reiterating his belief that the bill 
would seriously harm the country in this "critical period."
He commended Barkley and his colleagues who had fought 
against the bill, wishing them success in their efforts to
Qlsustain his veto.^
^^Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 1 Sess., 194%, 
XCIII, .
9C>Hartley, Our New National Labor Policy, 91.
^^Harry S. Truman to Alben Barkley, June 23, 1947, 
Truman Papers, OP 407-B, Truman Library.
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On June 23 the Senate overrode the veto by a vote of 
68 to 25 j with two not v o t i n g . T w e n t y  Democrats Joined 
the Republicans against sustaining the veto, all of them 
coming from the South or Southwest. This vote of Congress 
to override the veto of the Taft-Hartley bill, the 
Congressional Digest recorded, was "about as severe a rebuff 
as any President has received on major legislation In the
Q C'present century."
The day after the Senate vote a radio forum was 
held on the subject, "Will the Taft-Hartley Act Work and 
How Well Will It Work?" Senator Aiken expressed the opinion 
that Congress should have made a study of the "basic 
causes of labor unrest" before taking action but "pressure 
from the country made this delay Impossible." He 
continued by saying that If and when the Act was "properly 
amended" he thought It would prove Just and practical.
Paul Herzog, who would have to administer the Act, stated 
his misgivings but said that the NLRB and Its staff were 
pledged to "do their utmost" to make It work as effectively 
as possible. Lee Pressman of the CIO described It as a 
"nightmare" that brought government In on the employers' 
side to repress labor. And Ray Smethurst, NAM General 
Counsel, felt that the Act fell short of what the employers
^^Congressional Record, 80 Cong., 1 Sess., 194%, 
XCIII, 7 5 3 B T ^
^ ^Congressional Digest, XXVIII (April, 19^9)j 101.
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wanted in "equalizing'’ bargaining power, but most of them
were "reconciled to the fact that this law is a step in the
right direction.
News commentator Eric Sevareid declared that the
congressional vote overriding the veto was probably the most
important victory of the legislative over the administrative
branch since Franklin D, Roosevelt lost the 1937 Supreme 
qqCourt fight. Edwin C. Hill was certain that the veto
defied the 19^6 election returns and also the desires of a
large segment of the Democratic party. Only a political
wizard of Franklin D. Roosevelt's caliber could now fend off
a .split. Hill stated, that would be disastrous to the party
q6and to Truman's ambitions. The liberal Max Lerner 
condemned the Taft-Hartley Act and predicted that it would
be repealed only by a Congress elected as a part of a liberal 
97victory.^ The only regret Congressman Hartley had was that 
the Act did not "complete the Job the Republican party set out 
to do in November of 19^6."^®
9^Radio Forum, Office of Government Reports, Division 
of Press Intelligence, June 26, 19^7, Truman Papers, Misc. 
File, White House Central Files, Truman Library.
95Radio Comment of June 23, Office of Government 
Reports, Division of Press Intelligence, June 24, 1947,
Truman Papers, Misc. File, White House Central Files, Truman 
Library.
9̂ 1 bid.
97ibid., June 30, 1947.
9^Hartley, Our New National Labor Policy, 171.
133
After the bill was passed over his veto. President 
Truman issued a statement in which he said that the Taft- 
Hartley Act was "now the law of the land" which everyone 
had to respect. He wanted to make it "unmistakably clear" 
that as President he would see that the law was "well and 
faithfully administered," and stated that he had received 
similar reassurances from the NLRB. He then called upon 
labor and management to exercise "patience and moderation" 
in living under the Act and not seek to take unfair 
advantage of its provisions. "We must all do our part," he 
c o n c l u d e d . T h e  National Labor Relations Board, composed of 
Paul M. Herzog, John M. Houston and James J. Reynolds, Jr., 
issued a statement pledging "the fairest and most efficient 
administration" of the Act within its p o w e r . A l l  of the 
provisions of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 19^7, by 
its terms, were to go into effect on August 22, 19^7.
The veto of the Taft-Hartley bill was one of the 
most important domestic decisions made by President Truman 
during his first administration. As the heir and defender 
of the New Deal, the President was confronted with the 
extremely difficult choice of either riding the crest of the 
popular wave of a postwar reaction against the power of
^^Harry S. Truman, Statement, June 26, 1947, Truman 
Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
^^*^Paul M. Herzog, Radio Address, June 24, 1947,
Truman Papers, OF l4$, Truman Library.
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unions or standing firm in the face of it in defense of his 
sincere convictions. To compound the dilemma of his 
position, it came at a time when the tense coal situation was 
again inflaming public emotions against labor. If a coal 
strike developed, the Administration would need a weapon 
like the Taft-Hartley Act to combat it. If he vetoed the 
bill and a subsequent coal strike got out of hand, Truman 
would have no defense for his action.
This decision was further complicated by its 
political aspects. It came between two election years and 
in the middle of a postwar conservative reaction. The 
Republicans were gaining political momentum and could foresee 
the definite probability of capturing the Presidency in 1948 
after sixteen years of drought. If Harry Truman planned to 
be his party's candidate to succeed himself in 1948, and 
expected to win, he would need a firmly united party to 
counteract the growing political conservatism of the nation 
which was increasing Republican strength. And yet a large 
segment of his party. Senators and Congressmen from the 
South and Southwest, had Joined the Republican majority on 
this legislation. They not only Joined in passing the 
Taft-Hartley Act, but more important, voted to override the 
decision of the titular head of their party. In making 
this decision then, Truman not only had to fly into the 
face of apparent national public opinion, but also to 
stand in direct opposition to the desires of an important 
section of his party.
135
Also he had to consider the best course of action in 
regard to his own constituency, the urban laborers. Southern 
Senators and Congressmen could ignore the outcries of labor, 
but a Democratic President could not. President Truman was 
aware of the numerous complaints of union abuses from rank 
and file members but there was the distinct likelihood that 
if their unions were attacked by an outside force they 
would unite in opposition to such an onslaught. There was 
a possibility that they would not only close ranks but that 
such an assault would provide a stimulus in 1948 to overcome 
the apathy shown by labor in 1946. Although he was guided
by expert advice, the final choice as President was his own.
And once he made that irrevocable decision he became so 
emotionally committed to it that he would come to its 
defense whenever attacked. He had done everything within 
his power "to prevent an injustice against the laboring men
and women of the United States"^^^ and in doing so, Harry S.
Truman obtained a political nemesis that was to exact 
retribution from the Republicans in 1948.
^*^^Truman, Memoirs, II, 30.
CHAPTER V 
A 1948 MODEL PAUL REVERE
Charles Halleck, House Majority Leader of tne Both 
Congress, is quoted as saying, "it always galls me to think 
that Harry Truman won in 1948 by attacking the Congress which 
gave him his place in history."^ Truman used the "Do- 
Nothing Both Congress" as a whipping-boy in the campaign of 
1948 to arouse the American people into voting for him and 
the Democratic party and the Taft-Hartley Act was one of the 
major issues he used in castigating this Congress. Thus 
when the Republican Both Congress altered the national 
labor policy over the veto of President Truman it created 
a political nemesis that was to play a tremendous role in 
snatching almost certain victory from the Republican 
presidential candidate in 1948.
Although the Act went into effect on August 22, 194%, 
it did not actually become much of a political issue until 
the campaign of 1948. There were a few actions and comments
ljules Abels, Out of the Jaws of Victory (New York: 
Henry Holt and Co., 1959), 139.
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from the executive branch concerning the law during Its 
early operation, but In general the Truman Administration 
remained quiet on the Issue until It exploded Into criticism 
In 1948. One month after the law went Into effect Philip 
Hannah, an Assistant Secretary of Labor, resigned his 
position because he believed It "raised grave Issues for the 
American people." Hannah felt that he could not work under 
the new policy and his only alternative was to resign from 
government service and, as a private citizen, carry on "the
pfight to repeal this anti-labor and undemocratic law." But 
this Incident was scarcely noticed. Opponents for the most 
part were busy adjusting themselves to the new situation, as 
noted by Cyrus Chlng, Director of the new Federal Mediation 
and Conciliation Service, which left little time to devote 
to criticism.
President Truman, while having done everything In 
his power to prevent the Act from becoming law, utilized Its 
national emergency provisions. He Invoked these powers six 
times before the campaign of 1948; three times In maritime 
strikes, twice with coal mine disputes, and once before an 
Impending strike at the Oak Ridge atomic plant.^ Although
^Philip Hannah to the President, September 26, 1947, 
Truman Papers, OF 15, Truman Library.
■^Cyrus S. Chlng to the President, October 29, 1947, 
Truman Papers, OF 419-F, Truman Library.
^Congressional Digest, XXVIII (April, 1949), I06.
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Although the Taft-Hartley Act prohibited striking against the 
government, an altercation had developed at the Oak Ridge 
plant between the company which had leased the government 
plant and its employees, so the government was only indirectly 
involved. This Oak Ridge dispute in the spring of 1948 
evoked a message from the President to Congress. Truman 
reported that everyone involved in the controversy had 
complied with the Labor-Management Relations Act and should 
be commended for reaching a settlement without interruption 
of work. However, he said, this contention had raised the 
question of what policy should be followed in settling future 
labor strife in government-owned, privately-operated, atomic 
energy plants. He proposed establishing a commission of 
experts to study the problem and submit recommendations for 
necessary special legislation "in this new and vital field.
A special procedure for handling labor disputes in this 
area was later set up which has successfully settled a 
number of controversies.^
The 1948 State of the Union Message contained 
Truman's first significant discussion of the Taft-Hartley 
Act. As usual in preparing this message, the various 
departments and agencies were requested to submit their views
^Harry S. Truman, Statement to Congress, June l8, 
1948, Truman Papers, OP 407-B, Truman Library.
^John H. Leek, Government and Labor in the United 
States (New York: Rinehart, 1952), f.n., 266.
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on what should be included. Reporting for the NLRB, Paul 
Herzog concluded that experience under the law had been too 
brief to permit making a sound judgment on its effectiveness 
and the Board could not present any specific amendments.^
But Secretary of Labor Schwellenbach submitted several 
proposals. In addition to recommending that the federal 
minimum wage be raised to 75 cents per hour and extended to 
agricultural workers and seamen, he proposed several changes 
in the Labor-Management Relations Act. These included 
amendments to liberalize restrictions on union security 
agreements, union political contributions, health and welfare 
funds, return of the conciliation functions to the 
Department of Labor, and "early amendment or repeal of the
provisions of the Act which are found to be unworkable or
unfair.
President Truman incorporated the minimum wage 
raise recommendation into his annual message to Congress.
This increase was Justified, he felt, because "the welfare 
of industry and agriculture depends on high incomes for our 
workers." In regard to the Labor-Management Relations Act 
of 19^7 he reminded Congress that he had made his attitude 
quite clear in the veto message and nothing had occurred
^Paul M. Herzog to the President, November 4, 19^7,
Truman Papers, OF 419-F, Truman Library,
®L. B. Schwellenbach to the President, October 31, 
1947, Truman Papers, OF 419-F, Truman Library.
l4o
since then to change his opinion. But he made no specific 
recommendations for amendments, saying that as long as it 
remained the law he would carry out his "Constitutional 
duty to administer i t .
While the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act did not 
cause many change's or too much apparent consternation in the 
executive branch during the first few months of its existence, 
it had an immediate and pronounced effect upon the attitude 
and policies of labor officials. Immediately after its 
passage labor turned to politics with a vengeance, the slogan 
"Repeal the Slave Labor Act" becoming its shibboleth. On 
the day following the Senate action to override the veto,
A. P. Whitney sent a letter to the presidents of the AF of L, 
the CIO, the Locomotive Engineers, and the Executive 
Secretary of the Railway Labor Executive Association, 
pointing out that labor had for many years' relied upon the 
Senate for protection since the House of Representatives was 
"more or less reactionary." But after the Senate overrode 
the veto of this cardinal attempt to,.cripple labor, the 
"die" was cast and "labor should do something about it." 
Whitney suggested that the major groups who were "numerically 
and financially able" should carry on a fight to correct 
the damage and develop a program designed for "the mutual
^Harry S. Truman, State of the Union Message,
January 7> 1948, Truman Papers, OF 419-F, Truman Library.
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advantage of every group of l a b o r . E v i d e n t l y  most union
officials felt as he did because labor became more
politically active than ever before.
Section 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act forbade unions
making contributions or expenditures in national elections.
This provision was inserted in the bill mainly "to help
rally timid Congressmen" to support the measure, the idea
being that it would give them protection against labor
retaliation in e l e c t i o n s . A l s o  the Republican 8oth
Congress realized that labor's political activities in the
past had been directed largely toward helping Democrats
rather than Republicans. On the basis of this prohibition
unions early believed that they would be greatly restricted
in national politics, if not completely ejected. For
example, the Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders and Helpers
of America were denied permission to present a program
"pointing out the injustices of the Taft-Hartley Act" on
12this basis by the American Broadcasting Company. However, 
the law's prohibition defined "labor- organization" as one
l^A. F . Whitney to William Green, Philip Murray, 
Alvanley Johnston, and E. A. Lyon, June 24, 1947, Secretary 
Schwellenbach File (Bills, H.R. 3020), R . G. 174, National 
Archives.
^^A. J. Liebling, "The Wayward Press," New Yorker, 
XXIII (August 16, 1947), 67.
^^Clif Langsdale to John R. Steelman, August 11, 
1948, Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
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which dealt with employers in regard to wages, hours and 
working conditions. Unions soon discovered that this 
provision could be circumvented by setting up separate 
political organizations with funds voluntarily contributed 
and unconnected with their regular treasuries. '
The AF of L had, with the exception of the election 
of 1924, always pursued the strategy of "rewarding friends 
and punishing enemies." It now modified this traditional 
policy and embarked upon an active political program. When 
William Green addressed the AF of L annual convention in 
October of 194? he proposed two great objectives that labor 
must achieve "at any cost." The first was to repeal the 
Taft-Hartley Act "at the earliest opportunity" and the 
second to defeat for re-election every member of Congress 
who voted for it. To accomplish these goals, he asked the 
convention to declare election day of 1948 a holiday so 
labor could "march to the polls and vote against their 
enemies." ^ The convention did this and more. Following 
a resolution stating that the Taft-Hartley Act confronted 
labor with a challenge to "immediate political 
education . . .  to differentiate between political friends 
and enemies," the convention unanimously adopted a
•̂ Proceedings of the Sixty-Sixth Convention of the 
American Federation of Labor, 1947, p. 15.
l^Tbid., 662.
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resolution to set up such a political 'education program.
The AF of L Executive Council then met December 3, 1947, and 
established Labor's League for Political Education.^5
Labor's League for Political Education then set up 
a branch-LLPE In every state prior to the campaign of 1948. 
The AF of L Executive Council authorized the levying of a 
"voluntary assessment" on members, setting the goal of 
15 cents per month to be used for political purposes. With 
a fund of nearly one million dollars the AF of L launched 
Its campaign with full-page advertisements In 212 leading 
newspapers and dally radio broadcasts. After the Supreme 
Court removed the restriction on political advocacy by 
labor newspapers In the spring of 1948, the AF of L began 
Issuing the 1948 Campaign News Service, a newspaper designed 
to educate Its members politically for the coming election. 
The AF of L ultimately spent $850,631.32 In this campaign
on the national, state and local levels.
The CIO enlarged the activities of Its Political 
Action Committee, which had been functioning since 1944, and 
conducted a campaign against the "Slave Labor Law" that 
matched the AF of L In aggressiveness. At the 1947 annual
^^Proceedings of the Sixty-Seventh Annual Convention 
of the American Federation of Labor, 1948, p. 6^
l^Phlllp Taft, The A.F. of L. from the Death of
Gompers to the Merger (New York: Harper, 1959), 271.
ITlbld.
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CIO convention a resolution was unanimously adopted 
committing the CIO to work "unceasingly In the political 
field In complete unity with all other labor organizations 
and other progressive groups to Insure the political
repudiation of those reactionaries" responsible for the Taft-
1 8Hartley Act. Also the Independent machinists and telephone
workers created their own political action organizations
and even the railroad workers who were not affected by the
Act organized a political agency.
An Indication of labor's position In,the coming
election was given when several labor leaders early endorsed
Truman as a presidential candidate along with repeal of the
Taft-Hartley Act. The General Chairman of the International
Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers assured him that labor
would make every effort to elect Its friends and defeat Its
enemies, and that he would assist Truman In any way possible
20In the coming election. Following the stand taken by 
the AF of L In Its 194? convention, many federated unions 
submitted resolutions dedicating themselves to fighting for 
repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act and defeating congressmen who 
had voted for It. Even some of the Independents, like the
^^Proceedings of the Ninth Constitutional Convention 
of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, 194%, p. l8b .
^%ayback, A History of American Labor, 400.
or)Lee Anderson to Harry S. Truman, July 7, 1947, 
Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
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Brotherhood of Signalmen of America, sent in similar
resolutions "in accordance with the policy of the American
21Federation of Labor." Long before the 1948 nominating 
conventions the Maryland and District of Columbia branch 
of the LLPE approved a resolution lauding Truman for vetoing 
the bill. And "in appreciation for the known friendship of 
President Harry S. Truman toward organized labor," it 
endorsed his re-election, calling upon all members of 
organized labor to vote for him in November, 1948. The 
Democratic National Committee's Director of Publicity 
requested "200 to 250 copies" of this resolution "for 
distribution to prominent Democratic leaders throughout the
npcountry."
Truman decided to seek the Presidency in his own
right because there was still "unfinished business" needing
attention, the most important being the threat of Russian
Communism and the "coalition of southern Democrats and
northern Republicans, who hoped to compel the repeal of a
2^great deal of New Deal legislation." In the coming 
campaign he decided that the 8oth Congress was to be his 
"Exhibit A." This Republican-controlled Congress had ignored
^^C. L. Bromley to the President, August 13, 1948, 
Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
^^John M. Redding to Frank J. Coleman, May 4, 1948, 
Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
^^Truman, Memoirs, II, 172.
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his recommendations and "managed to reverse the sound 
democratic policies of collective bargaining, social security, 
rent controls, [and] price controls," which proved the
24Republican party to be the party of "special privilege."
Truman was convinced that the American people did not
actually realize the significance of what was happening
because of the distortion of news by the press. So the
threat of Republicans tearing down the New Deal structure
coupled with "the influence of a hostile press which promoted
the policies of the Republican party" led to the conclusion
that the only way he could win would be for Harry S. Truman
25to present the "facts to the people."
On June 3 Truman set out on a cross-country Jaunt
that was to last until June I8 . The ostensible purpose of
the trip was to receive an honorary degree from the 
University of California but this tour proved to be a preview 
of his presidential campaign. Also on this trip Truman 
received the news of the death of his Secretary of Labor,
Lewis Schwellenbach. At Seattle Truman informed a crowd of 
the event, paying high tribute to Schwellenbach as the
26"greatest" Secretary of Labor he had ever known. John R. 
Steelman was asked to fill this vacancy but declined on the
174-5.
^̂ Ibid., 177.
?6Harry Si Truman, Remarks at Seattle, Washington,
June 10, 1948, Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
147
grounds that he was more valuable in his current position,
27and Truman agreed with him. Maurice J. Tobin, Governor of 
Massachusetts, who had a good record as far as labor was 
concerned, accepted the position. Judging from his 
activities in the. campaign following his acceptance of the 
post, his speech-making ability was one of the major 
qualifications that determined Tobin's appointment.
During this June tour Truman revealed the two 
issues on which he later attacked the Republican 8oth 
Congress repeatedly--inflation and the Taft-Hartley Act. In 
a speech delivered at Butte, Montana, he charged that the 
8oth Congress had cut off almost all the appropriations to 
run the Bureau of Labor Statistics. This was quite important, 
he insisted, because this Bureau studied prices and tried to 
determine the causes of inflation. So the 8oth Congress had 
not only cut off price controls but had also removed the
28"speedometer" which told how fast prices were rising. The 
next day he told a gathering of Communications Workers of 
America that he realized they were unhappy over the Taft- 
Hartley Act but that as President he had to enforce it. The 
law came about, he said, because in 1946 only one-third of
^"^President Truman, Press Conference, July 1, 1948, 
Truman Papers, OR 21, Truman Library.
^^Harry S. Truman, Remarks at Butte, Montana,
June 8, 1948, Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
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those eligible had voted and their only remedy now was
29"November, 1948." From this trip he learned that the 
people were interested in issues and in order for them to 
make the right political decisions, they had to know the 
"facts." So in his presidential campaign of 1948 Truman, 
like a modern-day Paul Revere, would criss-cross the 
country in an operation resembling "a prolonged midnight ride 
warning the American people that the Republicans were 
coming.
The Republicans were the first of the major parties 
to hold their national convention in 1948. Thomas Dewey, 
Robert Taft and Harold Stassen were the three leading 
contenders for the nomination in this race. Stassen was 
eliminated by losing the Oregon primary. The deciding factor 
in this primary was a debate between Dewey and Stassen on 
outlawing the Communist party with Stassen taking the 
affirmative. The loss of this race "finished" Stassen as a
31potential nominee, leaving Taft as the major competitor 
for Dewey to defeat at the convention. While Taft was a 
strong contender, controlling the conservative wing of the 
party, there was a general feeling among the delegates that 
"he lacked vote-getting appeal and . . . would jeopardize
^^Ibid., Spokane, Washington, June 9, 1948.
BOvictor L. Albjerg, "Political Realignments,"
Current History, XXIII (October, 1952), 244.
"^Abels, Out of the Jaws of Victory, 60.
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the sure victory of the G.O.P."^^ As a result, the 
Republican national convention, meeting in Philadelphia on 
June 21, nominated as their presidential candidate Thomas 
Dewey of New York by acclamation on the third ballot.
Governor Earl Warren of California, the state with the fourth 
largest number of electoral votes, was nominated as the vice- 
presidential candidate to balance the ticket. The Republican 
platform omitted mentioning the Taft-Hartley Act, stating 
only that collective bargaining was "an obligation as well 
as a right" and pledged "continuing study to improve labor- 
management legislation in the light of experience and
-%» "i;!
changing c o n d i t i o n s . W i t h  most Republicans firmly united 
behind Dewey, the party was confident of victory and felt no 
need to make concessions to labor.
By contrast with Republican unity, the Democratic 
party seemed hopelessly splintered. Henry Wallace had split 
with Truman, disagreeing over the Administration's "get 
tough" attitude toward Russia. When he spoke out publicly 
against this policy he was fired as Secretary of Commerce 
in September, 1946. Wallace then became editor of the 
New Republic, using this liberal weekly as a sounding board 
to attract New Dealers who were disgusted with what they 
considered Truman's betrayal of the Roosevelt policies. Late
S^Ibid., 62-3.
■̂ ôfficial Report, 24th Republican National Convention, 
Philadelphia, June 21-25, 1948, p. 190.
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in 19^7 Henry Wallace declared his candidacy on a third 
party ticket. Reminiscent of the LaFollette movement In 
1924j the Progressive party met In Philadelphia In July 
following the other conventions and nominated Henry Wallace 
and Senator Glen Taylor as candidates for President and 
Vice-President, This third party movement thus persuaded 
many liberals and "left-wingers" to abandon the Democratic 
party.
In addition, Southern states'-rlghters withdrew 
from the Democratic party and formed another third party, 
the Dlxlecrats. When the Democratic convention, meeting 
also In Philadelphia on July 12, adopted a strong civil 
rights plank promoted by the Americans for Democratic Action, 
Southern dissidents walked out, At a meeting In Birmingham 
on July 17, a states'-rights ticket of Governor J. Strom 
Thurmond of South Carolina and Governor Fielding Wright of 
Mississippi as presidential and vlce-presldentlal candidates 
was "recommended" by delegates representing the Southern 
states plus California and Indiana. Realizing they could 
not hope to win, the Dlxlecrats planned to split the 
electoral vote so that no candidate would get an electoral 
majority. The election would then be thrown Into the House 
of Representatives where the Dlxlecrats could hold the 
balance of power and support a candidate who would oppose 
civil rights legislation. Thus the Democratic party went 
Into the campaign of 1948 with a three-way split. This
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constituted almost impossible odds against the regular 
candidate since no Democratic aspirant had won the 
Presidency without the support of the South, besides the 
loss of the extreme liberal element of the party.
Truman's national popularity had been declining 
rapidly and there was a brief but powerful movement within 
the party to block his nomination. Party regulars who 
wanted to "dump" Truman centered their support on General 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, one of the most admired and popular 
of American figures. In a public opinion poll conducted in 
June of 1948, it was found that when choosing between the 
three following candidates, the choice was Truman 26 per 
cent, Eisenhower 53 per cent, and Wallace 5 per cent, with 
l6 per cent expressing no opinion. This same poll showed
Truman with only 34 per cent against Dewey's 41 per cent and
34Wallace 3 per cent, indicating Truman's lack of popularity. 
Although Eisenhower stated in a letter January 23, 1948, 
that he would not consider being a candidate, his name 
continued to arise as a potential Democratic nominee. On 
July 5, one week before the Democratic convention, Eisenhower 
reiterated his decision not to run and oh this same day 
the New York Times indicated that Truman had the nomination 
with 809 delegates pledged to him.^^ After the General's
n 2i^ Elmo Roper, You and Your Leaders (New York: William
Morrow and C o ., 1957), 133-4.
■^^stefan Dorant, The Presidency (New York: Macmillan,
1957), 691-2 .
152
firm declaration, the drop-Truman move switched to Supreme
Court Justice William 0, Douglas but this also came to
naught as Douglas refused the honor. It seemed the Democrats
could find no candidate who wished to be sacrificed to
certain defeat by opposing the Republican nominee, except
Harry S . Truman.
After Truman decided to run, the possibility of
blocking his nomination was almost nil. To have passed over
him and nominated another candidate would have meant party
repudiation of Its leader and program, an almost certain
path to defeat. And as Truman himself points out, the
Incumbent President has much Influence with the National
Committee which usually selects a Chairman for the
convention that meets his approval. This gives the
President a great deal of control on the operation of the
convention. So Truman went Into the Democratic convention
In full control of the party machinery, although his
popularity was still at low ebb. In fact, even after his
nomination, a poll taken of Democratic voters In August
indicated that only 46 per cent thought he was the best
candidate that the party could have selected while 40 per
R7cent felt that someone else should have been nominated. 
However, due to the tight reins he held on the party regulars.
^^Truman, Memoirs, II, l86.
^'^Roper, You and Your Leaders, 134.
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Truman was able to dictate to the convention not only his 
own nomination but the platform as well.-^®
The Democratic platform unequivocably declared, "We 
advocate the repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act." The law had 
failed, the labor plank said, and labor-management disputes 
had increased because it encouraged litigation and 
"undermined the established American policy of collective 
bargaining." Instead, the Democratic party advocated 
legislation that would "establish a just body of rules to 
assure free and effective collective bargaining." This 
platform also recommended strengthening the Department of 
Labor and restoring the Federal Mediation and Conciliation 
Service, which had been made independent by the Taft- 
Hartley Act, to the D e p a r t m e n t . A f t e r  adoption of the 
platform by the convention, Harry S. Truman was nominated 
on the first ballot as the party's presidential candidate 
with 9^7 votes. Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, the 
choice of the states'-rights people, received 263 votes. 
Senator Alben Barkley received the vice-presidential 
nomination by acclamation.
Truman was on hand to deliver a rousing acceptance 
speech. Up to this point the convention had been a rather
^®Harold L. Ickes, "Taft Minus Hartley," New 
Republic, CXXI (July 18, 19^9), 16.
^^Official Report, Democratic National Convention, 
Philadelphia, 194Ü, pp. 530-1.
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humdrum affair with little enthusiasm for the party's 
standard-bearer. Speaking from notes assembled by Clark 
Clifford and Samuel Roseman, Truman opened his speech with 
the declaration that he and Barkley were going to win, an 
idea that had not been expressed too hopefully up to that 
time, and which created a new optimism in the party 
delegates. He told the convention that his June tour revealed 
that the people wanted to know the facts. He then recited 
the "facts" in a slashing attack on the "Do-Nothing Eightieth 
Congress." The sins of that Congress, he declared, 
included killing price controls, failing to pass necessary 
legislation for housing, minimum wages, social security, 
national health and civil rights. ' In labor relations, 
where moderate legislation was needed, it passed the Taft- 
Hartley Act which had disrupted labor-management relations 
and would "cause strife and bitterness for years to come" 
if not repealed.
Truman then played his trump card. The Republican 
•platform of 1948 called for many of the items Truman had 
been requesting of Congress for a long time, he charged. 
Therefore, he told the convention, he intended to call the 
"Do-Nothing" Congress into special session "on the twenty- 
sixth day of July, which out in Missouri they call Turnip 
Day," and give the Republicans a chance to prove they 
meant what they said in their platform. He planned to ask 
that special session to enact adequate legislation for
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housing, to halt rising prices, aid to. education, improve­
ment of national health, civil rights, and other items in 
the Republican platform. All this could be completed in 
fifteen days, he insisted, and congressmen would still have 
time to campaign for the coming election. "What that worst 
Eightieth Congress does in its special session will be the 
test," he stated. "The American people will decide on the 
record." This action was considered "smart" politics by 
Democrats, of course, and "dirty" politics by Republicans. 
But Truman's inflaming speech had the desired effect. The 
New York Times reported that the Democratic convention 
adjourned "with fire in its eye, in place of the glazed look 
of a week ago.
Margaret L. Coit states that the idea for this 
special session came from Bernard Baruch. She reports that 
Baruch consulted Samuel Lubell before the convention on 
Truman's strategy and later in an interview with Truman told 
him he must accept the- nomination'in person and then call a 
special session of -Congress "and dare the Republicans to
make their platform good." , She avers that Truman supposedly
42said, "By God, You've got something therel" When the
^*^Harry S. Truman, Acceptance Speech to Democratic 
Nominating Convention, Philadelphia, July 15, 1948, Truman 
Papers, OR, Truman Library.
^^New York Times, July l8, 1948.
^^Margaret L. Coit, Mr. Baruch (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1957), 625.
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special session convened on Turnip Day, the President
presented Congress his threatened requests. It would be a
great benefit to the nation, he declared, with tongue in
cheek, if this session had time to enact such legislation.
If not, then "certainly the next Congress should take them
up immediately." , The Eightieth Congress, Third Session,
44accomplished nothing, as Truman anticipated, and 
adjourned after two weeks. Truman had thus struck the first 
telling blow in the campaign of 1948, This move proved 
extremely successful in the following campaign even though 
the Republicans termed it "cheap politics."
It was reported before the Democratic convention 
that most union leaders "looked upon Truman's candidacy with 
s k e p t i c i s m . A f t e r  his nomination almost all union 
officials endorsed him. In fact Jules Abels is persuaded 
that the PAC and the LLPE each spent over $1,000,000 to 
elect T r u m a n . J o h n  L. Lewis was one of the few who 
refused to support the Democratic candidate. Although 
Lewis did not formally endorse Dewey, he urged his miners 
to defeat "Injunction Harry." At the UMW biannual convention 
in October, 1948, Lewis charged that Truman was "cowardly"
^OHarry S. Truman, Message to Congress, July 27, 1948, 
Truman Papers, OF 419-A, Truman Library.
^^Truman, Memoirs, II, 208.
^unpolitical Lineup of Union Leaders," United States 
News and World Report, XIV (June 25, 1948), 50.
^^Abels, Out of the Jaws of Victory, 224.
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In his attitude toward labor and a "malignant, scheming sort
of individual who is dangerous not only to the United Mine
Workers of America but to the United States of America." As
the Washington Star noted when reporting this speech, this
was speaking of Harry Truman "as no major figure has
referred to a President in modern times." '
To labor there was only one issue in this campaign
and that was the repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act. On this
basis labor's choice was easily made. Truman and the
Democratic platform were for outright repeal; the Republican
candidate and his party advocated "slight changes." But
the apparently meager prospect of a Truman victory stimulated
a feeling of apathy throughout the nation. When people
were asked whom they thought would win, in a poll taken in
July, 1948, Dewey received 64 per cent and Truman only 22
per cent. Elmo Roper conducted another survey after the
election, asking people which candidate they had believed
would win just before the election. In this poll the gap
was even greater with Dewey getting 69 per cent and Truman
48only 19 per cent. In fact the pollsters had generally 
given up taking polls some time before the election because 
it was considered futile since the outcome of the election 
was already decided.
'̂̂ Washington Star, October 6, 1948.
^®Roper, You and Your Leaders, 136.
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This general assumption of Dewey's victory made 
union officials' task of selling Truman to the workers much 
more difficult. But there was an additional factor which 
made the union leaders' job even more formidable. As 
Joseph A. Loftus pointed out at the time, the Taft-Hartley 
Act had proven to be "an abstract subject" to most workers 
because they had not "experienced the Slave Labor penalties"
49their leaders had predicted, Loftus observed, though, 
that the campaign had done much to develop cooperation 
between the AF of L and the CIO with the exception of the 
."far left" which supported Wallace. This rank and file labor 
Indifference to the Taft-Hartley Act was borne out by a 
public opinion poll taken In September of 1948, Roper asked 
what should be done with the law. Only 12 per cent said repeal 
It entirely, 11 per cent wanted It changed to favor unions 
more, 25 per cent desired only minor Improvements, 30 per 
cent would have liked to see It strengthened to check unions
CQfurther, and 22 per cent expressed no opinion.^
To help overcome this apathy and make sure the 1946 
mistake of labor staying home was not repeated, there was a 
strong movement within the ranks of labor to declare election 
day a holiday as suggested by William Green In the 194?
AF of L convention. On Labor Day Green delivered a speech In
^^New York Times, August 29, 1948,
^ORoper, You and Your Leaders, 136-7 .
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which he said labor's keynote should be "Use Your Votel," 
pointing out that if all workers registered and voted they 
could give the new Congress a "mandate for progress.
However, as Dayton David MeKean states, business quickly 
denounced this holiday tactic and he believes it was not 
"widely used."^^ But the forceful campaign by Truman and 
his forces brought labor to the polls in greater numbers 
than expected.
Even Department of Labor officials campaigned in 
..19^8 against the Taft-Hartley Act. John T. Kmetz, an 
Assistant Secretary of Labor, informed the Louisiana State 
Federation of Labor in April, 1948, that labor was going to 
be kept busy on many fronts defending its rights. He pointed 
out that the Taft-Hartley Act, which was "vindictively passed 
over one of the strongest Presidential veto messages" in 
history, had created "excitement and resentment." This, 
in turn, had distracted public attention from the antiunion 
drives conducted in the state legislatures.^^ Kmetz made a 
tour of this area campaigning against the law while ostensibly 
on official business. After he appeared in Dallas, Texas, 
an editorial appeared in the Dallas Times-Herald charging
51william Green, "Labor Day— Use Your Vote," Akron, 
Ohio, September 6, 1948, Vital Speeches, XIV, 23 (September 15, 
1948), 711.
5^Dayton David McKean, Party and Pressure Politics 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949), 476.
5-^John T. Kmetz, Address at Lake Charles, Louisiana, 
April 6, 1948, John T. Kmetz File (Adm.), R.G. 174,
National Archives.
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that as a government official he had attacked the Taft- 
Hartley Act and the congressmen who had voted for it.
Kmetz' defense of his speeches was that he was only 
expressing the view, gathered at labor conventions, that 
many congressmen who had voted for the measure were not going 
to return to Congress. Mrs. Katherine Dillard of the Dallas 
News reported him as saying he was not telling people how to 
vote but merely advising labor to help defeat representatives 
"who would destroy labor"^^--a rather fine distinction.
John W. Gibson, Acting Secretary of Labor following 
Schwellenbach's death, addressed a gathering of workers in 
July. In this speech he said the "propaganda line" of the 
framers of the Act was that workers wanted and needed 
"protection" and they were still working "tooth and nail to 
keep the truth about this vicious anti-labor, undemocratic 
law from the people.
The new Secretary of Labor, Maurice J. Tobin, threw 
himself into an all-out campaign against the Act. In three 
months of pre-election campaigning he delivered some I50 
speeches in more than 20 states and "in every speech he
^^House of Representatives, Sub-Committee on 
Expenditures in the Executive Departments, Hearings,
April 19, 1948, John T. Kmetz File (Adm.), R.G. 174,
National Archives.
55john W. Gibson, Address at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 
July 22, 1943, Assistant Secretary of Labor Gibson Pile 
(Speeches), R.G. 174, National Archives.
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exposed and denounced the iniquitous Taft-Hartley law.
The New York Times reported that Tobin used his first 
official news conference as Secretary of Labor to attack the 
law. The Times recorded him as calling the statute 
"impractical" and criticizing especially the closed shop 
and political expenditures bans, advocating changes "along 
the lines of the Democratic p l a t f o r m . I n  addressing a 
rally of the Liberal party in New York City, Tobin charged 
that the Republican Congress, "urged on by the NAM, took 
advantage of the emotional and hysterical atmosphere" 
engendered by the postwar strikes to pass "discriminatory 
legislation."^^ A few days later he repeated this accusation 
against the NAM. He said the only "protection" the law gave 
was to the "rugged individualists of the National Association 
of Manufacturers," pointing out how these "propaganda 
experts" had consistently fought against the Wagner Act.^9 
Another theme he used was to warn the workers to go to the
^^Maurice J. Tobin to Harry Head, October 5, 1949, 
Secretary Tobin File (1949 - CIO), R.G. 174, National 
Archives.
^^New York Times, August 19, 1948.
5^Maurice J. Tobin, Address at New York City, 
September 1, 1948, Secretary Tobin File (Speeches), R.G.
1?4, National Archives.
^^Maurice J. Tobin, Address at Akron, Ohio,
September 6, 1948, Secretary Tobin File (Speeches),
R.G. 174, National Archives.
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polls. They must "elect representatives to Congress" who 
would repeal the Taft-Hartley law.^^
It was Harry S. Truman, though, who took the issue 
he had created, by vetoing the Taft-Hartley Act, and made 
it "one of the chief political issues" of the 1948 campaign. 
Accepting the challenge of the tremendous odds against him, 
Truman undertook the greatest fight of his career. Truman 
was one of the few that summer who was convinced that he 
could win. He decided to conduct a "rip-snorting, back- 
platform campaign" to what Taft derisively termed 
"whistlestops" but what to Truman were the "heart of 
America." "When they count the whistle-stop votes," he 
declared, "Taft may be in for a big surprise," because they
62would "make the difference between victory and defeat."
The New York Post noted that there were two factors in the 
campaign that gave Democratic leaders "faint new stirrings 
of hope." First of all, Dewey's nomination had not stirred 
any particular enthusiasm among the independent voters; 
secondly, the President's "fighting tactics" of going on the 
offensive by attacks on the record of the Republican Both
^^Maurice’J. Tobin, Address at the Greater Lawrence 
Area, Secretary Tobin File (Speeches), R. G. 174, National 
Archives.
^^Congressional Digest, XXVII (April, 1949), I06.
^Drew Pearson, "The Washington Merry-Go-Round," 
Washington Post, August 15, 1948.
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Congress. This held "the promise of a stirring and exciting 
campaign" that might lead to a large turnout in voting, a 
traditional advantage for the Democrats. "In the final, 
analysis," the Post added, this new hope could be traced to 
"the fact that Mr. Truman is a fighter who doesn't know when 
he is licked.
Truman's appeal to labor was keynoted in a letter 
to be published in the Labor Day issue of the American 
Federationist. In this message he charged that the party who 
passed the Taft-Hartley Act over his veto was also responsible 
for the high cost of living. "Having inaugurated in the 
Republican-controlled 80th Congress a blueprint for tearing 
down 16 years of progress under the Democratic party," he 
continued, "the Republicans are now asking labor's support 
for their anti-labor policies." He referred to the 
Republican platform as being "afraid to mention the Taft- 
Hartley Act" while the Democratic platform boldly advocated 
its repeal. This record, he summed up, "tells American 
workers which political party has their best interests at 
heart year in and year out. In his annual Labor Day 
statement Truman declared again that the law "which unfairly 
restricts labor unions and their members . . . should be
^^"Washington Memo," New York Post, July 29, 1948.
^^Harry S. Truman to William Green, August 19, 1948, 
Truman Papers, PPF 85, Truman Library.
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repealed," He noted that labor was "making great efforts to 
get out the vote" and expressed the hope that every eligible 
voter would go to the polls in November. "Then," he said,
"the outcome will be the decision of all America.
In his actual campaign Truman electioneered thirty- 
five days, traveling approximately 31,700 miles and delivering 
356 s p e e c h e s . H e  inaugurated this campaign, significantly, 
with a Labor Day speech before 100,000 people in Cadillac 
Square, Detroit. Truman had the assistance of Clark Clifford 
and John R. Steelman in preparing this speech, asking their 
advice on "methods for carrying out the Democratic party's 
pledge to bring about repeal" of the Taft-Hartley Act.^^
Truman told the Detroit workers that a strong and free labor 
movement was the best bulwark against Communism. This 
necessitated "a friendly Administration and a friendly 
Congress" to help them remain strong. He declared that, 
although the 80th Congress did not "crack down on prices, 
it had cracked down on labor" by placing a "dangerous weapon" 
in the hands of big corporations. This weapon, the Taft- 
Hartley Act, was only a "foretaste" of what would happen 
if this Republican "reaction" were allowed to continue. If 
laborers stayed at home as they did in 1946 and allowed a
^^Harry S. Truman, Labor Day Statement, 1948,
Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
^^Truman, Memoirs, II, 219.
'̂̂ New York Times, August 24, 1948
i 65
Republican President to be elected along with a Republican 
Congress, labor would then be hit by "a steady barrage of 
body blows," he warned, and it would be deserved. He painted 
a gloomy picture of labor's position if the administration 
of the law were in the hands of a Republican, saying that 
it would bring on another "boom and bust" cycle similar to 
that of the last Republican Administration. Labor must now 
fight harder than ever before, he cautioned, and "anything 
short of an all-out vote would be a betrayal by labor of its 
own interests." "I know we are going to win this crusade for 
the right I," he c o n c l u d e d . T r u m a n  spoke to six Labor Day 
audiences that day, promising the "most important campaign 
this country has witnessed since the Lincoln-Douglas 
debates.
On September 17 Truman left Washington on an 
extended tour, but his campaign was curtailed by the 
Democratic National Committee lacking sufficient funds.
W. H. Lawrence reported that on this September trip the
Democrats were unable to "buy a single nationwide 'live'
70radio broadcast" of any of Truman's speeches. Nevertheless, 
what he lacked in the facilities of mass communications,
^^Harry S. Truman, Address at Detroit, Michigan, 
September 6, 1948, Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
^^Harry S. Truman, Address at Toledo, Ohio,
September 6, 1948, Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
^^New York Times, September 26, 1948.
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Truman made up for in personal appearances and by raising 
issues which would stimulate voters. At Herrin, Illinois, 
he said that the first action the Republicans took after 
winning control of the 80th Congress "was to pass the Taft- 
Hartley Act which was intended to take away some of the 
rights of l a b o r . A t  Carbondale, Illinois, he stated 
that the "puppet Congress" took the Republican way "backward" 
and "passed the reactionary Taft-Hartley Act."^^ At 
Evansville, Indiana, he charged that, following the 
Republican policy of keeping working people in "bounds," 
this Congress had placed "handcuffs on labor" by taking away 
its Bill of Rights. "Led by Senator Taft and Representative 
Hartley--two men who would like to take the United States 
back to the 1890's," he exclaimed, "the Republicans pushed 
through the Taft-Hartley law which converted the National 
Labor Relations Board into an agency to hamstring union 
labor."7^
Truman delivered several speeches in Kentucky and 
West Virginia on October 1, stressing the same theme. At 
Huntington, West Virginia, he raised the issue of prices 
rising faster than wages. The Republican Both Congress
T^Harry S. Truman, Remarks at Herrin, Illinois, 
September 30, 19^8, Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
72Harry S. Truman, Remarks at Carbondale, Illinois, 
September 30, 19^8, Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
^^Harry S. Truman, Remarks at Evansville, Indiana, 
September 30, 19^8, Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
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passed the Taft-Hartley Act to weaken unions, he proclaimed,
so that they could not bargain as effectively for better 
74wages. In Philadelphia he reiterated the Democratic
plank, advocating repeal of the law. He did not believe that
unions should be destroyed, he told his audience, and he
did not think the American people thought so either. He
did believe though that the American people would "repudiate
the enemies of labor at the ballot box."
At Elizabeth, New Jersey, he reminded an audience
that when the "reactionary" Republicans controlled Congress
"reactionary laws" were produced. The answer was to vote
Democratic and the people would then get "good housing . . .
repeal of that vicious Taft-Hartley Act and more social
security c o v e r a g e . At Amsterdam, New York, he repeated
his charge that two-thirds of the eligible voters stayed
home In 1946 and received a Congress that worked "for
special privilege." The first move that Congress made was to
amënd the Wagner Act so that It would no longer help labor,
he said, "but would work In the Interests of special 
77privilege." Truman answered Dewey's statement that the
'^^Harry S. Truman, Remarks at Huntington, West 
Virginia, October 1, 1948, Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
75narry S. Truman, Remarks at Philadelphia,
October. 6, 1948, Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
'^^Harry S. Truman, Remarks at Elizabeth, New Jersey, 
October 7, 1948, Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
T^Harry S. Truman, Remarks at Amsterdam, New York, 
October 8, 1948, Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
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Both Congress "delivered" for the future of the country by
claiming that It "delivered . . .  a body-blow at labor" by
passing,the Taft-Hartley Act.^^
By the time Truman reached the Mid-West he had
added a new note to his theme song. "Our good old mossback
friends passed . . . one of the most complicated laws that
anybody ever saw," he affirmed, but this Taft-Hartley Act
was not the end. Hartley's book. Our New National Labor
Policy, had been published and Truman gleefully proceeded to
quote from It, emphasizing Its sub-title, "And the Next
Steps." He cited Hartley's statement that the Taft-Hartley
Act corrected "In a single piece of legislation the
outstanding mistakes of the New Deal." Hartley had Insisted
In his book that good labor legislation would require
"Interim treatment" which was the Taft-Hartley law. Truman's
warning to labor was that after this Interim treatment the
Republicans would then "take the gloves off, and give you the
bare knuckles. Truman returned from this Mid-West tour
confident that the crowds he had attracted disproved the
fin 'polls showing Dewey In the lead.°
The President was soon back on the road winding up 
his campaign. In Scranton he compared the "shameful and
^^Harry S. Truman, Remarks at Dayton,. Ohio,
October 11, 1948, Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
79Rarry S. Truman, Remarks at Akron, Ohio,
October IT, 1948, Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
^^New York Herald Tribune, October IT, 1948.
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awful" Taft-Hartley Act to "a termite, undermining and eating
away" the "legal protection to organize and bargain 
0-1
collectively." ^ In Chicago he warned that the Taft-Hartley 
Act was but "the opening gun in the Republican onslaught
Qp.against the rights of working men in this country." He 
told New Englanders that if they wanted to know what to 
expect if the Republicans won they should read Mr. Hartley's
Q o
book. He reiterated that he wanted the Act repealed and 
the best way to accomplish this was "to elect a Democratic
Oh
President and a Democratic Congress." He assured a 
gathering in Yonkers, New York, that the Republicans would 
"pass even more restrictive labor laws" if they had a 
chance, while he was working to get the Taft-Hartley Act
8sdestroyed. Truman concluded his campaign with a speech 
in St. Louis and then went home to Independence to await 
the outcome of the election.
While Truman hit specific issues, Dewey, had 
conducted a lofty campaign centering on the theme of "unity"
®^Harry S. Truman, Remarks at Scranton, Pennsylvania, 
October 23, 1948, Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
^ % a r r y  S. Truman, Remarks at Chicago, October 25,
1948,. Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
O ■n°^Harry S. Truman, Remarks at Worcester, Massachusetts, 
October 27, 1948, Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
®^Harry S. Truman, Remarks at Taunton, Massachusetts, 
October 28, 1948, Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
^^Harry S. Truman, Remarks at Yonkers, New York, 
October 29, 1948, Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
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speaking in generalities. Taft did not like this "Me, too" 
campaign and after the election told William S. White that 
he had known three weeks before the election that Dewey 
would lose.®^ But even the day before the election a Gallup 
Poll showed Dewey with 49.5 per cent of the votes, Truman
8744.5 per cent, Wallace 4 per cent and Thurmond 2 per cent.
Elmo Roper had announced his "final" poll in August with
Truman receiving 37.1 per cent of the popular vote, Dewey
52.2 per cent, Thurmond 5,2 per cent, Wallace 4.3 per cent
88and Other 1.2 per cent. Roper insists that all the polls 
failed, exploding the persistent myth that Louis Bean 
correctly predicted Truman's victory. Roper attributes this 
tremendous polling error to four factors: (1) figures
gathered too early, (2) Truman's hard-hitting campaign changed 
votes late, (3) assumed the "Don't Know" vote would divide 
evenly and most of it went to Truman, and (4) more labor 
voted than expected.®^ Truman later said that the polls 
had been wrong because he had been willing to go out and tell 
the people what was "good" for them. "You have to sell
®^White, The Taft Story, 83.
^^Lorant, The Presidency, 712.
^^Roper, You and Your Leaders, 111. For a complete 
survey of these polls see Prederich Marsteller and Others of 
Social Science Research Council, The Pre-Election Polls of 
1948 (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1949)•
89lbid., 117-19.
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yourself, and what you stand for," he d e c l a r e d . T r u m a n  
sold himself to the American people with speeches in language 
the common man could understand, punctuated with color, humor 
and facts.
The Chicago Daily Tribune courageously released its
issue the evening of the election with the headline "Dewey
Defeats T r u m a n . E v e n  after the election returns began
showing Truman with a substantial lead, news commentators
could not accept the possibility of his winning. "Wait for
the rural vote to come in," they said with knowing assurance.
Eut the returns kept mounting an even greater lead for
Truman, The incumbent had slipped away from reporters on
election night, going to Excelsior Springs, Missouri. He
went to bed confident that when he awoke he would have been
elected. He had listened to the broadcast of H, V.
Kaltenborn at midnight when he was ahead by 1,200,000 but
according to that august commentator Truman undoubtedly
would still be beaten. At 4:30 a,m. he awoke finding himself
with 2,000,000 votes in the lead and decided he had won.
At 10:00 a,m. November 3 he received a telegram of congratu-
□ 2lations from Thomas Dewey.^ The oOth Congress, so certain 
of a Republican victory, had conveniently voted an
9®Harry S, Truman, Address, Washington, D. C .,
May 17, 1952, Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
^^Chicago Daily Tribune, November 3, 1948.
^^Truman, Memoirs, II, 220-1,
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appropriation for an impressive inauguration which the 
Democratic party proceeded to make plans to utilize.
The final popular vote made Truman a minority Presi­
dent with 24,104,836 votes or 49.4 per cent. Dewey received 
21,969,500 votes or 44.9 per cent, Thurmond 1,169,021 votes 
and Wallace 1,157,172. Truman won in twenty-eight states 
with 303 electoral votes, Dewey sixteen states with 189 
votes and Thurmond carried four Southern states and one 
elector from Tennessee for a total of 39- Truman had carried 
several large agricultural states and Jules Abels states 
that this unexpected switch in the farm vote was "the prime 
cause of the u p s e t . S a m u e l  Lubell, in The Future of 
American Politics, claims that, due to the closeness of the
vote, Truman's victory could "definitely be credited" to
94the German-American vote that switched to Truman. This 
writer observes that the German-American vote, which had 
swung away from Roosevelt in 1940 and 1944 because of the 
war, began returning to the Democratic party in 1948. It 
seems there are almost as many interpretations of the 
results-of this election as there are analysts studying it.
Unions did not hesitate to take credit for Truman's 
victory, agreeing with the New Republic declaration that
^^khels, Out of the Jaws of Victory, 290.
9^Lubell, The Future of American Politics, 134.
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"the main credit goes to organized l a b o r . Truman himself
told intimates that "labor did i t . To substantiate this
view, Newsweek later stated that three out of every four
97union members voted for Harry S. Truman. Truman points out 
that he carried the thirteen largest cities, which had a 
heavy labor vote, and if he had received the American Labor 
party votes in New York that went to Wallace he would have 
defeated Dewey in his home state. Truman insists that the 
two key states in this election were Ohio and California 
because without them he would have fallen short of a majority
qo
by 12 votes less than the required 266. The vote in these 
two states was close--Truman beat Dewey by only 17,865 in 
California and 7,107 in Chio--and certainly the labor vote 
in these states played a decisive role.
Although Abels declares that the farm vote was the 
principal factor in the upset, he agrees that, with the 
vote being so close in Ohio and California, "the union vote 
undoubtedly made the difference" in these two states.
Abels quotes an analysis made by William Lawrence in the 
New York Times of the returns of the nine largest industrial
■ 9 5New Republic, CXIX (November I5, 1948), 6 .
SGjbid. (November 22, 1948), 16.
'̂̂ Newsweek, XL (September 15, 1952), 21.
9&Truman, Memoirs, II, 221.
^^Abels, Cut of the Jaws of Victory, 293.
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counties in Ohio. This study indicated that the Democratic 
percentage shrank from 55-2 per cent in 1944 to 52.7 
per cent in 1948 in these areas. Abels concluded then that 
the farm vote gave Ohio to T r u m a n , w h i c h  would not 
necessarily contradict his previous declaration that labor 
"made the difference." At the same time Lubell decided that 
the German-American vote was the decisive factor in Ohio 
with Truman gaining over Roosevelt's showing in 1944 in those 
areas predominantly German-American.
Dewey's popular vote in Ohio dropped from 50.1 
per cent in 1944 to 49 per cent in 1948 while Truman's 
percentage was 49.5 compared to Roosevelt's 49.9 in 1944.
The deciding factor in Ohio could have been the 1 per cent 
vote that went to Wallace. If Dewey had received Wallace's 
37,596 votes he would have carried Ohio, yet Truman would 
have undoubtedly received these votes if Wallace had not 
been on the ticket. Truman's percentage in California 
dropped from Roosevelt's 56 in 1944 to 47.84 while Dewey's 
rose from 43 per cent in 1944 to 47.39 per cent. However, 
this 17,865 vote difference still gave California's 25 
electoral votes to Truman.
The election returns of the six largest industrial 
counties of Ohio and the five largest industrial counties
lOOlbid., 294.
^^^Lubell, The Future of American Politics, 134.
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of California gave Truman a substantial lead In those areas. 
But Dewey polled less votes than he did In 1944 and Truman 
less than Roosevelt In 1944 In both cases. The Important 
conclusion to be drawn from the role of labor In this 
election Is that labor returned Its support to the 
Democratic party after having briefly strayed from the fold. 
Truman had alienated unions to some extent by his strike 
draft proposal In 1946 and as a result labor did not go to 
the polls to support the Democrats In such large numbers In 
the elections of that year. With his veto of the Taft- 
Hartley Act and his vigorous campaign pledging repeal of the 
law In 1948, Truman recaptured the support of organized 
labor. But too often. In attempting to determine decisive 
factors In elections, the Importance of every state and 
every vote Is overlooked. Labor's votes throughout the 
nation were extremely Important In this election. Dewey 
also brought "unity" to the national government with the 
Democrats recapturing control of both houses of Congress.
In 1948 Truman was at an all-time low In popularity 
and after l6 years the people seemed ready for a "change"
In administration. By fighting against almost overwhelming 
odds, and almost alone In the belief that he could win,
Harry S. Truman brought about one of the most smashing 
upsets In the history of presidential elections. The total 
popular vote In this election was 48,402,070 or over
1,000,000 less than the 1944 vote and much smaller than
176
expected. That a Democratic candidate could win with such
a small turnout of voters made this election result even more
surprising to many political analysts.
That Truman was able to overcome these handicaps
was due to his fighting spirit of not knowing when he was
"licked." In this campaign he convinced the American people
that Harry S. Truman was Just "plain folks" who would fight
for them against the special interests. This appeal to the
common man was significant even in winning labor's support.
As Samuel Lubell maintains, it is highly questionable that
labor leaders have too much influence on the rank and file
workers in an election. His thesis is that the factors
tying laborers to the Democratic party "are ethnic and
102religious as well as economic." Therefore, regardless
of the official position of a union, a successful candidate 
must still sell himself and his program to the rank and 
file.
Truman's sincere commitment to repeal of the 
Taft-Hartley Act, which was a very personal thing to him, 
won the almost unanimous support of labor throughout the 
nation and turned the tide in his favor in several key states, 
It is impossible to point to any one fabtor as the deciding 
one in an election of this magnitude and scope. Truman
lO^ibid., 185.
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stated that labor was responsible for his election and is 
convinced that he won by using the Taft-Hartley Act as an 
i s s u e . A b e l s  states that the farm vote turned the tide 
and Lubell maintains that the German-American vote was the 
deciding element. All of these votes were necessary. But 
it is obvious that Harry S. Truman could not have won in 
1948 without the support he received from labor. As an 
indication of the sincerity of his intention to carry out the 
major promise he made in 1948, one of his first actions upon 
returning to Washington after the election was to call 
"a Cabinet meeting and a series of conferences to plan 
immediate repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act."^*^^
■^Personal Interview of the author with Harry S. 
Truman, August 3, 19^1, Truman Library, Independence, 
Missouri.
104Truman, Memoirs, II, 222.
CHAPTER VI
THE DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATION FAILS 
TO REDEEM A CAMPAIGN PLEDGE
Labor leaders immediately hailed the election of 
Harry S. Truman to the Presidency as a signal for the 
eradication of the "Slave Labor Law." Labor assumed credit 
for his election and, as repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act had 
been one of Truman's major campaign issues, organized labor 
was certain that his triumph meant the American people 
endorsed repeal of the detested statute. The AF of L and 
CIO annual conventions in the fall of 1948, following the 
election, were joyous celebrations. Jack Kroll, Director 
of the PAC, told the CIO meeting that the people had "given 
their mandate for the repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act" by 
voting for the platform of the Democratic party. The people, 
he said, "confidently expect fulfillment of that platform."^ 
William Green reminded the AF of L convention that Democratic
^Proceedings of the Tenth Constitutional Convention 




leaders had continuously, repeated in the campaign that they
would repeal the Act, if elected. The Democrats had won.
Green declared, so there should be no qualification of that 
2promi se.
Secretary of Labor Maurice Tobin agreed with these 
expressions, saying that when labor took its "case to the 
people," the response had been "a clear mandate to wipe out 
the Taft-Hartley law." President Truman vowed that he 
would carry out his party's platform to the best of his 
ability. However, he said that repeal of the Taft-Hartley 
Act might require re-writing of the Wagner Act as they were 
"so tangled up" he could not "tell one from the other.
Life magazine prophetically cautioned that these gay 
festivities might be "premature" since the Southern 
Democrats would still have "a swing vote in Congress." But 
labor was too pleased over the election results to heed such 
warnings.
Even before the election of 19^8 the Joint 
Congressional Committee, provided for by the Taft-Hartley Act,
2Proceedings of the Sixty-Seventh Convention of the 
American Federation of Labor, November 13-22, 194b, p. 9"!
•^Maurice J. Tobin, Address to the AF of L Convention, 
November 1^, 19^8, Secretary Tobin File (Speeches), R.G.
174, National Archives.
^President Truman, Press Conference, Key West, 
Florida, November I5, 1948, Truman Papers, OR 21, Truman 
Library.
^Life, XXV (November 29, 1948), 36.
l8o
had been conducting hearings for the purpose of proposing 
necessary amendments to the law. This "watchdog" committee, 
with Senator Joseph Ball as Chairman and Representative 
Fred Hartley as Vice-Chairman, concerned Itself basically In 
Its early Investigations with the , roblem of the NLRB being 
overloaded with work. There was a n%.d for accelerating 
NLRB action on representation and unfair practice cases 
and the Board was flooded with petitions for elections 
authorizing the union shop, Paul Herzog Informed this 
committee In June of 1$48 that the number of representation 
and unfair labor practice cases filed with the NLRB In the 
previous six months equalled those of the year 19^7 -^
The petitions for union shop elections presented 
an even more pressing problem. In these same hearings 
Robert N. Denham, the NLRB General Counsel, testified that 
In the first nine months of operation under the Act,
18,407 petitions were filed for union shop elections. The 
NLRB held 9,105 such elections covering 1,195,843 employees 
eligible to vote. The results of these elections must have 
been disappointing to the proponents of the Taft-Hartley Act 
who had hoped to curtail union security provisions as 
98,2 per cent of the employees Involved voted to retain their
^Statement of NLRB to Joint Congressional Committee 
on Labor-Management Relations, June 11, 1948, Truman Papers, 
OF 407, Truman Library,
I8l
union shop.? Denham concluded from the results of these
elections that workers did not want to accept the "so-called
emancipation" from their union bosses as provided by the 
8Act. However. Raymond Smethurst, NAM General Counsel,
replied that the suggestion for discontinuing such elections
was "too specious to receive serious attention." He
maintained that there had been no real test on the issue in
"large industrial plants" where the provision was of
significance.̂
William Green, in testifying before the committee,
recommended complete repeal of the Act. He described a
national survey taken by his union among AF of L members on
the Taft-Hartley issue. The response to this poll was a
vote of "15 to 1 against the Taft-Hartley bill."^^ However,
the committee voted unanimously against recommending any
changes in the policy at this time.^^ And when the committee
made a final report on December 31, 19^8, it found the law
"to be working well, without undue hardship upon labor
12organizations, employers, or employees."
?Joint Committee on Labor-Management Relations,
80 Cong., 2 Sess., 1948, Hearings, Ft. I, p. 50.
Qjbid., 61.
9%bid., 132.
lOlbid., Ft. II, p. 1050. 
l?New York Times, June 2, 1948.
^^Congressional Digest, XXVIII (April, 1949), 112.
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After the new policy had been in operation for a
year there were, of course, conflicting opinions in regard
to its efficacy. After ten months, the New York Times
editorialized that it was "beyond question" that the law
contained anything "to justify even faintly the dire
prophecies of its extreme critics," including those in
18President Truman's veto message. After a year's experience 
United States News and World Report believed that unions were 
stronger than ever. This magazine pointed out that union 
treasuries and membership were larger, there had been fewer 
strikes, wages were higher, and Communist infiltration into 
unions had been checked. These were quite positive results
14even though the Act was supposed to hurt labor. Professor 
Sumner Slichter compared union membership figures of l4,841,000 
in the fall of 1947 with that of 15,070,000 in the fall of 
1948 which revealed only a slight rise. But, he added, this 
slower expansion was to be expected since union membership 
had more than doubled from 1937 to 1945. Slichter declared 
that a decline in the rate of growth was inevitable. 
felt that one of the most important effects of the law had 
been to make union officials realize they could not "lean
■̂̂ New York Times, June 4, 1948.
^^"Union Gains Under Taft-Hartley Act," United States 
News and World Report, XXV (August 20, 1948), 20.
^^Sumner Slichter, "The Taft-Hartley Act," The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, LXIII (February, 19'^T^, 12.
183
too heavily on the government, and that they must avoid too 
flagrant a disregard for the welfare and convenience of the 
community. These were too extremely Important factors 
that had helped bring about the Taft-Hartley Act, and 
labor's cognizance of public concern about Industrial strife 
was a healthy Improvement,
As for management reaction, employers Indicated 
relative satisfaction with the law during the first year. 
Business Week conducted a poll of management In August of 
1948, using the sampling method to obtain "a fair measure" 
of attitude toward the new labor policy. In this poll 73 
per cent Indicated that the Act had not changed labor 
relations, 24 per cent felt It had eased labor relations, and 
3 per cent said labor problems had been made "tougher," 
Seventy-four per cent affirmed that the NLRB was administering 
the statute "In a fair and proper way" In contrast to 8 
per cent who felt the Board was unfair. Eighteen per cent 
expressed no opinion. Fifty per cent of those polled 
believed the Act should be amended, 42 per cent wanted It 
retained with no change and only 1 per cent favored repeal, 
with 7 per cent expressing no opinion. Of those who 
advocated amendments, 75 per cent wanted compulsory 
arbitration, 75 per cent wished to ban Industry-wide 
strikes, and 53 per cent Indicated a desire to ban
l6Ibid., l6,
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industry-wide b a r g a i n i n g . W h i l e  many employers were 
convinced the law did not go far enough in restricting 
labor, management in general was satisfied with the new 
"balance" and was reluctant to utilize the provisions which 
might hurt the unions with whom they had to negotiate.
One of the purported purposes of the policy had
been to free members from control of labor bosses by making
unions more democratic. But as Philip Taft has illustrated,
the Both Congress committed the fallacy of assuming a
conflict between rank and file members and their officials
which did not exist. This misconception was borne out by the
large favorable votes in union shop elections, negligible
use of decertification procedures, and the large majorities
by which members had voted against the employer's "last 
1 Aoffer." Walter Reuther complained of the Taft-Hartley 
provision which prohibited an employer firing an employee 
for non-payment of union fines. Reuther said that under 
the Wagner Act unions had fined members for not attending 
meetings but were now restricted in this practice. As he 
pointed out, this provision curtailed enforced democratic 
participation and"yet was included in the law to "protect"
^'^"What 528 Management Men Think of Taft-Hartley 
Law," Business Week (August 21, 1948), p. 19.
^®Philip Taft, "Internal Affairs of Unions and the 
Taft-Hartley Act," Industrial and Labor Relations Review,
XI (April, 1958),
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19members. ^ However, as one writer put it, the shoe was now
20"on the other foot," Management had disliked the Wagner
Act and endeavored to change it just as labor now bewailed 
the Taft-Hartley Act and fought for its repeal.
The basic motivation behind labor's desire to repeal
the Taft-Hartley Act stemmed not so much from the current
abridgement of union activities but from fear of what the
future might produce under operation of the law. As Life
magazine stated, labor did not "mind," and had no reason to
resent, the statute during the period of relatively full
employment. But if unemployment were to rise as a result of
an economic slump in the future, management might be able
to take advantage of certain phases of the law's "gimmicks
21to bust the unions." If the economy were to go into a
sharp decline and mass unemployment ensued, labor leaders 
feared that antiunion employers could utilize the Act's 
restrictive provisions to destroy union effectiveness. But 
this argument could be answered by the fact that the elements 
determining union bargaining power such as the level of 
economic activity, industrial costs, product market 
structures, nonunion competition, and quality of union
^^Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
83 Cong., 1 Sess., 1953, Hearings, Pt. 1, p. 423.
^^Edwin E. Witte, "An Appraisal of the Taft-Hartley 
Act," American Economic Review, XXXVIII (May, 1948), 38I.
^^Life, XXV (November 29, 1948), 36.
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leadership, have been only slightly affected by the law.
One labor relations expert asserted that, although union
gains would slow down in a future depression, this would
result from "the relevant factors in the economic environment
impinging on union bargaining power," and not from the
2?Taft-Hartley Act as such.
Even Business Week, the eminent periodical of 
businessmen, lent credence to this fear of labor. Soon 
after the results of the election of 1948 were known, and it 
was clear that the Democrats would attempt to repeal the 
statute, this magazine lamented its coming extinction by 
stating that the Act had been a failure because of lack of 
consent. "Only a police state can enforce a law which is 
believed to be unjust by the people it affects," Business 
Week observed. The mistake committed by the Taft-Hartley 
Act was that it went too far in crossing "the narrow line 
separating a law which aims only to regulate from one which 
could destroy." To prove its argument, this article then 
drew up a blueprint by which unions could be wiped out in 
a period of unemployment. Whenever a pool of surplus labor 
existed from which to hire strike replacements, employers 
could use four provisions of the law to break unions. When 
a strike occurred, management could hire replacements and
22Joseph Shister, "The Impact of the Taft-Hartley 
Act on Union Strength and Collective Bargaining," Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review, XI (April, 1958), 346.
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then follow these steps: (l) restrain picketing by
injunction, (2) employer petition for a collective bargaining
election, (3) hold strikers ineligible to vote--while the
replacements cast the only ballots, and (4) if the election
outcome was "no union," the government would have to certify 
24and enforce it. This article did nothing to quiet union 
suspicions and was widely quoted by those attempting to 
illustrate how the Act could wreck organized labor.
After the election of 1948 even management accepted 
the fact that the national labor policy would be changed 
by the new Congress. Business Week made the unequivocal 
statement that the Taft-Hartley law would "give way before 
a new Thomas-Lesinski act early in 1949," and stated that 
employers were signing new contracts contingent on a change 
in the statute. The fact that contracts with union shop 
agreements were being signed following the election of 1948
without the formality of a union shop election required by
?4the Taft-Hartley Act was given as an example.
Labor leaders were even more certain that they 
would soon be free of the hated law. The New York Times 
reported that an AF of L delegation called at the White 
House before Christmas, 1948, and five officials of the CIO 
were Truman's first White House visitors after his return
2o"why the Taft-Hartley Act Failed," Business Week 
(December l8, 1948), 124.
^^Ibid., November 20, 1948.
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from a holiday in Missouri. Both of these delegations
"received his assurance that labor legislation headed the
agenda he would ask Congress to a p p r o v e . U n i o n s  throughout
the country were quick to remind the Administration of the
campaign promise to repeal thé Taft-Hartley Act. Even the
new Senate Majority Leader, Scott Lucas of Illinois, had
his attention called to this vow by the President of the
Communications Workers of America who stressed the point
that the law was "one of the most talked of issues" in that
campaign and that the Democrats had pledged r e p e a l . T h e
peak of this mail, requesting repeal of the statute, was
reached in April and May of 19^9 when the White House
mailroom reported about 3,000 letters and postcards received
27in these two months. '
The New York Times announced in December of 1948
that organized labor was agreed on the "main outlines of
legislative policy" it expected the 8lst Congress to enact.
Labor was now ready to accept bans on jurisdictional strikes
and secondary boycotts involving unjustifiable objectives
if it could get the Taft-Hartley Act repealed and the Wagner 
28Act re-enacted. These were the two major changes President
^^New York Times, December 30, 1948.
2&J, A. Beirne to Scott W. Lucas, March 10, 1949, 
Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
^^Mailroom to William Hopkins, Memorandum, n.d.,
Truman Papers, OP 550, Truman Library.
^^New York Times, December 14, 1948.
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Truman had requested of the Both Congress in his I9U7 
State of the Union Message.
Secretary of Labor Tobin, who had toiled so 
diligently to make the Taft-Hartley Act an issue in the 
campaign of 1948, was completely convinced that the results 
of the election indicated a mandate for repeal. Tobin 
believed that the Taft-Hartley Act had created "a situation 
more dangerous than the open-shop drive and the so-called 
rights of the individual worker campaigns" of the 1920's 
and must be stricken from the s t a t u t e s . I n  a speech 
delivered to the annual Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinner, 
Secretary Tobin emphasized that the Administration intended 
to carry out "the solemn pledges made to the people" in the 
election and pointedly added that even Senator Taft had 
"abandoned much of his own law." "The Taft-Hartley law will 
be repealed," he proclaimed.
President Truman addressed this same gathering with 
the announcement that the Democratic party was working, and 
would continue to work, until the law was replaced with one 
that was "fair and decent." The Taft-Hartley Act was "an 
insult to the working men and women of the country," he 
declared, and they would not rest until it was "repealed
^^Maurice J. Tobin, "Town Meeting of the Air,"
March I5, 1949, Secretary Tobin File (Speeches), R.G. 174, 
National Archives.
^^Ibid., Remarks at Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinner, 
Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D. C ., February 24, 1949.
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and destroyed." Truman said he assumed that after the
outcome of the preceding election the Republicans would
want "to throw the Taft-Hartley Act overboard faster than
the sailors got rid of Jonah." Instead, he had found that
the "special interests" were waging a campaign to convince
everyone that it was a good law and thus obstruct its 
31repeal. Truman's response to a letter maintaining that 
labor was not the only group that helped to elect him 
President was to send the writer a copy of the Democratic
32platform with the section on repeal of the Act underlined. 
Even Scott Lucas agreed that as a result of the election 
revocation of this law was "one of the most crucial problems 
facing the Eighty-First Congress.
When the 8lst Congress met in January of 19^9 
President Truman submitted a program to carry out his 
campaign promises. Cyrus S. Ching had suggested some items 
he wanted included in the annual message to Congress. Ching' 
believed that the national labor policy would be strengthened 
if the boards of inquiry, provided for by the Taft-Hartley 
Act, were permitted to make recommendations for settlement
^^Harry S. Truman, Address at Jefferson-Jackson 
Day Dinner, Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D. C ., February 24, 
1949, Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
S^Harry S. Truman to Clarence F . Lea, December 2, 
1948, Truman Papers, OP 407, Truman Library.
2-^Scott W. Lucas to John R. Steelman, November 20, 
1948, Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
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of labor disputes rather than merely reporting the facts.
In addition Ching wanted amendments to eliminate the secret 
vote on the employer's "last offer," to shorten the 
injunction to less than 8o days, and to provide that 
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service employees should 
not testify before courts, boards or agencies with regard to 
Service records.^ Secretary of Labor Tobin proposed a 
sweeping two-point program to carry out the Administration's 
campaign promises to labor in his recommendations for this 
message, Tobin wanted to transfer the Federal Mediation 
and Conciliation Service and the National Labor Relations 
Board directly to the Department of Labor, and he proposed 
repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act and re-enactment of the Wagner 
Act.
In his State of the Union Message to Congress Truman 
observed that workers were "unfairly discriminated against" 
by the Labor-Management Relations Act of 19^7 and he 
recommended its repeal. He requested that Congress then 
re-enact the Wagner Act with amendments prohibiting 
Jurisdictional strikes, unjustified secondary boycotts, and 
the use of economic force in interpreting existing contracts.
3^Cyrus S. Ching to the President, December l4, 1948, 
Truman Papers, OF 419-F, Truman Library.
35^aurice J. Tobin to James E. Webb, December 30, 
1948, TrUman Papers, OF 419-F, Truman Library.
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These were Items he had been requesting of Congress since 
he vetoed the Case bill In 1946. Truman also asked that the 
Department of Labor be "rebuilt and strengthened" with 
"those units properly belonging" to It placed under Its 
Jurisdiction, but he did not specify any a g e n c i e s . T h e  
New York Times presented an Interesting graph Illustrating 
congressional reaction to this annual message. On a ten-point 
scale, Truman's reference to repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act 
brought a response of eight points of applause, equalled 
only when he expressed a hope of "cooperation with Congress," 
and exceeded only at the conclusion of his message.
The Chicago Dally Tribune, In a fantastic analysis. 
Interpreted Truman's labor proposals to "boll down almost 
to a design" to remove the names of Senator Taft and. 
Representative Hartley from the law and "re-enact some of 
Its more Important provisions." The Tribune did note 
Important omissions In the message such as the non-Communlst 
affidavit and union financial reports. The writer 
sarcastically deduced that President Truman therefore 
believed It "all right for Communists to run unions . . . and 
union bosses to loot union treasuries without being 
embarrassed."^® The New York Star believed that the proposal
36'Harry S. Truman, State of the Union Message to 
Congress, January 9, 19^9, Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
3^New York Times, January 9, 1949.
3®Chlcago Dally Tribune, January 6, 1949.
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to re-enact the Wagner Act with improvements made "sense,"
The Both Congress had produced a statute that challenged
"the wit of the best Philadelphia lawyer" and "new patches
on such a bad patchwork" would be a "waste of effort,
The Wall Street Journal agreed that Truman could expect
repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act but that Congress might modify
the Wagner Act more than "Mr. Truman and labor leaders want,"
The Journal anticipated a "big fight" in Congress over the
issues of the closed shop, the antistrike injunction, an
independent NLRB, and separation of NLRB Judicial and
40prosecutory functions.
Newspaper columnist Peter Edson was the first to
note President Truman's reference to "a fair deal" and
felt this would be a good name to describe his .program. It
was not a "new" New Deal, Edson insisted, because everything
in Truman's program had been mentioned in the 1948 campaign,
and it was not the "old" New Deal because it went "far
beyond anything Franklin D, Roosevelt ever thought o f ,
This same newspaper remarked that Truman's message indicated
the Administration was "intent on moving first and fastest on
42new labor legislation to replace the Taft-Hartley law,"
S^New York Star, January 6, 1949.
^^Wall Street Journal, January 6, 1949.
^^Washington News, January 6, 1949.
42ibid,
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While the Administration and labor leaders were
unanimous on the objectives of the desired labor policy,
a disagreement developed as to means of achievement. It
was agreed that the Taft-Hartley Act should be repealed
and the Wagner Act re-enacted with improvements. But labor
leaders wanted the Wagner Act to be reinstated and amended
later whereas the Administration preferred the strategy
of completing the entire program in one bill. The
New York Times noted that President Truman failed to tell
Congress in his message whether the "one package" or "two
package" method should be followed in enacting new
legislation. The Times stated that the AF of L and CIO
presidents interpreted the State of the Union Message as
4Sfavoring the two-step procedure. However, labor was soon 
disillusioned as the Administration pursued the "one package" 
approach. As the New Republic pointed out, the Administration 
believed that something was needed immediately to replace 
the national emergency section of the Taft-Hartley law that 
had proved so useful. The motivation behind this conviction 
was a "political fear that Truman would be badly hurt" if he 
lacked the power "to deal with a hypothetical John L. Lewis 
coal strike.
^̂ New York Times, January 6, 1949.
^^"One Package or Two?," New Republic, CXX 
(January 24, 1949), 7.
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The 19^8 elections had returned control of Congress 
to the Democrats. The Blst Congress was composed of 263 
Democrats In the House and 5^ in the Senate against 42 
Republican Senators and I7I Representatives. In tabulating 
the members of this new Congress in terms of their stand 
on the Taft-Hartley Act, the Congressional Digest found that 
222 of the 331 Representatives who voted to override the 
veto had returned and 54 of the 68 Senators who voted to
45override were still members. A congressional majority of 
those who favored the Act in 194? reappeared in Congress in 
1949. This was not a very optimistic picture to anyone who 
analyzed the congressional situation closely. But in the 
eyes of labor the election results were a clear mandate for 
repeal. Labor asserted that it had elected 16 pro-labor 
Senators and defeated 9 Taft-Hartley Senators while in the 
House union votes had elected 172 pro-labor Representatives 
and defeated 57 Taft-Hartley congressmen.^^ In one state 
election in particular labor could claim credit for the 
result since the Taft-Hartley Act was the principal issue 
in the contest. Senator Joseph Ball of Minnesota, who had 
done so much to assist Taft in producing the statute, came 
up for re-election in 1948. Hubert Humphrey ran on the 
Democratic ticket against Ball and defeated him, using the
^^Congressional Digest, XXVIII (April, 1949), 101.
^^Rayback, A History of American Labor, 402-3.
196
law as the "sole Issue" on which to campaign. But the 
fact remained that the Administration had pledged repeal of 
the.Act while a majority In the new Congress had voted for 
It. It remained to be seen whether enough congressmen had 
changed their minds In two years, or If the Administration 
could exert enough pressure to obtain sufficient votes for 
repeal.
When the 8lst Congress was organized, the Admini­
stration Democrats were quick to fill the vacancies on the 
Senate Labor Committee with pro-labor men like Humphrey and 
Paul Douglas of Illinois. Senator Elbert Thomas, the new 
committee Chairman, made Immediate plans to secure repeal of 
the Taft-Hartley Act. On January 6 Thomas Introduced S. 249 
where It was referred to his committee. Hearings were held 
from January 31 to February 26 and the Thomas bill was 
reported favorably out of committee on March 4, 1949.
Thomas' counterpart In the House, Representative John 
Leslnskl, Introduced an Identical bill, H.R. 2032, on 
January 31. The House Labor Committee conducted hearings 
from March 8 to March 21, 1949, and favorably reported the 
Leslnskl bill with no amendments. The Thomas-Leslnskl bill 
was the Administration's measure to fulfill Its promise to 
labor.
^'^House of Representatives, Sub-Commlttee of Committee 
on Education and Labor, 8l Cong., 1 Sess., 1949, Hearings 
(H.R. 2032), 843.
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The Administration measure was drawn up under the
supervision of Secretary of Labor Tobin. Senator Thomas,
who directed the Administration's legislative forces in
this project, held a meeting with Ching, Herzog, Tobin and
Clark Clifford the second week of January to discuss the
proposed legislation. After these discussions Tobin was
asked by Thomas to draft the bill and the result was the
proposed National Labor Relations Act of 1949, "designed to
return to the policy first declared in the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935."^® The New York Times charged that
labor union lawyers were consulted in the drafting and as a
result the bill bore "virtually no substantial resemblance to
,.49the Taft-Hartley law.
The Thomas-Lesinski bill provided for the repeal of 
the Taft-Hartley Act and re-enactment of the Wagner Act with 
certain amendments. The national labor policy would revert 
to that from 1935 to 1947, but in addition secondary boycotts 
with unjustifiable objectives would be prohibited. Parties 
to a collective bargaining agreement would have to give the 
Conciliation Service 30 days notice prior to modification 
or termination of such contract to allow the setting up of 
a board of inquiry to investigate the proposed changes. The 
scope of free collective bargaining would be expanded by
^^Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
8l Cong., 1 Sess., 1949, Hearings, P t . <1, 19-20.
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again allowing the check-off and union security provisions.
The new law also provided procedures to avert national 
emergencies arising out of work stoppages during the 30-day 
period when a board of inquiry would be investigating the 
dispute. The Thomas-Lesinski bill would have returned 
federal conciliation services to the Department of Labor 
but retained the five-man NLRB set up by the Taft-Hartley 
Act. Finally, the bill provided for a Labor-Management 
Advisory Committee composed of representatives from labor, 
management and the public to advise the Secretary of Labor 
in regard to policy and administration of the Conciliation 
Service.
Secretary of Labor Tobin was the first to testify 
before the Senate committee. Tobin listed several "important" 
reasons why he felt the Taft-Hartley Act should be repealed. 
The ban on the closed shop had outlawed collective bargaining 
agreements that had been "mutually beneficial to both labor 
and management" and had helped to keep industrial peace for 
over 100 years. The law was pernicious in emphasizing the 
use of injunctions to settle labor disputes, he said. The 
act abandoned the principles of the Administrative Procedures 
Act of 1947, singling out the NLRB as the only regulatory 
agency to have its functions separated. By providing for so 
many elections employer-employee relations were kept in an 
unstable condition and it was unjust to allow strike-breakers 
fb vote while denying this privilege to strikers who had not
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been reinstated. The law was unreasonable in restricting 
peaceful picketing and certain aspects of collective 
bargaining agreements like the check-off and welfare funds.
The Taft-Hartley Act was unfair, Tobin charged, in 
banning union political expenditures and all secondary 
boycotts and by allowing unions to be sued in federal 
courts. And an error had been made in removing the 
Conciliation Service from the Department of Labor where it 
had functioned successfully for 3^ years. Tobin summed up 
his criticisms of the Taft-Hartley Act by blaming its bad 
features on the atmosphere of the times that gave it birth. 
Had Congress been faced with "different economic and 
psychological conditions" in 19^7, Tobin explained "the 
result would undoubtedly have been very different from that 
Act."5“
Cyrus S. Ching, Director of the Federal Mediation 
and Conciliation Service, testified that it would be a 
mistake to restore his Service to the Department of Labor. 
Experience as an- independent agency, he explained, had 
indicated that the new system was more effective. Management 
regarded the Department of Labor as "the spokesman for labor" 
and this had tainted the Service when it was under the 
Department's jurisdiction. As an independent agency, Ching
^^Maurice J. Tobin, Statement to Senate Committee on 
Labor and Public Welfare, January 31, 19^9, Secretary Tobin 
Pile (Speeches), R.G. 17^, National Archives.
200
stated. Service employees now found many employers'
."doors ajar" that had previously been closed to them. 
Management was now more willing to use his agency's services 
than they had been under the Wagner Act.^^
The CIO filed a 112-page statement with the 
committee describing Its views on the Taft-Hartley Act.
Arthur J. Goldberg explained that the CIO had "not had 
access to the avenues of public opinion" and resorted to 
this lengthy testimony as a means of expressing his organi­
zation's views. He stated that the Saturday Evening Post 
had published two pro-Taft-Hartley artlcles--one on the eve 
of the 1948 electlon--but when the CIO asked to submit a 
report describing the faults of the statute, the Post 
replied that It would solicit only those articles It desired. 
Goldberg also pointed out that the New York Times had 
published several editorials favorable to the Act but, 
when he sent the Times a letter presenting his viewpoint.
It was not printed.^
The strategy of those who opposed the Thomas- 
Leslnskl bill In the House took the form of Introductlng a 
counter-proposal. The coalition of Republicans and Southern 
Democrats, desiring to keep the Taft-Hartley law Intact, 
sponsored a bill Introduced by John S. Wood of Georgia In,
^^Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
8l Cong., 1 Sess., 19^9, Hearings, Pt. 1, pp. 99-6.
52lbld., 939-6.
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March which contained all the major provisions of the Labor- 
Management Relations Act of 19^7- Their plan, which was 
carried out, was to offer a motion to substitute the Wood 
bill for Lesinski's and the Administration congressmen would 
then have to amend the Wood bill piece by piece to restore 
the Lesinski bill.^^ The Administration's reaction to the 
Wood bill was typified by Secretary Tobin's description of 
it as being "as objectionable as the Taft-Hartley Act."^^ 
However, in April Tobin still believed that the 
Administration's bill would prevail in Congress. He based 
this opinion on the fact that he had been keeping "a close 
check on practically every member on the hill." He said 
this check revealed that "a great many" Democrats and 
Republicans who had voted for the Taft-Hartley Act were now 
ready to vote for the Thomas-Lesinski bill as they now 
realized the "unfairness of the Taft-Hartley law. This 
conviction was either bluster or wishful thinking. A White 
House memorandum, drawn up in May, indicated that the 
Administration could count on only 38 Senators and 200 
Representatives for support of the Thomas-Lesinski bill and 
this House count was probably "overoptimistic." This
5^New York Times, April 2, 1949.
5^Maurice J . Tobin, Press Conference, April 13, 19^9, 




memorandum emphasized that the entire state Democratic 
delegations from Alabama, South Carolina, Virginia,'Georgia, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, Texas, and Arkansas would vote 
against Taft-Hartley r e p e a l . ^6
House debate on the proposed new labor law began 
April 26. Lesinski defended the committee bill on the 
grounds that the 19^8 election was a mandate for repeal.
"•After months of debate, after more than a year's experience, 
after a public scrutiny of the law that was detailed and pains­
taking, the voters of the Nation expressed their opinion"
by electing the presidential candidate who advocated
57repeal, Lesinski maintained. The opposition argument for
the Wood bill, led by Samuel McConnell of Pennsylvania,
centered on the point that the 19^6 elections were a mandate
for the Taft-Hartley Act whereas the 19^8 elections gave no
mandate for repeal. It was also claimed that, irrespective
of a popular' mandate, the Taft-Hartley law protected individual
workers and was good for the country.
On May 4 the House took a final vote on the Lesinski
bill. By the close vote of 212 to 209 the bill was
s8recommitted to committee.^ The New York Times reported
^^Memorandum, unsigned (file date May 6, 19^9),
Truman Papers, OP 407, Truman Library.




that this "hairline" decision gave the Democratic leaders
and "labor chieftains little more than a chance to fight 
eg
another day."^ The New Republic stated that only this last 
minute move to recommit had prevented the adoption of the Wood 
bill. One writer blamed the failure on "Secretary of Labor 
Tobin for premature and maladroit efforts to compromise, 
and to Speaker Sam Rayburn for lack of support of the 
President's program.
The Senate did not begin debate on the Thomas bill 
until June 2.. In the meantime, the opposition coalition 
under the leadership of Taft, followed the strategy of their 
House counterparts by offering a substitute bill on May 4. 
However, Taft's bill was a sincere attempt to correct some 
of the imperfections which by this time he realized existed 
in the Taft-Hartley Act. Taft's amendments.to the Thomas 
bill would have changed the Taft-Hartley law in some 30 
ways. The major alterations he presented included changing 
definitions so that only actual foremen would be considered 
supervisors and unions would be responsible only for actions 
of their actual agents and not their entire membership. His 
bill proposed enlarging the NLRB to seven members and making 
it bipartisan, putting the Board back under the Administrative
^^New York Times, May 5, 1949.
60"The Lesson of Defeat," New Republic, CXX 
(May 16, 1949), 5.
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Procedures Act and abolishing the independent General 
Counsel. Taft also wanted to eliminate the voting require­
ment to authorize the union shop, featherbedding restrictions, 
the prohibition against striking employees not being 
eligible to vote if ineligible for reinstatement, and he now 
would permit a limited use of the secondary boycott. His 
amendments would have simplified union financial reports, 
extended the non-Communist oath to employers, allowed the 
check-off on a yearly basis, and kept the prohibition on 
union political contributions in elections but permit union 
political expenditures. Finally, Taft wanted to change 
the national emergency provisions to give the President, 
during such a strike, the alternative of referring to 
Congress for special legislation, applying for a court 
injunction for 6o days, or seizure. These provisions, 
if enacted, would have eliminated the most objectionable 
features of the Taft-Hartley Act.
Thomas opened Senate debate by stating that with 
S. 249 the Democratic party was thus fulfilling its campaign 
promise. Although he admitted that the election results 
could not be attributed to any single issue or factor, still 
"perhaps no single question . . .  in that election more 
clearly demonstrated the character of choice the people had"
^^Congressional Record, 8l Cong., 1 Sess., 1949,
XCV, 5590.
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62than the Taft-Hartley law. Taft replied that, however 
bound the President might be by his promise to repeal the 
statute, there was no such mandate on Congress. He defended 
this by pointing out that the present Congress contained 
222 Representatives and 54 Senators, or more than a majority, 
who had voted to override President Truman's veto. Taft 
agreed that his proposed amendments would help labor 
relations but argued that "except for the rather violent 
labor propaganda," the Taft-Hartley Act had, without these 
changes, "entirely satisfied the people of the United 
States.
A final vote was taken on the labor bill on
June 30, 1949- Taft's amendments to the Thomas bill were
approved 49 to 44 and the Thomas bill then passed the Senate
51 to 42.^^ Many of the Administration Democrats, wanting
complete repeal, voted against the amended bill and thus
almost defeated it. The Thomas bill was then sent to the
House where it was referred to the Committee on Education and
Labor on July 1. However, it was never reported to the 
65House floor.






having wrecked "the Administration's six months effort to
repeal the Taft-Hartley Act."^^ Truman's immediate reply
was that he would continue to fight as "hard" as he could to
carry out the Democratic p l a t f o r m . J a m e s  C. Petrillo
assured the President that labor did not feel it had been
betrayed by the Administration but by John L. Lewis because
68of his previous heedless actions. Harold L. Ickes agreed
with this opinion that Lewis' previous disregard for public
opinion had assisted Taft in defeating the Thomas bill.
Benjamin Aaron summed up the failure on the grounds that .
there was no "popular mandate" for repeal because much of
70the voting public was indifferent to the issue. Also, 
Southern Democrats, who were beyond the political reach of 
unions, could indulge their desires and did so even in the 
face of Truman's threat that he would use voting on the 
Thomas-Lesinski bill as a test of party loyalty for patronage.
^^New York Times, July 1, 1949.
^'^President Truman, Press Conference, June 30, 1949, 
Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
^^Jarnes C, Petrillo to the President, telegram,
June 30, 1949, Truman Papers, OR 407, Truman Library.
^^Harold L . Ickes, "Taft Minus Hartley," New Republic, 
CXXI (July 18, 1949), 16.
T^Benjamin Aaron, "Amending the Taft-Hartley Act: A
Decade of Frustration," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 
XI (April, 1958), 330.
T^President Truman, Press Conference, April 28,
1949, Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
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But the basic cause for failure can be attributed to the 
fact that the strongest Administration supporters refused to 
accept any compromise. It proved impossible to obtain the 
necessary votes to i-epeal the Taft-Hartley Act, but if the 
Administration had been willing to compromise on half-a-loaf 
some of the worst features of the law would have been removed 
by Taft's proposed amendments. The Saturday Evening Post 
declared that the Administration had not attempted to write 
a workable labor law but was trying "to pay off its debt 
to labor's leaders" and the result was inevitable.
• William Green attributed the defeat of repeal of 
the "treacherous" law to "obstructionists" who "were able to 
deny a fair deal to the American people." Green declared 
that the "leaders of Toryism welded the surviving remnants 
of the Republican forces into a tight coalition with the 
Southern Democrats" in the 8lst Congress and thus checked 
the 1948 mandate for "progress and social justice."
President Truman refused to concede that the battle was lost. 
Although the "special interests" managed to prevent repeal 
of the Taft-Hartley Act, the issue was "far from settled."
"We are going to continue the fight for the repeal of that
72iiTruman's Labor Advisors Weave a Tangled Web," 
Saturday Evening Post, CCXXI (March 5, 1949), 10.
T^William Green, "American Labor Must be Strong and 
Free," Speech at San Diego, California, September 5, 1949, 
Vital Speeches, XV (September l4, 1949), 715.
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repressive law/' he promised, "until it is wiped off the 
statute b o o k s . A l m o s t  a year after the Thomas-Lesinski 
failure Truman reiterated his dedication to continue the 
fight, saying that the people had elected him on the 
Democratic platform which called for r e p e a l . A  few days 
after this speech he reminded the Democratic party of its 
promise, vowing to repeal the statute and "replace it with 
a law that is fair to both management and labor.
It was not until 1951 that the Taft-Hartley Act
was amended for the first and only time during the Truman
Administration. , This change came in the provision requiring
union shop authorization elections as a result of a Supreme
Court decision. Between the passage of the Act and the time
it was amended, 46,146 such authorization elections were
conducted and the union shop was rejected in only 2.9
per cent of these elections. Of the 9,069,261 workers who
voted, 85.7 per cent approved the union shop, substantiating
77the conviction that this provision was useless. A number of
'^^Harry S. Truman, Address at Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, 
September 3> 1949, Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
'^^Harry S. Truman, Address at Butte, Montana,
May 12, 1950, Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
"^^Harry S. Truman, Address at the National Democratic 
Oonference, May 15, 1950, Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
'^^Philip Taft, "Internal Affairs of Unions and the 
Taft-Hartley Act," Industrial and Labor Relations Review,
XI (April, 1958), 35^
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these elections had been held in 1948 under NLRB auspices 
before CIO officials had signed the non-C.ommunist oath. The 
Taft-Hartley Act required union officials to sign such an 
affidavit or their union would be ineligible for benefits 
under the law, such as NLRB-sponsored elections. In May, 
1951, in what was known as the Highland Park Case, the 
Supreme Court ruled these elections invalid because the 
union officials had not signed the affidavit prior to the
y O
voting, thus nullifying some 4,700 such elections. It 
was estimated that the cost of holding new elections would 
run "in excess of $3,000,000 of public f u n d s , s o  Congress 
decided to validate them with special legislation.
In August, 1951, S, 1959, sponsored by Robert Taft 
and Hubert Humphrey, was unanimously approved by the Senate 
Labor Committee, The bill would validate the outlawed 
elections and remove the Taft-Hartley requirement for 
union shop elections. As Representative Richard Nixon 
stated, the bill had "the additional merit of having the 
support of both industry representatives," as well as unions. 
The bill passed the Senate on August 21 by unanimous consent
^^National Labor Relations Board v. Highland Park 
Manufacturing Company, 341 U.S. 322 (1951).
^^Harry S. Truman, Statement, October 22, 1951, 
Truman Papers, OF 145, Truman Library.




and was sent to the House of Representatives. The House
approved the measure, without amendments, on October 9 by
Q 2a vote of 307 to 18, with 103 not voting.
President Truman signed the bill on October 22, 1951. 
He used the occasion to strike again at the.Taft-Hartley 
Act, saying that while S. 1959 was "desirable," it eliminated 
"only one of the Act's defects." He expressed the hope that 
this law would be "the forerunner of the future development 
of sound legislation behind which labor, management, 
government and the people may unite to achieve industrial
O
peace and economic progress in the national interest.”
The election of 1948 and the action of Congress in 
1949, .on labor legislation, proved a striking example of 
the "double constituency" in American politics. When the 
Republicans won control of Congress in 1946 they claimed 
it was a mandate for the Taft-Hartley Act. When Harry S. 
Truman was elected President in 1948, mainly because of his 
opposition to the law, he claimed a mandate for repeal. On 
both occasions the defeated insisted that the election results 
stemmed from factors other than those which the victors 
maintained. In both instances there was a manifest edict 
from the people. However, the different results in 1947
81Ibid., 10464.
Q^Ibid., 12864.
^Harry S . Trurr 
Truman Papers, OP 145, Truman Library.
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and 19^9 can be attributed to Congress being elected by, 
and representing the interests of, the business, middle 
class and agrarian groups of the nation who favored retention 
of the law.
Although many who voted for the Act were defeated in 
19^8, a congressional majority of "Taft-Hartleyites" 
returned to Washington in 19^9 and, disclaiming Truman's 
apparent mandate, withheld the desired legislation. The 
Democratic majority in Congress, being so small, was 
dependent on the Southern Democrats for support to enact any 
contested legislation and the continued coalition of 
Republicans and Southern Democrats defeated the Administration 
effort. So the nation's labor legislation remained unaltered 
even though the Democratic President insisted that the 
people wanted it changed and did all he could to help his 
constituency, the laboring masses. Failing in this 
frontal assault on the Taft-Hartley Act, the Administration 
next turned to indirect means to achieve its objective--the 
operation of a national labor policy which would not be 
prejudicial to labor unions.
CHAPTER VII
HARRY S. TRUMAN ALTERS NLRB ADMINISTRATION
When the Truman Administration failed in its 
frontal attack on the Taft-Hartley Act in 19^9 it turned to 
flanking maneuvers to achieve its objective. Organized 
labor was convinced that the law was designed to hurt them 
and wanted to return to the policy of a paternalistic 
government under the Wagner Act. The Democrats, desirious 
of assisting unions, were unable to obtain the necessary 
congressional support to repeal the Act outright so they 
diverted their tactics to indirect means in an attempt to 
circumvent the intentions of the statute's framers. Congress 
had enacted the labor policy but the executive branch could, 
with discretion, administer that law in such a way as to 
lessen the blow of its restrictive provisions against its 
constituency, the laborers.
The philosophy of the New Deal Wagner Act, created 
by Democrats, was to foster and promote union organization 
in order to elevate union power to a par with that of 
industry. The philosophy behind the Taft-Hartley Act,
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devised by Republicans, contained the premise that by 
"coddling" and "protecting" organized labor under the 
Wagner Act, its power had grown out of proportion and a new 
balance needed to be struck. Under the Wagner Act the 
government restricted management activities to assist unions; 
under the Taft-Hartley Act the government was expected to ■ 
restrict union activities to "equalize" the contest between 
labor and management. But where a Democratic administration 
had vigorously applied the New Deal policy, obviously it 
would not administer a Republican policy with equal vigor 
that was antipathetic to its philosophy.
The early NLRB, established by the Wagner Act to 
administer the national labor policy, had been criticized as 
being too pro-labor by those who endorsed Taft-Hartley 
principles. New Dealers who staffed this agency were 
largely crusaders for organized labor and, using admini­
strative discretion in applying and interpreting the Wagner 
Act provisions, tended to determine unfair labor practices, 
for example, in favor of unions if any doubt existed as to 
guilt. After the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act this same 
agency was expected to play a neutral role in umpiring labor- 
management conflicts. But it could be expected that the 
Democratic executive branch, in administering this new 
policy, would continue to favor organized labor whenever 
possible. Although President Truman emphasized that it would 
be executed fairly, the administrative discretion inherent in
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interpreting and applying a policy of such magnitude would 
allow sufficient latitude to administer the law "fairly" and 
still be partial to unions. The NLRB was a unified agency 
under the Wagner Act and could coordinate the administration 
of the labor policy. The Taft-Hartley Act made it a 
bifurcated commission with divided powers and authority, thus 
creating a situation fraught with possibilities of internal 
dissension. As long as the two divisions of the agency agreed 
on principles and objectives there would be little conflict. 
But when the two disagreed over philosophy and interpretation 
of the statute, collision was inevitable. Such disagreement 
developed and the Administration took advantage of this 
conflict, attempting to subvert the designers' objectives 
contained in the new policy.
One of the chief criticisms of the original NLRB 
had been that it was a combination of Judge, Jury and 
prosecutor. Conforming with the pattern of other 
governmental regulatory agencies. Board decisions had been 
final and could be appealed only in the federal courts.
When the Administrative Procedures Act was passed in 1946, 
the NLRB had altered its organization to accommodate the 
new principles. Thus,'after 1946 NLRB practices and 
procedures complied "fully . . . with the letter and spirit 
of the Administrative Procedures A c t . Under the revised
^Paul M. Herzog, Statement of NLRB to Senate 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, March 6, 194%, Truman 
Papers, OF 419-B, Truman Library.
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system, when a charge of unfair practice was brought, it
was heard by a representative of the Trial Examining Division,
This Division was a separate, autonomous unit of the Board,
operating under the supervision of a Chief Trial Examiner.
Decisions by this Division were based on NLRB interpretations
but either party could file exceptions and appeal to the
Board with, of course, final appeal lying in the federal
courts. But critics of the Board, disregarding this
conformable procedure, disliked what they considered the
Board's dictatorial powers and voiced their resentment to
the writers of the Taft-Hartley Act. This law answered
their criticism by dividing Board functions. This concept
of dividing NLRB powers and functions was not new in 19^7,
2having been advocated by the NAM as early as 1935. An 
independent General Counsel was created and the prosecutory 
functions assigned to him. The Board, after 19^7, was 
merely judge and jury. This unique division created 
administrative problems which were left to the agency to 
solve,
When the Taft-Hartley Act went into effect on 
August 22, 1947, the Board members met with the new General 
Counsel and drew up a Statement of Delegation agreement.
Under this agreement, necessitated by the new law, the Board 
delegated to the General Counsel authority over the Trial
^Congressional Record, 8l Cong., 1 Sess., 1949,
XCV, 7379.
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Examiners, or field personnel, representation cases, and 
applications for discretionary injunctions. The Board 
recognized that if the function of the General Counsel was 
to prosecute, this would necessitate his having control over 
personnel of the agency's prosecutory arm. During the early 
operation of the law this arrangement seemed satisfactory. 
Seven months after the agreement was made, Paul Herzog 
reported that this "common-sense allocation of responsibility 
had worked well so far."^ As long as the Board and the 
General Counsel were harmonious in interpretation of the 
statute the arrangement worked smoothly. It soon became 
apparent, though, that the General Counsel's philosophy 
of the function of government in labor relations was 
antagonistic to that held by the Board.
President Truman appointed Robert N. Denham as the 
first General Counsel. Denham, a Republican, was a lawyer 
with some forty years experience, having served the last 
nine of these as an NLRB Trial Examiner. Denham states 
that in June of 19^7 he was approached by James J. Reynolds 
and asked if he were interested in the new position. Reynolds 
informed Denham that he was the unanimous choice of the NLRB 
to fill this office. Denham maintained that he "was not
^N.L.R.E. Release, Address of Paul Herzog to 
Industrial Relations Conference of United States Chamber of 




Interested" but John R. Steelman persuaded him to take the 
job until he could "get things running."^
Reynolds has a different recollection of what
transpired. According to Reynolds, Denham actively sought
the position and asked for his assistance in securing it,
which he gave. Reynolds supported his nomination mainly
because he believed Denham to be "competent" and was
"impressed by his sincerity and"his devotion to the
principles of the new legislation." But it also occurred to
Reynolds that the appointment of a Republican "would
conceivably be good strategy to shelter the Administration
from criticism that might be directed at the NLRB" by
Senator Ball's "watchdog" committee that was studying the
operation of the Act during its first year.^ It was the
impression of Stephen Spingarn, a White House aide, that
this was one of the major reasons for Denham's selection.
President Truman did not want to be subject to criticism
that he had placed administration of the law "in the hands of
an unfriendly official," because of his. well-known opposition
to the Taft-Hartley Act, so the appointment of a Republican 
7was desirable. Denham's subsequent actions would indicate
^Robert N. Denham, as told to Stacy V. Jones, "And 
So I Was Purged," Saturday Evening Post, CCXXIII 
(December 30, 1950), 23.
6james J. Reynolds to the author, September 19, 19^1,
^Stephen J . Spingarn to Clark Clifford, Memorandum, 
November 17, 19^8, Truman Papers, Charles S. Murphy Pile, 
Truman Library.
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that he was the pursuer of the position much more than he 
was the pursued.
The fact that Denham's concept of the role of 
government In labor disputes was radically different from 
that of the Administration was not immediately apparent.
But when Denham assumed his new position he brought with him 
preconceived'notions concerning the fallacy of the old 
NLRB New Deal philosophy. He believed that these early 
Boards had been too sympathetic to unions and had 
inclinations "to protect labor even in its excesses, and 
the privileges thus given by the Wagner Act grew into 
license."^ Denham readily admitted that during the time 
he was a Trial Examiner he "was in almost continuous 
conflict" with the NLRB over labor relations philosophy.^
He declared that when he took over the office of General 
Counsel, the staff which he inherited was convinced that 
"labor was a sacred cow . . . and an employer was regarded 
as guilty merely because he was an e m p l o y e r . A n o t h e r  
time he remarked that labor had "been pampered and spoiled 
by political influences and governmental favor" under the
^N.L.R.B. Release, Remarks of Robert N. Denham to 
Metal Trades Association, Chicago, November 6, 1947, Truman 
Papers, OF 145, Truman Library.
^Robert N. Denham, as told to Stacy V. Jones,
"And So I Was Purged," Saturday Evening Post, CCXXIII 




With this philosophy, it is not surprising that
Denham wholeheartedly endorsed the principles of the Taft-
Hartley Act. In fact, as noted previously, he had assisted
Senator Donnell with a memorandum on changes to be
incorporated when the Labor-Management Relations Act of 19^7
was being written. Unlike most NLRE personnel, he did not
believe the new law was "partisan legislation," but agreed
with the authors of the Act that it equalized, or tended
"to equalize the balance between labor, and management.
Although it had a few "bugs," it was a "magnificent piece
12of legislative machinery" to Denham.
While the Administration was fighting to repeal the 
law, Robert Denham as NLRE General Counsel was campaigning 
in support of the Act. When he was appointed, Truman told 
him that, although he did not like the Act, it was the law ■ 
and he expected Denham to administer it "in accordance with 
its terms, and in the way Congress intended it to be 
administered."^^ Denham took these instructions literally.
^^Stephen J. Spingarn to Clark Clifford, Memorandum, 
November 17, 19^9, Truman Papers, Charles S. Murphy File, 
Truman Library.
l^N.L.R.B. Release, Remarks of Robert N. Denham to 
Metal Trades Association, Chicago, November 6, 1947, Truman 
Papers, OP 145, Truman Library.
^%obert N. Denham to the President, September 15, 1950, Truman Papers, OF 145, Truman Library.
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As General Counsel, with the extensive powers given that 
office by the new Act, he was ready to apply this law 
covering "that part of our economic structure which probably 
has more far-reaching ramifications than any other" and
which covered "them thoroughly and well," according to the
1 •"intent of the authors, '' One of his first actions upon 
assumption of his new position was to "invite" the personnel 
working under him "who were unwilling to subscribe to Taft- 
Hartley to get out."^^ When the Senate Labor Committee 
conducted hearings on the Thomas-Lesinski bill, Denham was 
the "star witness" from the administrative branch who 
supported the Taft-Hartley Act. He was asked by the 
committee why he had assembled three or four hundred pages 
of data as evidence to oppose any changes when he did not 
know whether he would be summoned by the committee. ■ Denham 
responded that he had relied upon what he "conceived to be 
the good judgment of the committee" and was therefore certain 
he would be called to testify.
As the rift between Robert Denham and the Board 
widened, the General Counsel delivered an increasing number
^^N.L.R.B. Release, Remarks of Robert N. Denham to 
New York Personnel Management Association, New York City, 
November 24, 194?, Truman Papers, OF 145, Truman Library.
l^Robert N . Denham, as told to Stacy V. Jones,
"And So I Was Purged," Saturday Evening Post, CCXXIII 
(December 30, 1950), 73-
^^Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
8l Cong., 1 Sess., 1949, Hearings, P t . IV, 1724-6.
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of speeches to management in which he expressed his support
of the Taft-Hartley Act. In one of these addresses Denham
stated his conviction that the Wagner Act was definitely
social legislation "designed and administered for the
benefit of one branch of our labor-management economy, at
the expense of another." In contrast, the Taft-Hartley Act
was "balanced, regulating legislation." In this address he
reminded his audience that the personnel of the entire
NLRB structure was made up of "persons who were raised in
the climate of the philosophy and . . . religion of the
Wagner Act" and it was difficult to get "a divorcement of
thinking . . . from their old Wagner Act formulae." These
people had "found a further deterrent to changing their
ways," he said, "in the still unfulfilled expectation that
the Taft-Hartley Act would be repealed . . . and the
salubrious clime of the Wagner Act restored to them--sans
the incubus of a General Counsel." The General Counsel
felt that the trend of NLRB decisions served "markedly to
restrict application of the law concerning unfair labor
practices" committed by unions in which he could not acquiese.
But Denham conceded that perhaps the Board "honestly held"
17these opinions.
The Washington Post comment on this speech was that
^^N.L.R.B. Release, Remarks of Robert N. Denham to 
Building Trades Employers' Association, New York City,
January 12, 1950, Truman Papers, Charles S. Murphy File,
Truman Library.
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conflict between the General Counsel and the Board was
inevitable due to the nature of the General Counsel's
separate status set up by the Taft-Hartley law. The Post .
added that it was doubtful whether Congress contemplated
the General Counsel attacking the Board "in public in this
fashion." Even more serious, according to this newspaper,
was the fact that when Board decisions were appealed to
the federal courts, the General Counsel represented the
Board in these cases. The General Counsel was thus inviting
"employers dissatisfied with the Board's rulings to
appeal . . . knowing that he himself will represent" the
1 8NLRB in the resulting cases.
In another speech in his campaign to discredit the
Board Denham claimed that under the Wagner Act the NLRB had
no difficulty in finding "almost any conduct charged to an
employer . . . as a violation . . .  of the unfair labor 
»
practices." "Now, however, it has become more difficult to 
classify the unfair labor practices" of unions, he charged, 
because the Board narrowly construed the unfair practices 
provisions in regard to labor organizations.^^ He later 
repeated the indictment that the Wagner Act was "class" 
and "pure social" legislation which made "12 years of
^Qwashington Post, January l8, 1950.
^^n.L.R.B. Release, Remarks of Robert N. Denham to 
American Trucking Association, Washington, D. C ., January 30, 
1950, Truman Papers, Charles S. Murphy File, Truman Library.
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■rough-going for the employers." But "the demand from an 
irate public that the scales be reset and that some degree 
of balance be established" brought about the Taft-Hartley 
Act which was "regulatory legislation in the full sense."
This law set down "the rules of the game for employer and 
employee," he declared. As for policy disagreements between 
himself and the Board, Denham quoted Justice Louis Brandeis' 
reasoning on the dominant attribute of the doctrine of
separation of powers--"to preclude the exercise of arbitrary
20power . . .  to save the people from autocracy." Denham 
believed that his position was established to save 
management from NLRB autocracy and that he was correctly 
interpreting congressional intent in the Taft-Hartley Act.
Denham's differing interpretation of the function 
of the NLRB in labor relations both embarrassed and assisted 
the Administration in its struggle against the Taft-Hartley 
Act. Although both the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts used 
identical language in regard to the term "affecting commerce," 
Denham decided, in opposition to the hands-off policy of the 
old NLRB, that this should apply to the hotel industry. 
Therefore, as General Counsel he assumed jurisdiction over 
representation cases in this industry that had hitherto been 
regarded as intra-state commerce and not subject to the
^‘̂N.L.R.B. Release, Remarks of Robert N. Denham to 
Bronx Board of Trade, March 30, 1950, Truman Papers,
Charles S. Murphy, File, Truman Library.
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national labor law. Thus he Inadvertently assisted the
campaign for repeal of the law. An interdepartmental
memorandum noted that on November 23, 1948, Denham directed
the NLRB field offices "to take Jurisdiction of any cases
'affecting commerce' even though only one employee was
involved." At the bottom of this memorandum John R.
Steelman noted that Denham's attitude was helping the
Administration "by setting various people outside labor,
21to help kill the Taft-Hartley law."
But Denham's support of the law led him to commit 
extremities in its defense. In a speech in San Francisco, 
he had characterized the law as being "legislation which, 
if fairly administered," could "do more to bring about 
industrial peace than any other legislation we have ever had, 
or which has been proposed up to this time." Referring to 
this speech, Stephen J. Spingarn maintained that it was one 
thing for Denham to favor the law but quite another "for 
him to go out on the stump and propagandize for the 
continuation of the Act in direct opposition to the President's 
and the Administration's oft-enunciated position." Spingarn 
felt that this attitude and conduct could serve as a basis 
for requesting Denham's resignation or removal.
^^Russell P. Andrews to John’R. Steelman, Memorandum, 
March 30, 19^9, Truman Papers, OF 407, Truman Library.
22gtephen J. Spingarn to Clark Clifford, Memorandum, 
November 17, 19^9, Truman Papers, Charles S. Murphy File,
Truman Library.
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Denham's attitude and policies also brought 
outcries from organized labor. As he increased his 
activities of what labor considered pro-management policies, 
the number of union requests and demands increased for the 
President to remove him as General Counsel. One congress­
woman from California decided that, on the basis of 
complaints from her constituents, Denham was abusing his 
powers by using "deliberate procrastination and delay" when 
it would help management and by applying for injunctions "to 
assist employers in breaking strikes even when such 
injunctions were not justified." She requested Truman to 
investigate these charges and if proven true, "retire him to 
private life." In November of 19^9, Philip Murray publicly 
requested Truman to remove Denham from office on the grounds 
that he had used "his vast powers to aid employers bent on 
destroying free unions." Spingarn noted that this request 
would make it more-difficult for the President to remove him, 
because of public reaction to such a request from a union 
official, but was satisfied that the proposal still deserved 
"serious consideration." Another alternative, this official
observed, would be to reorganize the NLRB by abolishing the
2i|office of General Counsel. But when questioned by the press
^OHelen Gahagan Douglas to Harry S. Truman,
December 2, 1949, Truman Papers, OF 145, Truman Library.
ohStephen J. Spingarn to Clark Clifford, Memorandum, 
November 17, 194-9, Truman Papers, Charles S. Murphy File, 
Truman Library.
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In February, 1950, on whether he was considering a CIO 
Executive Board request to dismiss Denham, the President
pcreplied In the negative,
With the General Counsel following an apparently 
pro-management course In administering the national labor 
policy and the NLRB continuing Its Interpretations, Insofar 
as possible, along Its traditional pro-labor lines, conflict 
was Inevitable. This discord was especially noticeable 
when the Board had to depend upon the General Counsel and his 
staff to prosecute cases. The gulf between these two 
divisions widened until In the fall of 19^9 the Board and 
the General Counsel held several meetings and exchanged 
memoranda concerning changes to be made In the Statement of 
Delegation. In a memorandum of September 20, 19^9, the 
Board Informed Denham that It wanted to assume control over 
"the selection, retention, transfer promotion, demotion, 
discipline and discharge" of all NLRB Regional Directors and 
officers. When Denham refused to be swayed by hints and 
threats In this series of meetings, the Board Informed him on 
February 23, 1950, that It was putting a revised Statement 
of Delegation Into effect which contained the proposed changes 
of the previous S e p t e m b e r . D e n h a m ' s  reply was a public
^^Presldent Truman, Press Conference, February l6, 
1950, Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
nf.N.L.R.B. to Robert N. Denham, February 23, 1950, 
Truman Papers, Charles S. Murphy File, Truman Library.
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statement in which he vowed he would not "submit to such
action." He would not agree to this revision, he declared,
because if the Board possessed the authority it was seeking
the General Counsel, through the Regional Directors, would
lose his "independence of action" as prosecutor for the 
27NLRB. Although Denham protested this unilateral change 
in the Statement of Delegation, it went into effect anyway, 
and the Administration then turned to more direct means to 
bring NLRB administration in line with its labor policies.
In July of 19^7 Congress established the Commission 
on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government 
headed by former President Herbert Hoover, popularly known 
as the Hoover Commission. This commission made a compre­
hensive study and in January, I949, made its recommendations 
for reorganizing the departments and agencies of the executive 
branch to obtain more efficiency with less expense. On 
June 20, 1949, Oongress passed the Reorganization Act which 
authorized the President to reorganize a department or 
agency and submit such plan to Congress for approval. If 
neither house rejected the plan by a majority vote, it would 
go into operation. After the failure to replace the Taft- 
Hartley Act with the Thomas-Lesinski bill, and with the 
deepening antagonism between the General Counsel and the
^"^N.L.R.B. Release, Statement by Robert N. Denham, 
March 2, 1950, Truman Papers, OP 145, Truman Library.
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NLRB, the Administration decided to utilize the Reorgani­
zation Act and revamp the National Labor Relations Board, 
abolishing its bifurcated nature and returning it approxi­
mately to its original form under the Wagner Act.
The Administration, desirous of cancelling the 
powers of the General Counsel, could find Justification for 
this action in the Hoover Report. After studying the NLRB 
organization and administration, the Hoover Commission noted 
that the General Counsel's office, independent of both the 
Board and the Secretary of Labor, marked a "departure from 
previous administrative practice." If permitted to set a 
pattern for future Governmental organization," the Report 
continued, "it may lead to a diffusion of responsibility." 
The Report observed that the nature and power of the General 
Counsel's office gave rise to "several internal admini­
strative problems," using as an illustration the handling 
of unfair labor practice cases. Regional Directors issued 
some types of unfair labor practice complaints only with 
the approval of the General Counsel. If a refusal to issue 
the complaint were forthcoming, appeal had to be made to 
the same unit from which the rejection originated. The 
Report concluded that "the present position of the General 
Counsel is an unstable one," and recommended creating a 
Council of Labor under the chairmanship of the Secretary of 
Labor which would include all federal officials concerned
229
28with labor problems.
President Truman submitted Reorganization Plan XII 
to Congress for approval on March 13, 1950. This Plan 
proposed abolishing the office of General Counsel and 
transferring his powers to the Chairman of the National 
Labor Relations Board. The proposal was assigned for hearings 
to the Senate and House Committees on Expenditures in 
Executive Departments. Paul M. Herzog gave a lengthy 
testimony in defense of the Plan, on behalf of the NLRB, 
saying that Board support was "unanimous" and "unequivocal." 
Herzog stated that the President's plan was propounded so 
that the NLRB would once again function as the Hoover 
Commission recommended regulatory commissions should operate. 
Herzog pointed out that, although the Board had disagreed 
with the wisdom of separating their functions at the time 
the Taft-Hartley Act was passed, it had gone even further 
to make the plan work by delegating additional duties and 
functions not required by the statute to the General Counsel. 
But when the Board tried to correct one of their mistakes by 
issuing a revised Statement of Delegation, the General Counsel 
refused to accede to the change and it had to be made 
without his consent.
Herzog then went into detail on the adverse effects
28Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch 
of the Government, Task Force Report on Regulatory Commissions 
(Appendix N ), Washington, D. C., January, 1949, 139-^0.
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of this separation of functions, saying that It had caused 
"friction . . . and confusion" and had evoked "uncertainty 
and litigation." He complained that the General Counsel had 
Insisted on regulating labor relations even In purely "local 
business enterprises like neighborhood drugstores, corner 
groceries, and local bars and restaurants." Yet early In 
19^8 the Board had made known to the General Counsel Its 
views In a series of decisions on representation proceedings, 
that such operations were "essentially local In character 
and that the Federal Government should not Intervene." This 
conflict continued to arise, Herzog maintained, because "the 
General Counsel In his unrevlewable discretion to Issue 
complaints" had adhered "adamantly to his own conflicting 
standard" and sent such cases to the Board "with full 
knowledge" that they would be dismissed. This "double 
standard," the Board felt, caused "a waste of time, energy 
and money," both for the government and private parties. It 
subjected employers and employees to "unnecessary harrassment 
and litigation" and created "confusion and uncertainty among 
them as to their rights and duties" under the law. In 
addition, the NLRB Chairman said. It left state agencies In 
doubt as to where their powers began and ended.
Herzog stressed that the General Counsel had 
"unlimited authority" to frustrate enforcement of the public 
labor policy by his refusal to act, and even If this action
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were arbitrary. It was "subject to no review whatever."
The nature of the General Counsel's office embarrassed the
Board at times by the fact that when it disagreed with a
complaint issued by the General Counsel and the plaintiff
appealed, the Board had to rely upon the General Counsel for
its courtroom defense. In some of these appealed cases the
General Counsel had also stated his contrary views to the
court, Herzog said, and thus created the strange anomaly
of the federal government being on both sides of the same
case. Herzog summed up the NLRB testimony by stating that
"the experiment of the past 30 months has . . . shown that
separation of functions creates a nearly insoluble dilemma
29in internal administration."
In testifying against Plan XII, Denham stated that 
the only "completely satisfactory answer" to the problem was 
for Congress to '.'define the area as precisely as possible 
within which the Board must and must not assert federal 
jurisdiction." The abolition of his independent office 
would not solve the difficulty, Denham insisted, but would 
"merely give the Board the unfettered power to perpetuate 
the confusion, inconsistencies, and contradictions implicit 
in its decisions." Denham was certain that destroying the 
separation of judicial and prosecutory functions under the
29paul M. Herzog, Statement to House of Representatives 
Committee on Expenditures in Executive Departments, March 23, 
1950J Truman Papers, OF 145, Truman Library.
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authority of the Reorganization Act would be deprivation of 
due process. He questioned whether the President had the 
authority to do this with a reorganization plan when this 
particular due process was "deliberately created" by Congress. 
If the Board received this additional function, Denham said, 
there was not "the slightest doubt" in his mind that the issue 
would be taken to the courts. It would take "a considerable 
period of time" to get a Supreme Court decision, he warned, 
and all Board decisions rendered in the meantime "would be 
illegal and void."^^ Paul Herzog commented that by this 
testimony "once more the General Counsel seems to be inciting 
litigation.
Although Reorganization Plan XII of 1950 proposed
doing almost exactly what Taft wanted to do in 19^9 when he
amended the Thomas bill so as to remove the office of
General Counsel, Senator Taft opposed the idea in 1950. He
submitted Senate Resolution 248, on April 3, opposing 
32Plan XII. Taft said he disapproved of the Plan for four 
reasons: (l) it was not in accord with the Hoover Commission
recommendations, (2) it attempted to reverse a basic matter 
of congressional policy by executive action, (3) it proposed
S^Robert N. Denham, Statement to Senate Committee on 
Expenditures in Executive Departments, April 6, 1950,
Truman Papers, Charles S. Murphy File, Truman Library.
3^Paul Herzog to Charles Murphy, April T, 1950,
Truman Papers, Charles S. Murphy File, Truman Library.
■^^Congressional Record, 8l Cong., 2 Sess., 1950,
XCVI, 4575.
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an unsound mixing of Judicial and prosecutory functions 
"similar to that responsible for the greatest miscarriage 
of Justice this country has ever seen under the Wagner Act," 
and (4) it attempted to use the Hoover Report for political 
purposes.
The Administration defense of Plan XII was undertaken 
by Senator John Sparkman, Democrat from Alabama, who was 
furnished a speech by the White House for this purpose. 
Sparkman argued that Plan XII sought to provide "exactly 
what the senior Senator from Ohio was arguing for less than 
a year ago."^^ But Taft had pointed out the major deviation 
from his proposal which was the weakness of Plan XII, namely, 
all of the General Counsel's powers were going to be 
transferred to the Chairman of the NLRB. If these functions 
were going to be placed in the Board, Taft might have agreed,
but he felt that this was concentrating too much power in the
6hands of one man.^
As it had done with the Thomas-Lesinski bill in 
1949, the Administration now placed its full support behind 
Reorganization Plan XII of 1950. Stephen J. Spingarn
33lbid., 3703.
3^John Sparkman to Stephen Spingarn, May I5, 1950, 
Spingarn Papers (General Government - Plan 12), Truman 
Library.




reported that unions were "working feverishly" and the 
Secretary of Labor was "cooperating" 100 per cent In the 
attempt to get the Plan approved. Spingarn had given Tobin 
a list of Senators "to talk to." He was very concerned 
about this Issue as "it would be the only Important labor 
victory" the Administration could take Into the elections 
of 1950.^^ The day before the Senate took a final vote on 
the Plan, Spingarn decided that "five to eight votes" still 
needed to be won. He pointed out this deficiency to 
W. Stuart Symington, Democrat from Missouri, noting that It 
was Immaterial whether Senators voted for the Plan. As 
long as there were not 4-9 votes against It, under the terms 
of the Reorganization Act It would go Into effect. Spingarn 
asked Symington to try persuading Senators not to vote at 
all rather than to vote against the Plan. This Plan was 
"by far the most Important of the Reorganization Plans from 
the standpoint of the President and the Administration," he 
reminded Symington, and "Its victory or defeat will mean 
a lot In November", since It was the "only significant labor 
victory which the Administration has a chance of getting 
this year."^^
3'^Stephen J. Spingarn to Charles Murphy, Memorandum, 
May 8, 1950, Spingarn Papers (General Government - Plan 12), 
Truman Library.
■ -^^Stephen Spingarn to W. Stuart Symington, May 10, 
1950, Spingarn Papers (General Government - Plan 12),
Truman Library.
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Taft's resolution against Plan XII came up for a 
final vote in the Senate on May II, I950. On this,same day 
President Truman sent a telegram to Alben Barkley urging 
the Senate's approval. Truman declared in this communi­
cation that Plan XII would "correct an administratively 
unworkable organizational set-up" and bring the NLRB proce­
dures into conformity with the other independent regulatory 
agencies. He insisted that the issues involved were "not 
matters of personalities, neither do they go to the substance 
of the controversy over the Taft-Hartley Act," quoting Taft's 
1949 statement when the Senator argued for his amendment 
abolishing the General Counsel's o f f i c e . B u t  the final
Senate vote approved Taft's resolution 53 to 30, thus
4oblocking Reorganization Plan XII. Nineteen of these 53 
votes of approval came from Southern Senators. Plan XII 
was reported to the House from committee but no further 
action was taken. However, after the Senate killed the Plan, 
what occurred in the House of Representatives was irrelevant 
since either house could stop a reorganization plan.
The day after the Senate rejected Plan XII Denham 
sent the NLRB a note saying that since the Plan was now 
"behind" them, the time was appropriate for making serious
39press Release, Telegram from the President to the 
Vice-President, May 11, 1950, Truman Papers, OP 1^5,
Truman Library.
^^Congressional Record, 8l Cong., 2 Sess., 1950,
XCVI, 68861
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efforts "to find a basis for more effective cooperation,"^^
Spingarn observed that Denham was apparently going to be
"magnanimous about his victory" and the note would deny
rumors that Denham planned to "resign now in a blaze of 
42glory." The Board's response to the General Counsel's 
note was that the time had "always been appropriate." The 
Board had, since August 22, 194%, "consistently sought 
to find a basis for effective cooperation of the Agency"
iland it would "continue to be glad to do so. " Denham got 
in the last word in this exchange, replying to the Board's 
rather "sassy" note that he did not recall the Board every 
trying to compose differences within the commission "except 
by its mandate that its own terms must govern.
The Administration considered the idea of 
resubmitting a revised plan to Congress. This revision 
would have made the reorganization conform to Taft's 
amendment of 1949 by giving the General Counsel's powers to 
the Board rather than to the Chairman. It was believed that 
by doing this, it could make Taft "do a lot of wriggling . .
^^Stephen Spingarn to Charles Murphy, Memorandum,




^ ^ o b e r t  N. Denham to the NLRB, Memorandum, May 19, 
1950, Spingarn Papers (General Government - Plan 12),
Truman Library.
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and . . . might be able to pick up the five votes or so
necessary to put it t h r o u g h . A f t e r  discussing this with
Senators, Tobin found three who had voted against Plan XII
and might "go along" but wanted to see the revised plan
before committing t h e m s e l v e s . A  revised plan was drawn up
ready to transmit to Congress abolishing the office of
General Counsel and transferring his functions to the Board.
But both Stephen Spingarn and Charles Murphy decided "it
seemed to be too late" to submit the plan and both Secretary
Tobin and Paul Herzog were "reconciled to dropping the idea,"
47so the project was abandoned. '
Following the failure of Plan XII, strife between 
the two branches of the NLRB continued until it reached a 
climax in August, 1950. On August 8 the Board was notified 
that the General Counsel had demoted Ida Klaus and William 
Consedine, NLRB Solicitor and Associate Solicitor 
respectively, to Assistant Solicitors. The Board decided 
that he had acted "without authority" and "accordingly directed 
Miss Klaus and Mr. Consedine to ignore the General Counsel's
h O
invalid and unauthorized instructions."
^5stephen J. Spingarn to William Hopkins, May 12,
1950, Spingarn Papers (General Government - Plan 12), Truman 
Library.
^^Stephen J. Spingarn, Memorandum for the Piles,
June J, 1950, Spingarn Papers (General Government - 
Plan 12), Truman Library.
^Tlbid., June 22, 1950.
^^N.L.R.B., Minutes of Board Action, August 8, 1950, 
Truman' Papers, Charles S. Murphy File, Truman Library.
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When this arbitrary attempt to demote personnel 
under direct Board control failed, Denham proposed a plan 
to help resolve the conflict. He suggested to a third 
party, John R. Steelman, that he trade supervision over the 
NLRB Enforcement Division for return of his powers over 
appointment of field personnel lost by the revised Statement 
of D e l e g a t i o n . S t e e l m a n  had one of his aides, Russell P. 
Andrews, analyze the proposal. This assistant decided 
that Denham was setting a snare by asking the White House to 
direct and be a party to a transaction that was favorable 
to Denham and would discomfit the Board. It was Andrews' 
opinion that "good faith" in the NLRB had deteriorated 
to the point where the only workable measure would be 
removal of one of the contending sides and his "personal 
nominee would be on the non-plural side." He went on to 
remind Steelman that Truman had instructed the Board the 
previous May not to recede from the amendments made in the 
revised Statement of Delegation and if the Board accepted 
this "compromise" it would be "ignoring the desires of the 
President." Also, it was not a problem of reconciling 
conflict of interest but of dealing with an offender, Denham, 
who had been "guilty of malfeasance in office in several 
instances.
^^Robert N. Denham to John R. Steelman, August 8, 
1950, Truman Papers, Charles S. Murphy Pile, Truman Library.
50Russell P. Andrews to John R. Steelman, 
Confidential Memorandum, August 17, 1950, Truman Papers, 
Charles S. Murphy File, Truman Library.
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Charles Murphy suggested that the Administration 
proceed with a "project of sicking the Senate Committee" on 
Denham to investigate his administration. Paul Herzog, 
however, did not favor the idea because it would give Denham 
"a soapbox of official character, from which to vent his 
spleen." Also, Herzog felt, such an investigation would 
assume the aspects of a new controversy over the Taft-Hartley 
Act and Denham's "later removal would appear to flow from 
evidence of his pro-Act and pro-employer bias, rather than 
be on the basis of his impossible administration, as now."
In this same memorandum Herzog enclosed a copy of a recent 
issue of "The Joe Ball Washington Letter" as an "example 
of the stuff D. is feeding Joe Ball right now for his 
weekly 'labor letter'." Ball had written that the campaign 
to get Denham fired had been revived but whereas the unions 
had sparked the demand before, the "present intrigue" was 
the work of Paul Herzog and Ida Klaus. "Reports are that 
the President is about ready to move," Ball had proclaimed.
President Truman was ready to move and in September 
he asked Denham to resign. In his ensuing letter of 
resignation Denham described his adversities to Truman. He 
admitted that in his three years' tenure, no one from the 
White House "offered any suggestion" on how he should treat
51paul Herzog to Charles Murphy, August 17, 1950, 
Truman Papers, Charles S. Murphy File, Truman Library.
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any matter that came before him. He had "tried to obtain 
the cooperation of the Board" but failed, he said, and 
this lack of concerted action had deprived the public of 
good administration. It had produced "a situation that 
should not be allowed to exist in a governmental agency."
A few weeks previously he had "made a final offer to bring 
about a readjustment," he informed Truman, but had "heard 
nothing from it." Since the President had asked for his 
resignation "forthwith," he had no choice but to comply, his 
resignation to become effective at Truman's "convenience."^^ 
Truman accepted his resignation effective September l8, 1950, 
being "grateful for the frankness and spirit of fair play 
with which it was offered." Truman said it was his view 
that the situation was caused by the Taft-Hartley Act 
creating "an administratively unworkable arrangement." 
Nevertheless, it was his duty as President to try to make it 
work.^J George J. Bott, one of Denham's assistants, became 
the new General Counsel.
Senator Taft called Truman's request for Denham's- 
resignation "another surrender" to the CIO-PAC and an 
attempt "to nullify the Taft-Hartley Act." Taft concluded 
that this was "only another evidence that the CIO-PAC is
^^Robert N. Denham to the President, September 15, 
1950, Truman Papers, OP 145, Truman Library.C n
Harry S. Truman to Robert N. Denham, September 16, 
1950, Truman Papers, OP 145, Truman Library.
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making steady progress toward taking over control of the 
Democratic party." The Senator based his conclusions on the 
fact that a week before Denham's resignation Truman attended
a private dinner of leaders of the AF of L and the CIO In
54Washington, D . C. Denham was convinced that this dinner
sealed a bargain exchanging his "political head for the
promise of votes--whlch did not materialize."^^ He described
his successor, George Bott, as "a Fair Deal Democrat" who
Indicated that he would "do nothing to prevent the board
from turning Taft-Hartley back to Wagner." "Bott had
already surrendered much of his Independence," Denham 
56charged.^ The New Republic later characterized Denham's 
administration by accusing him of having "harangued employers 
to prosecute under the new law. Ignored the five-man Board 
In Initiating his own prosecutions of unions, and all but 
destroyed the NLRB's function as an agent for Industrial 
peace.
The elections of 1950 came up soon after the fight 
over Denham's resignation. The most Important race In these 
elections, as far as organized labor was concerned, was
5^New York Times, September 17, 1950.
55pobert N. Denham, as told to Stacy V. Jones, "And 
So I Was Purged," Saturday Evening Post, CCXXIII 
(December 30, 1950), 22.
56ibld., 74.
5?New Republic, CXXIII (November 13, 1950), 8.
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the campaign of Robert Taft for re-election to the Senate. 
Being co-author of the Taft-Hartley Act, leader of the forces 
that blocked repeal of the law in 19^9 and also the one who 
stopped Reorganization Plan XII in 1950, Taft was labor's 
"Number One Enemy." Labor therefore was determined to 
employ all its forces to defeat him. Labor men and labor 
money poured into Ohio in an all-out attempt to retire Taft 
from the Senate. Taft answered labor's challenge in the 
most direct manner possible. Ignoring all advice to "soft- 
pedal" the Taft-Hartley Act, he campaigned in every country 
in Ohio and carried the fight into the enemy camp by making 
his labor law the principal issue.^ Taft won the election 
with a majority of over 4-30,000, the widest margin Ohio ever 
gave a senatorial candidate, dealing organized labor "one 
of its worst defeats since the Roosevelt era began in 
1932."59
Samuel Lubell attributed part of this large majority 
to the weakness of Taft's opponent. The Democratic candidate, 
Joseph Ferguson, proved to be an impotent campaigner and in 
addition received no support from Governor Frank Lausche, the 
titular head of the Democratic party in Ohio.^^ William S. 
White believed that labor defeated its own objective in this
5^White, The Taft Story, 95.
99n 6W York Times, November 8, 1950.
^^Lubell, The Future of American Politics, presents 
a good analysis of this important election, pp. 189-97.
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election by overzealousness. It was "widely publicized 
that the powerful unions were sending in non-Ohio money and 
non-Ohio workers" which resulted in helping Taft by making 
him appear as a "victim of foreign f o r c e s . T h i s  election, 
which labor hoped would be a demonstration of its power, 
instead indicated labor's political weaknesses. Lubell 
summed up these weaknesses as being: (l) "an overly militant
labor campaign" evokes in turn an antilabor coalition,
(2) labor and the Democrats are "uneasy, mutually suspicious 
allies," (3) rank and file labor votes its natural incli­
nations regardless of the official stand, and (4) there is 
a fear even among rank and file workers of labor becoming too 
powerful.
The results of the elections of 1950 were a victory 
for the Republican party. The 82nd Congress, meeting in 
January, 1951, was composed of 49 Democrats and 47 Republicans 
in the Senate and 235 Democrats and 199 Republicans in the 
House. In these elections the Democrats lost 5 Senate seats 
and 28 in the House thus considerably reducing the majority 
they had won in 1948. Yet the Republican victory was not as 
great as could have been expected. Democratic losses in' 
Congress in 1950 were "less than any previous mid-term
^^White, The Taft Story, 99-
fnPLubell, The Future of American Politics, 190.
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election since 1938” and "only half the average loss in the
last three mid-term t e s t s . elections of the preceding
decade, the Democratic party had made gains in the presidential
election years and suffered losses in the mid-term elections.
This was attributed to, and helped give rise to, the
political theory that fewer people voted in mid-term elections
and therefore a small vote favored the Republicans. Gus
Tyler, a political writer for New Republic, decided that
Democratic losses in 1950 were smaller than usual because
64of an above-normal vote. Forty million voted in the 1950 
congressional elections, compared to 34,000,000 in 1946 and
28.000.000 in 1942. These numbers, when contrasted with the
46.000.000 votes in 1948 congressional elections, 45,000,000 
in 1944 congressional elections, and 46,000,000 in 1940 
congressional elections, illustrate that there is much less 
voter interest in mid-term elections than in presidential 
races.
By the end of 1950 organized labor had little to 
show for its political efforts. After extravagant promises 
in 1948, the Truman Administration had been unable to reward 
labor's loyalty by giving unions what they most desired. 
Reorganization Plan XII would have helped, but as a result
^^Gus Tyler, "The Midterm Paradox," New Republic,
CXXIII (November 27, 1950), 14.
G^ibid., 15.
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of labor's demands for removal of the General Counsel and 
the fact that this reorganization resembled another attack 
on the Taft-Hartley Act, the Senate refused to approve the 
Plan. Failing in this, the only alternative left to the 
Administration was to remove the General Counsel and replace 
hlmrwith one whose labor relations philosophy would be in 
line with that of the Board. The labor policy could now 
be administered in a way favorable to labor and the 
Administration could mark time until future elections sent 
more liberals to Congress. But the tide continued against 
unions and the Democratic party in the 1950 elections. The 
only thing now left for the Democrats and labor to anticipate 
was the hope that they could stage a political resurgence 
in the election of 1952.
CHAPTER VIII
THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT WANES AS A POLITICAL ISSUE
By 1952 the attitude of Taft-Hartley opponents had 
undergone a limited change. After four years of vain 
endeavor to secure repeal of the hated statute critics 
gradually realized that complete destruction of the Act 
was probably Impossible, Their collective attitude 
progressively transformed to the more realistic approach of 
amending the law so as to remove the more drastic antlunlon 
provisions. In the presidential campaign of 1952 both 
major candidates advocated change; Dwight D, Elsenhower 
by amending the existing law and Adlal E, Stevenson by 
writing a new statute. But neither candidate recommended 
a return to the Wagner Act "with Improvements" as had been 
demanded by Harry S, Truman In 1948,
Even President Truman gave no outward Indication 
that he was still Insisting upon outright repeal of the 
Taft-Hartley Act until the campaign of 1952 had begun.
His statements In reference to the law no longer contained 
the word "repeal," In his 1951 State of the Union Message, 
in the midst of the Korean crisis, he asked Congress for
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''improvement" in the policy "to help provide stable labor- 
management relations and to make sure that we have steady 
production in this emergency."^ When he signed the Taft- 
Humphrey amendment in October, 1954, he stated that he 
hoped this would be "the forerunner of . . . future . . . 
sound legislation." When Truman dedicated Gompers Square 
in Washington, D. C ., in the same month he did not mention 
repeal. Instead, he said the objective should be "a law 
that will insure free unions and free collective bargaining,
pand be fair to both employers and employees."
Truman was asked at a press conference in November, 
1951, if he anticipated that the Taft-Hartley Act would be an 
issue in the election campaign of the coming year. He replied 
that he could not answer until he had analyzed any amendments 
that might be made by Congress before the election.^ And 
he declared in the 1952 State of the Union Message that the 
law had "many serious and far-reaching defects." Truman 
pledged continuation of his effort to get "a fair law--fair
^Harry S. Truman, State of the Union Message to 
Congress, January 8, 1951, Truman Papers, OF 419-B,
Truman Library.
^ H a r r y  S. Truman, Address, October 27, 1951,
Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
7■^President Truman, Press Conference, Key West, 
Florida, November 15, 1951, Truman Papers, OR, Truman 
Library.
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to both management and l a b o r . W h e n  challenged by reporters 
that he had asked for Improvements and not repeal in this 
message, Truman countered by saying, "If that requires repeal 
of the Taft-Hartley Act, why that's It."^ However, while 
campaigning for the Democratic candidate In 1952, he again 
repeatedly demanded repeal.
The New York Times reported In December, 1951, that 
there were "signs" that even organized labor was abandoning 
Its drive for repeal and was "ready to cooperate In working 
out acceptable amendments on a piecemeal b a s i s . T h i s  
labor acceptance of the Inevitable was clearly demonstrated 
when, after the Republican success In,1952, the presidents 
of the two largest International federations of unions 
asked Congress to make specific amendments In the law.
George Meany requested changes to: (1) remove antlunlon
security clauses, (2 ) ease restrictions on secondary 
boycotts, (3) provide better distinction between repre­
sentation and Jurisdiction cases, (4) remove the national 
emergency Injunction, (5) eliminate the provision for union 
damage suits, (6) renovate the NLRB, and (7) remove
^Harry S. Truman, State of the Union Message to 
Congress, January 9, 1952, Truman Papers, OF 419-B,
Truman Library.
^President Truman, Press Conference, Old State 
Department Building, January 11, 1952, Truman Papers,
OR 22, Truman Library.
^New York Times, December l8, 1951.
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7exemption of supervisors and agricultural workers,
Walter P. Reuther urged Congress "to redeem President 
Elsenhower's promise" by proposing modifications similar 
to those Meany requested for the closed shop. Injunction, 
secondary boycott and union suability provisions. In 
addition, Reuther wanted to remove the non-Communlst 
affidavit requirement and the employer "free speech"
O
clause.
Although the Taft-Hartley Act was discussed In the 
election of 1952, It did not play the major role It had In 
19^8. Five years after the enactment of the law, during 
which there were repeated failures to achieve repeal, the 
opposition was beginning to concede that It would be more 
practical to work for Improvement by amendment. However 
the Act could still stimulate fiery denunciation from Harry 
Truman and was again used by the Democrats to solicit the 
support of labor In the 1952 election. But before the 
campaign got underway, the Taft-Hartley Act became an Issue 
In one of the most-famous strikes In American history.
This was the steel strike of 1952 and the role of the Taft- 
Hartley Act In this strike had an Important Influence on 
the presidential race that followed.
^AF of L News Release, Statement of George Meany, 
March 3, 1953, Lloyd A. Mashburn File, R.G. 174, National 
Archives.
^CIO News Release, Statement of Walter P. Reuther, 
March 30, 1953, Lloyd A. Mashburn File, R.G. 174, National 
Archives.
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This labor dispute originated in the demand of the
steelworkers for a wage increase. The steel industry refused
to grant the requested raise since the government would not
allow what the industry considered a sufficient compensatory
price increase in steel. On November 1, I95I, the United
Steel Workers of America, CIO, notified the steel industry
that it was ready to begin negotiations for a new contract
to replace the existing one that would expire on December 31.
The union asked for an 18 1/2 cent wage increase. In
addition, requests were submitted for a union shop, six
paid holidays, double time on Sundays, and a guaranteed
annual wage. It was estimated that these supplementary
benefits would amount to 5. cents per hour increase in the
gfirst year and 3.5 cents per hour the second year.
In resisting these demands, Benjamin P. Fairless, 
President of U. S. Steel, appealed to the principle 
accepted by the general public that a raise in wages would 
mean a rise in the cost of living. In a public statement 
Fairless said that labor had received "a general round of 
wage increases" on five different occasions since V-J Day, 
"and five times the cost of living has shot upward in the 
wake of the pay boost." These new economic demands, Fairless 
insisted, would raise the industry's employment costs over
^Mary K. Hammond, "The Steel Strike of 1952,"
Current History, XXIII (November, 1952), 285.
251
50 cents per man hour. Steel profits for the first nine 
months of 1951 were 25 per cent lower than for the same 
period in 1950, he stated, because of higher federal income 
taxes, higher employment costs, and higher prices for 
purchased goods. Negotiations with the union had made 
"little progress . . .  to date," Fairless complained, 
"because the Union flatly refuses to trim down its financial 
demands to what will fit into the Government's wage 
stabilization rules.
Collective bargaining negotiations produced no 
results and the union announced a strike for December 31,
1951. The union blamed the steel industry for the failure 
of these negotiations. Philip Murray, the CIO president, 
accused the steel companies of "acting in concert" and 
engaging "in an industry-wide strike against collective 
bargaining." The companies, Murray charged, would not even 
discuss the proposals or submit counterproposals. He 
emphasized that "they simply said NO." In this same 
statement Murray pointed out that the meetings held by 
Cyrus S. Ching on December 20 with representatives of the 
two sides were terminated by Ching after two days "when
it became apparent that the companies would not even make
^^Benjamin F. Fairless, Statement, December 22,
1952, Truman Papers, OF 419-B, Truman Library.
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serious counter-proposals.''^^ Because of this serious 
threat to national defense. President Truman referred the 
dispute to the Wage Stabilization Board, This action opened 
an extended controversy over his refusal to Invoke the Taft- 
Hartley law.
With the outbreak of the Korean War steady 
production and stable labor relations In vital Industries 
assumed paramount Importance. To meet this crisis President 
Truman reconstituted the Wage Stabilization Board on April 22, 
1951, by Executive Order, basing his authority to do so on 
his constitutional powers as Chief Executive and Commander- 
In-Chlef, and on the Defense Production Act of 1950. This 
new Board was composed of eighteen members with labor, 
management and the public being equally represented. The 
Board was empowered to Investigate both economic and non­
economic Issues In disputes threatening national defense 
and to make recommendations to the disputants. It was given 
"virtual assurance from the Economic Stabilization
Administrator" that If It "recommended certain changes In
12wage policy" he would approve them. Truman thus had an 
"administrative alternative" to use In the place of the
llphlllp Murray, Statement to Wage Stabilization 
Board In Steel Strike (filing date February 5, 1952), Truman 
Papers, OF 407-B, Truman Library.
^^New York Times, April 22, 1951.
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1Taft-Hartley Act In a threatened strike in vital industries.
When Murray announced the strike for December 31
Truman immediately referred the dispute to the Wage
Stabilization Board, requesting "promptly . . . its
recommendations , . . as to fair and equitable terms of
settlement. The President publicly announced his action
the same day, saying that negotiations were "at an impasse,"
with apparently "no hope of settlement through mediation."
Therefore he had to find some means of avoiding a shutdown
15of the steel industry. Truman requested that the workers 
continue on the Job because he had "confidence in the Wage 
Stabilization Board and . . . the parties . . .  to arrive 
at a fair settlement," to which the union promptly complied. 
Truman later said he had considered using the Taft-Hartley 
Act in this dispute, but since the WSB "had been established 
especially for defense labor disputes and had been 
reaffirmed by Congress in this function within the year," 
he decided this "situation" would be better handled by the 
Board than by injunction.
■^Frederick H. Harbison and Robert C.-Spencer, "The 
Politics of Collective Bargaining: The Postwar Record in
Steel," American Political Science Review, XLVIII 
(September, 1954), 713-
l^Harry S. Truman to Nathan P. Peinsinger,
December 22, I951, Truman Papers, OP 407-B, Truman Library.
l^Harry S. Truman, Statement, December 22, 195I, 
Truman Papers, OP 407-B, Truman Library.
l^Harry S. Truman to Philip Murray, December 31,
1951, Truman Papers, OP 407-B, Truman Library.
l^Truman, Memoirs, II, 467.
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In November, 1951, prior to the steel controversy,
the Council of Economic Advisors had established a national
wage-price policy based on: (l) wage adjustments subject to
general restraint, (2) maintenance of real wages based on
cost of living adjustments, (3) correction of unmistakable
inequities, (4) some productivity increases, and (5) restraint
of fringe benefits. This Council had concluded that the
government's position in the steel dispute should be based
on "a tight application" of this policy and no general price
increase. Then, in contrast to Fairless' declaration of
falling profits, the Council stated that U. S. Steel's
profits before taxes in the first half of 1951 were at the
annual rate of $574,000,000 or 26.6 per cent on net worth
compared to their 1950 earnings of $450,000,000 before taxes,
1 Ror 22.9 per cent on net worth.
After more than two months of investigation the 
Wage Stabilization Board presented its recommendations on 
the dispute. The Board recommended, although not 
unanimously, that the workers be given a 12 1/2 cent raise 
immediately with another 2 1/2 cent raise July 1, followed 
by 2 1/2 cents more on January 1, 1953. The Board approved 
the union shop request and advised further discussions on the 
demand that employers pay 7 cents per hour into a trust
1 RCouncil of Economic Advisors, Memorandum,
November l4, 1951, Truman Papers, David D. Lloyd File,
Truman Library.
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fund for the guaranteed annual wage. The Chairman,
Nathan P. Feinsinger, defended these proposals on the grounds
that the increases would merely permit steel workers to
catch up with other major segments of industry, and not
start another "round" of wage increases.
Steel industry officials estimated that a 15 cent
wage increase would necessitate raising the price of steel,
already at $110 per ton, another $6.6o. But the Office of
Price Administration would only allow a $2.86 per ton 
20increase. The industry accordingly refused to accede to 
the WSB proposals, offering instead the 13 1/2 cent 
package raise advocated by the industrial members of the 
Wage Stabilization Board. Benjamin Fairless denounced the 
Board's wage recommendation, saying that this would 
constitute a greater increase than steelworkers ever 
received "in normal times when no governmental wage and price 
controls were in effect." He further pled that this raise 
would "gravely impair and perhaps destroy" the steel industry's 
ability to maintain and expand its plants, at a time "when 
free men are still fighting in Korea and a Free World needs
our strength. ,,21 Further negotiations produced no results
^^Report and Recommendations, Wage Stabilization 
Board, Steel Strike, March 22, 1952, Truman Papers,
OP 407-B, Truman Library.
2C>Mary K. Hammond, "The Steel Strike of .1952, "
Current History, XXIII (November, 1952), 286.
^Ifienjamin F. Fairless, Radio Address, April 6, 1952, 
Truman Papers, Charles S. Murphy File, Truman Library.
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and the union prepared to strike on April 8.
A White House memorandum had suggested several
bases for emergency seizure of an industry by the President.
These included: (1) Section l8 of the Selective Service Act
of 1950, (2) Title II of the Defense Production Act of
1950, (3) inherent executive powers found in Article II of
the Constitution, and (4) a possible additional statutory
basis in the emergency injunction provisions of the Taft- 
22Hartley Act. In an unprecedented action on April 8, 1952,
President Truman ordered Secretary of Commerce Charles
Sawyer to seize and operate the nation's steel mills involved
in the d i s p u t e . T h e  next day Truman informed Congress
that he had made this decision "with the utmost reluctance."
He said the only alternative was to grant the industry's
demand "for a large price increase" which he and the
stabilization officials believed "would have wrecked our
stabilization program." If Congress took no action in the
dispute he would "keep the steel industry operating and . . .
24bring about a settlement . . .  as soon as possible."
From this point on the issue, became a legal and 
political battle. Truman "sided squarely with the
22Memorandum to Assistant Attorney General Baldridge, 
unsigned, n.d., Truman Papers, David D. Lloyd File, Truman 
Library.
^^Harry S. Truman, Executive Order 10340, April 8, 
1952, Truman Papers, OF 272, Truman Library.
24Harry S. Truman, Statement to Congress, April 9, 
1952, Truman Papers, OF 407-B, Truman Library.
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Steelworkers and verbally blasted the steel industry" while
the steel industry countered with the charge that the
seizure was a "political deal between the CIO and the
25Administration." Clarence E. Randall, President of 
Inland Steel was certain that this "evil deed" discharged 
"a political debt to the CIO" and warned the American 
housewife that this wage increase would start "the whole 
giddy spiral of inflation . . . again." "To freedom loving 
people it means the closed shop and compulsory unionism," 
Randall lamented, and "to the businessman it is the threat
26of [nationalization] nationalism."
Demands came from all sides, except labor, for 
Truman to invoke the Taft-Hartley Act. The Senate debated 
cutting a supplemental appropriations bill to restrict funds 
necessary for government operation of the steel mills because 
of the conviction that the law should have been invoked. 
Truman replied that the Taft-Hartley Act provided only for 
a fact-finding board investigation during the 80-day 
injunction and could not prevent a shutdown. By acting as 
he did, Truman reminded Congress, a "delay--voluntarily--of 
100 days in the work stoppage" was achieved. He acknowledged
25prederick H . Harbison and Robert C. Spencer, "The 
Politics of Collective Bargaining: The Postwar Record in
Steel," American Political Science Review, XLVIII 
(September, 1954), 715.
^^Clarence B. Randall, Radio and Television Address, 
April 9, 1952, Truman Papers, Charles S. Murphy File,
Truman Library.
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that some congressmen wanted him to invoke the law even at 
that late date, but any further delay would be "futile." 
Furthermore,It would be "unfair," he Insisted, "to force the 
workers to continue at work another 8o days at their old 
wages." "To freeze the status quo by Injunction would, of 
course, be welcomed by the companies, but It would be
27deeply and properly resented by the workers," he explained.
Harold L. Enarson, a White House assistant, noted 
that the pro and con public opinion mail on the steel 
seizure ran "about half and half." He felt that the letters 
Indicating "bewilderment and concern" were probably most 
representative of the public attitude on the Issue and 
suggested selecting one of these letters for the President
28to answer personally. The result was a,letter from Truman 
to C. S. Jones who had asked why the Taft-Hartley Act had 
not been used. Truman replied to this citizen that If he 
had Invoked the law, "there Inevitably would have been a 
work stoppage" because of the elaborate procedure required 
by the Act. He then went through the steps of the procedure 
that were necessary before an Injunction could be obtained 
and which, he explained, consumed "time." Truman used this 
opportunity to elaborate on the Administration theme that 
steel profits were high enough to justify refusing the
2fHarry S. Truman to Alben Barkley, April 21, 1952, 
Truman Papers, OF 272, Truman Library.
^®Harold L. Enarson to John R. Steelman, April I5, 
1952, Truman Papers, Charles S. Murphy File, Truman Library.
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requested price raise. He said the Iron and Steel Institute 
had reported that its members, who included some 90 per cent 
of the industry, averaged $6.59 profit per ton "after taxes 
in the three years before Korea." For 1951 their profits 
came to $7.07 per ton "after taxes.
The Administration tried to publicize the letter to 
present its side of the controversy but the press was not 
as cooperative as desired. When another citizen asked 
Truman if the newspapers were correct in stating that all 
steel workers would be forced to Join the CIO if union demands 
were fulfilled, he received a copy of the "Jones Letter." 
Truman added a note to this letter saying that only a few 
newspapers had printed it in full or even summarized it, but 
instead had been "busy printing the paid propaganda ads 
of the steel companies.
On April 29 Federal District Judge David Pine 
ruled the government seizure illegal. The next day the 
Court of Appeals stayed the effect of this order until the 
Supreme Court could rule on the case. The Supreme Court 
agreed to hear the case immediately and on June 2, by a 
6 to 3 decision, held the seizure illegal and returned the
^^Harry S. Truman to C. S. Jones, April 27, 1952, 
Truman Papers, OF 407-B, Truman Library.
^^Harry S. Truman to Vic Householder, May 26, 1952, 
Truman Papers, OP 407-B, Truman Library.
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SImills to their owners. The workers Immediately began a
strike which was to last for 53 days. On June 10 Truman made
one final effort by requesting congressional authority to
seize the strikebound plants. He told Congress that he would
prefer them granting him this special power rather than
Invoke the Taft-Hartley Act. Investigations, provided for
by the law, already had been made, he said, and It would be
unfair to require the workers to continue under their present
wages when even the companies admitted they were entitled
to more. Also, such an Injunction would "take away
management's Incentive to bargain" as they would have
nothing to lose by delay. Finally, he reminded Congress, that
Invoking the Taft-Hartley Act "would not guarantee a
restoration of full-scale production," whereas the special
legislation he was requesting would accomplish that
32"primary objective."
The congressional response to this application was 
a resolution requesting the President to use the Taft-Hartley 
Act and "the cat began the trip back to the White House." 
Harold Enarson then recommended Invoking the law because 
failure to do so In the war emergency meant "only tragic 
loss In further delay." Then If the Injunction- failed to
I’̂ Youngstown Sheet and Tube Company v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579 (1952).. :
3^Harry S. Truman, Message to Congress, June 10,
1952, Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
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settle the dispute, this assistant said, "the cat . . . may
'I -n
claw the Congress not the President.' However, most of 
the department heads and advisors had advised against using 
the law, so the bitter strike continued.
By the Supreme Court invalidating the seizure and 
Congress refusing to grant special seizure authority, the 
steel companies then "held all the advantages," according to 
Truman, and if steel were obtained it would be on their
33terms. By July 22, steel stock supplies were dangerously 
low so President Truman called both sides to the White House 
for talks and on July 24 a settlement was announced, thus 
ending the strike. The new contract provided for a l6 cent 
wage increase plus an estimated ^ .4 cents per hour in fringe 
benefits. In return, the President "approved . . . with a 
reluctant heart" a price increase of $5.65 per ton on 
steel.
The result of this strike could be termed a victory 
for the steel industry. Although a wage increase was granted, 
it was less than the original union demand and the price 
increase was almost twice the $2.86 per ton the OPA would . 
have allowed when the dispute began. In addition, the
33-^Harold L. Enarson to John R. Steelman, Memorandum, 
June 24, 1952, Truman Papers, OF 407-B, Truman Library.




workers had worked five months under the old wages and 
conditions. But the President's actions In this controversy 
helped hold organized labor In the Democratic party In the 
approaching election. His actions convinced labor once 
again that he was on their side. Newsweek commented that 
labor, "which had been drifting Into a dangerous neutralism," 
was "lured back Into the Democratic camp" by the President's 
firm refusal to Invoke the Taft-Hartley Act In this strike.
During the eight-month steel crisis, potential
candidates for President were maneuvering for position and
by the time the steel strike ended the two major parties
had held their conventions. Dewey was out of the Republican
running after having suffered two defeats, and by January
of 1952 the Republicans had three announced candidates.
Senator Taft, Governor Warren and Harold Stassen. Taft,
being considered the titular head of the party, leader of the
Republican forces In Congress and with a tremendous 1950
victory to his credit, was far In the lead of these early
contenders. But another rival soon made his appearance.
As In 19^8 when some Democrats were attempting to "dump"
Truman, the name of General Dwight D. Elsenhower continued to
arise as a potential candidate. Early In January a Gallup
Poll showed him to be the "overwhelming choice" of all
S8voters, regardless of party.^ However, It was not until
87Newsweek, XL (August 4, 1952), 13. 
38lbld., XXXIX (January 7, 1952), l4.
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the New Hampshire primary, held in March, that Eisenhower was
declared a candidate, or even that he was a Republican.
Eisenhower was in Europe at this time as commander
of NATO forces and Taft was campaigning hard. In the first
week of March Taft overtook the General in popularity among
Republicans with 3^ percentage points against Eisenhower's 
3933. But the New Hampshire primary slightly altered the 
outlook when Eisenhower defeated Taft by a vote of 46,66l
to 35,838. This victory injected "new spirit" into the
4oEisenhower campaign. When Eisenhower received 106,000
votes in Stassen's home state of Minnesota, against
Stassen'5 128,000 with 100,000 of Eisenhower's votes being
write-ins, a "potential run-away Eisenhower boom" was 
4ireported.
The Democratic race was much less certain because
Harry S. Truman declined to state his intentions. Although
his national popularity was reported at an all-time low in 
42December, 1951, he was still undoubtedly in a position to 
dictate his own nomination, or the choice of his successor.
On April 26, 1950, Truman had written a memorandum, which 
he "locked away," declaring he would not be a candidate in
39Ibid. (March 10, 1952), 25.
4^1bid. (March 24, 1952), 33.
4llbid. (March 31, 1952), 19.
42lbid. (January 7, 1952), 13.
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the next presidential race. In March of 1951 he announced
this to the White House staff, but it was a well-kept
secret because his position was not publicly known until his
announcement on March 29, 1952. Truman's first choice of a
successor was Chief Justice Fred Vinson who eliminated
himself by declining, and his second choice was Governor
41Adlai E. Stevenson of Illinois. But with no definite 
statement from Truman until March, 1952, the Democratic field 
was open, and yet to a keen aspiring candidate it would be 
closed until the incumbent opened it with a declaration of 
intentions.
Late in January, 1952, Senator Estes Kefauver
announced his candidacy regardless of Truman's plans.
President Truman did not think Kefauver would be the best
candidate and indicated to "his cronies" that he would run
again "if there were no other way of keeping Kefauver from
getting the n o m i n a t i o n . H o w e v e r ,  at the annual Jefferson-
Jackson Day Dinner on March 29, Truman announced that he would
4'înot accept renomination. In April Stevenson declared 
himself a candidate for re-election as Governor of Illinois 
and therefore would not accept any other nomination. A week
ho
■^Truman, Memoirs, II, 488-91.
^^Newsweek, XXXIX (February 4, 1952), 17.
^^Truman, Memoirs, II, 492.
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later W. Averell .Harrlman of New York announced his 
candidacy "to fill the vacuum" left by this proclamation.^^
Immediately before the Republican convention Taft 
and Eisenhower were reported to be "running about as close 
as they can." In his favor Taft had a greater number of 
pledged delegates, control of the convention machinery, and 
party "dedication to Mr. Republican." Eisenhower had as 
outstanding assets a "fresh face," ability to make inroads 
on the Democratic South, the persistent notion that Taft 
could not win, and the fact that, being numerically 
inferior, the Republicans would have to pick up independent 
and Democratic votes to take the election.
When the Republicans met in Chicago July 7 to 11, 
Taft's control of the party machinery paid off when the 
National Committee voted to seat most of the Southern Taft 
delegates instead of the contested Eisenhower delegates.
But this.opening battle almost split the party in two. The 
Eisenhower forces carried the fight to the convention floor 
and managed to win back some of the contested seats. The 
turning point in the balloting came when Minnesota switched 
from Stassen and Eisenhower won the nomination on the first 
ballot with 845 votes to 280 for Taft. The vice-presidential 
candidate. Senator Nixon of California, was nominated by
^^Newsweek, XXXIX (May 5, 1952), 25.
47Ibid. (July 1, 1952), 15.
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acclamation. Newsweek reported that Elsenhower won "only
after the most violent battle within the Republican party
48since 1912." The comment of the New Republic on the
Republican choice was that It liked General Elsenhower as a
man but wanted to know what he stood for "besides Youth,
Motherhood and God." Not knowing Elsenhower's position on
any Issues, this magazine characterized the Republican
candidates as "the Ulysses S. Grant-Dlck Tracy ticket.
The labor plank of the Republican platform advocated
"retention of the Taft-Hartley Act," with changes necessary
to Insure "industrial p e a c e . T h e  Independent-minded
Wayne Morse described this section of the platform as
"verbose, platitudinous and evasive." He complained that
the Republicans were making the same mistake as In 19^8 .by
not telling labor and the American people "exactly what kind
51of legislation" they proposed.
When the Democrats held their convention In Chicago, 
July 21-26, Stevenson still refused to be a candidate, 
leaving Kefauver, Harrlman, Alben Barkley, and the Southern 
favorite Richard Russell of Georgia, as the leading
48ibld., XL (July 21, 1952), 21.
49New Republic, CXXVII (July 21, 1952), 3.
^Qpfflclal Report, 25th Republican National Convention, 
Chicago, July 7-11, 1952, p. 3l8.
^^Wayne Morse, "The GOP Platform," New Republic,
CXXVII (August 4, 1952), 12.
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contenders. Since Stevenson refused to run, Truman endorsed 
Barkley. But Barkley made the mistake, according to Truman, 
of meeting with all the labor leaders at the same time prior
52to the convention to request their support and they refused. 
Strangely enough labor was backing Stevenson. Harriman and 
Kefauver were advocating repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act ■ 
while Stevenson had merely recommended revision. But labor 
leaders were considering the total picture of picking the 
best candidate to win. They had learned in Ohio in 1950 
that opposition to Taft-Hartley was not sufficient in itself 
to win an election.
The Democratic platform again stated, "We strongly 
advocate repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act," because it had 
proven to be "inadequate, unworkable, and unfair." Instead, 
this plank proposed that "a new legislative approach toward 
the entire labor-management problem should be explored.
In comparing the labor planks of the two platforms, the 
New York Times declared that the Democrats were "trapped in 
the coils of a venerable political tradition" of not 
repudiating the policies of the party's titular head. This 
was the only reason, the Times stated, for the Democrats to 
again urge repeal of the law after the 8lst Congress had
^^Truman, Memoirs, II, 495.
53Newsweek, XL (August 4, I952), 17.
^^Officlal Report, Democratic National Convention, 
Chicago, July 21-2b, 1952, p. 265.
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"repudiated the efforts of organized labor, with the all-out 
support of the White House, to turn the clock back to the 
Wagner Act." "By way of contrast," the Times intoned, the 
Republicans advocated "adopting such amendments . . .  as 
time and experience show to be desirable.
In the voting that followed Kefauver led on the 
first two ballots. Eut when Harriman withdrew and New York 
swung to Stevenson, the Stevenson bandwagon started. The 
Governor from Illinois won on the third ballot with 617 1/2 
votes against Kefauver's 275 1/2 votes. Senator John 
Sparkman of Alabama was nominated as Stevenson's running mate, 
When Harry Truman addressed the convention he reminded the 
delegates that the Republicans were for only two things, the 
Taft-Hartley Act and the "discredited Both Congress." He 
then pledged that the party would "fight for repeal of that 
good-for-nothing Taft-Hartley Act."^^
The Democrats were jubilant over the Republican 
disunity. Newsweek warned that Eisenhower face greater 
obstacles than Dewey had in 1948 because the Democratic party 
was "united as it has not been since 1936." This magazine 
attributed much of the unity to the fact that labor was 
firmly back in the party. Labor support had been retrieved
55wew York Times, July .25, 1952.
5^Harry S. Truman, Address at Democratic National 
Convention, July 26, 1952, Truman Papers, OR, Truman 
Library,
26g
because Truman had refused to invoke the Taft-Hartley Act 
In the steel strike and because of the Democratic platform 
"promising repeal of the much denounced statute.
In contrast to ig48, the Taft-Hartley Act did not 
become a major political issue in 1952. The major issues 
in this campaign were the Korean War, inflation, and Communism 
and corruption in government. In August, 1952, Elmo Roper 
asked people to indicate the two or three issues they 
thought were most important in this campaign. The response 
was 57 per c.erit-for halting rising prices, 51 per cent for 
ending the Korean War quickly, 48 per cent for keeping 
Communists out of government jobs, and 35 per cent for 
preventing corruption and dishonesty in government. Only 
6 per cent thought changing the Taft-Hartley Act was a 
leading q u e s t i o n . B u t  to the NAM this law was an issue.
This organization warned that "regardless of who wins, 
Taft-Hartley must be defended.
At the beginning of the campaign the two leading 
candidates expressed similar views on the law. Eisenhower 
was quoted as saying that "we cannot make legislation that 
can compel people to work. That is'regimentation. We have
^^Newsweek, XL (August 4, 1952), 13.
5®Roper, You and Your Leaders, 249.
^^National Association of Manufacturers, The 
Washington Bulletin, I, No. 3 (October 7, 1952), Truman 
Papers, Kenneth Hechler File, Truman Library.
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got to find a way, a means of respecting the advances labor 
has made . . .  I believe that we should not give up these 
social g a i n s . Stevenson was caught in the dilemma of 
having advocated "modifications" before the convention and 
then having to run on the platform of repeal. In his first 
press conference after his nomination he tried to reconcile 
the contradiction. At this time he expressed the conviction 
that it was "more a question of form than of substance."
He felt the area of agreement on objectives between employer 
and employee was increasing so possibly it would be "better 
to remove the political symbolism of the name 'Taft-Hartley' 
by repeal." But to him the result was more important than 
the method by which it was g a i n e d . I n  a Labor Day speech 
at Detroit Stevenson boldly stated that he did not think the 
Act was "a slave law," but added that "it was biased and 
politically inspired." He then established five basic 
principles as the basis for a new labor law; (l) the law 
must accept unions, like employer corporations, as the 
responsible representatives of their members' interests,
(2 ) labor unions must conform to standards of fair conduct,
(3) the law must outlaw unfair bargaining practices by both 
sides, (4) reject the use of the labor injunction, and
(5) find new methods for handling national emergency disputes.
^^Newsweek, XL (August 4, 1952), 29.
Glfbid. (August 11, 1952), 19-20.
^ % e w  Republic, CXXVII (October 20, 1952), 14-15.
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Most labor leaders endorsed Stevenson. The CIO early 
sanctioned his candidacy but Richard Gray of the building 
trades and William Hutcheson of the carpenters were definitely 
for Elsenhower while John L. Lewis was reported "unpredictable,"^^ 
The two major candidates took the unprecedented step of 
addressing the AF of L annual convention In an attempt to win 
the support of this union. Elsenhower assured this convention 
that he knew the law "might be used to break unions" and 
"must be c h a n g e d . B u t ,  characteristic of his entire 
campaign, he spoke In generalities, making no specific ' 
recommendations. By contrast, Stevenson specifically 
advocated legalizing union security clauses, redefining 
secondary boycotts and limiting, or ending, use of the 
I n j u n c t i o n . A s  a result, the ÂF of L broke Its tradition 
and for the only time In Its history, with the exception of 
1924, endorsed a presidential candidate, Adlal E. Stevenson.
The first Gallup Poll conducted after the 
conventions gave Elsenhower the lead with 47 per cent,
Stevenson 4l per cent and 12 per cent u n d e c i d e d . A t  the 
time of the AF of L convention a Crossley Poll showed 
Elsenhower even further ahead with 52.8 per cent and
G^Newsweek, XL (September 15, 1952), 21.
G^ibld. (September 29, 1952), 32.
^5qus Tyler, "The AFL Joins the Democrats," New 
Republic, CXXVII (October 6, 1952), 8 .
^^Newsweek, XL (August l8, 1952), 17-
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•Stevenson 46.6 per cent with .6 per cent O t h e r . T h e n
on September 12 the character of Eisenhower's campaign
underwent a drastic change. Taft and his supporters, in
disgust over the Chicago convention, had refused to campaign
for the General. On September 12 Taft flew to Eisenhower's
Morningside Heights home in New York. At this meeting
Eisenhower received instructions as to what he, as a
Republican, stood for. Five days previously, when asked his
views on the use of the labor injunction, Eisenhower had
replied that he did not know enough about the subject to
discuss it. Taft now proceeded to explain the law's
provisions and exacted the promise that Eisenhower would not
accept an amendment authorizing plant seizure in a national
68emergency without special legislation. From this point on 
Eisenhower espoused traditional Republican policies and 
Stevenson, by comparison, seemed more liberal. But the Taft 
forces now began to campaign for the Republican candidate.
One of the highlights of the campaign occurred 
when the New York Post published a story headlined "Secret . 
Nixon Fund." Dana C. Smith, a California attorney, told how 
he and several friends had, during the past two years, 
collected some $l6,000 to $10,000 for Nixon's "political
G^Ibid. (September 22, 1952), 26.
68Edwin A. Lahey, "Eisenhower Moves Right," New 
Republic, CXXVII (September 22, 1952), 8 .
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expenses. This revelation caused a great deal of
consternation In Republican circles and It was the almost
unanimous view that Elsenhower should drop his running mate.
But on September 22 Nixon vindicated himself In a 30-mlnute
talk on a national radio and television hookup. He explained
that all of this money had been used for political purposes
and offered as evidence that he was In debt. His $13,000
California home was mortgaged for $10,000; his $41,000
Washington home was mortgaged for $20,000; he owed his
parents $3500 and a bank $4500; and for conclusive proof, his
wife Pat did not even "own a mink coat." His explanation was
so convincing that Elsenhower tearfully embraced him at
Wheeling, West Virginia, with, "Dick, you're my boy.
In the meantime President Truman was conducting a
whistle stop campaign that gave, according to one observer,
"an extraordinary lift to the Democrats" and dispersed
71"the gloom that had enveloped the Stevenson camp." By 
the time of the election he had traveled over 15,000 miles 
and made more than 200 speeches on behalf of Stevenson.
In his tour Truman repeated his campaign tactics of 1948 by 
hitting specific Issues, and again one of the most Important
^^New York Post, September l8, 1952.
TOwewsweek, XL (October 6, 1952), 25.
71lbld. (October 20, 1952), 26.
^^Ibld. (November 3, 1952), 28.
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of these was the Taft-Hartley Act. He told a group of
miners In West Virginia that unions were not always "in the
right," but the Republicans had produced a labor law that
"bears down on people who belong to unions, whether the unions
T ̂are right or wrong. In May, 1952, the Wall Street
Journal had published an article entitled "Mr. Taft Has Some 
Ideas." This story stated that Republicans and Southern 
Democrats were "mulling over such schemes as putting labor 
under anti-trust laws, or simply breaking up nation-wide
74unions. ' Truman quoted this to an audience, warning them 
that if the Republicans came into power they would "crack 
down on everybody except the special interests that put them 
into power . ^
Truman admonished New Englanders for not "leading the 
fight to get rid" of the Act. He said it was not "an 
academic question in New England" since the law was "hurting" 
them.^^ He explained to the coal miners of Pennsylvania 
that the object of the Taft-Hartley Act "was to drive the 
laboring men back into slavery" and if the Republicans got
7:iHarry S. Truman, Remarks at Keyser, West Virginia, 
September 2, 1952, Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
74wall Street Journal, May 26, 1952.
"^^Harry S. Truman, Remarks at Gerber, California, 
October 3, 1952, Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
T^'Harry S. Truman, Remarks at Manchester, New 
Hampshire, October l6, 1952,.Truman Papers, OR, Truman 
Library.
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"control of this country," that is what would happen. He 
pointed out that the Republican party represented "Wall 
Street and the National Association of Manufacturers In 
Congress" while the Democratic party supported "the plain 
people . . . against the lobbies." He had tried to get the
Taft-Hartley Act repealed, he said, but the Republicans,
77with Dlxlecrats and Shlvercrats" blocked It. He reminded
coal miners In West Virginia that this "terrible, vindictive,
anti-labor act" could "wreck the American labor movement."
He cited as proof the Business Week article of December l8,
19^8 , which drew up the blueprint for destroying unions with
the law In a time of unemployment. He cautioned his listeners
to "look out" If the Republicans won the election, because
Senator Taft and his party had plans that would "pulverize
the labor unions." He quoted the Wall Street Journal of
May 26, 1952, as an example of Republican Intentions.
Truman admitted that the Republican presidential
candidate did not have a record on labor questions but said
that Elsenhower had "picked one of the most anti-labor men
79In Congress to be his running mate." Truman reminded a
T^Harry S. Truman, Remarks at Wilkes-Barre, 
Pennsylvania, October 22, 1952, Truman Papers, OR, Truman 
Library. Allan Shivers, Democratic Governor of Texas, 19^9- 
1957, was considered by Truman and other liberal Democrats 
at this time as being more of a Republican than a Democrat 
because of his policies.
T^Bhrry S. Truman, Remarks at Wheeling, West 
Virginia, October 23, 1952, Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
79lbld.
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gathering at Gary, Indiana, that Nixon had "worked for the
passage of union-busting legislation even more punitive
than the Taft-Hartley l a w . At Terre Haute, Truman
explained that the reason for Nixon being "a favorite of the
National Association of Manufacturers" was he had worked
hard for the Hartley bill "which was even more violently
8lanti-labor than the final product,"
The climax of the 1952 campaign arose over the 
issue of the Korean War. Eisenhower had been criticizing 
the Administration on its conduct in Korea and President 
Truman defied him to produce his "panacea to cure the situation."
Truman felt that if the General had a solution it was his
82"duty" to explain it to him "and save lives now." On
October 24 Eisenhower accepted this challenge, with the
8 8blunt sentence, "I shall go to Korea," and this affected 
last-minute voting decisions. As one writer stated, the 
instant popularity of Eisenhower's Korean statement 
"demonstrated that Korea had been the dominant issue ever
RnHarry S. Truman, Remarks at Gary, Indiana,
October 27, 1952, Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
®^Harry S. Truman, Remarks at Terre Haute, Indiana, 
October 27, 1952, Truman Papers, OR, Truman Library.
G^Newsweek, XL (October 27, 1952), 27.
Gjibid. (November 3, 1952), 26.
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84since the nominating conventions." The final Gallup Poll
before the election showed Eisenhower with 47 per cent and
Stevenson trailing with 4o per cent. But 12 per cent were
B estill undecided.
The presidential race of 1952 inspired the largest 
vote in American history up to that time with 61,637,991 
casting ballots. Eisenhower received 33,938,285 popular 
votes against Stevenson's 27,312,217. Eisenhower received 
the greatest number of votes of any presidential candidate 
although Franklin D. Roosevelt's 60 per cent in 19p6 was 
greater than Eisenhower's 55 per cent of the total vote. 
Stevenson received the largest number any defeated candidate 
had been given. Eisenhower was elected with 442 electoral 
votes, being the first Republican to split the Solid South 
since Hoover in 1928. Stevenson received a total of 89 
electoral votes, carrying only-the nine states of West 
Virginia, Kentucky, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina and North Carolina. In 
addition, the Democrats lost control of Congress. The 83rd 
Congress was composed of 221 Republicans, 212 Democrats and 
one Independent in the House and 48 Republicans, 47 Democrats 
and one Independent in the Senate. Senator Wayne Morse,
^^Richard L. Neuberger, "The West--Eyes on Korea,"
New Republic, CXXVII (November 17, 1952), 7-
^^Newsweek, XL (November 10, 1952), 26.
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the Independentj had changed his politics as a result of the 
Eisenhower campaign and now held the balance in the Senate.
Despite all that Harry S. Truman could do, there is 
little or no evidence that the Taft-Hartley Act played any 
significant part in the outcome of the presidential election 
of 1952. After refraining from use of the word repeal for 
over a year, Truman returned to the fray with a vengeance. 
Recalling perhaps the successful tactics he had employed in 
19^8, he again flayed the 8oth Congress for enacting the 
Taft-Hartley Act and cast the blame for inflation upon the 
Republicans. But his efforts were in vain. The American 
people were interested in other problems such as Communism 
and the Korean War, and in spite of his flaming indictment 
he was unable to make the "Slave Labor Law" a major issue. 
Voters turned out in record numbers and elected their hero 
as President.
Eisenhower's extreme popularity, even among the 
nation's workers and in the Solid South, permitted his appeal 
to cut across party lines and draw from the Democratic and 
independent vote. The failure of congressional elections to 
follow the Eisenhower landslide and give the Republicans an 
overwhelming majority testified that the people were voting 
for a personality and not Republican principles. Although 
Stevenson received official labor endorsement, unions were 
unable to force labor legislation into the predominant 
position it had occupied in previous elections. Eisenhower
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was held In such high esteem that his stand on labor Issues 
was immaterial. This election again proved that laborers 
vote their own inclinations regardless of the official union 
position. The Taft-Hartley Act was not a critical issue to 
workers in 1952 so the political tide continued to flow 
against unions and the Democratic party.
CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSIONS
Several Important conclusions regarding the American 
labor movement and national politics can be drawn from a
study of the early political history of the Taft-Hartley Act.
This law immeasurably assisted labor organizations in 
developing socially and politically. Concerted political 
action helped to bring about unification of the two largest
international federations of unions, the AF of L and the CIO.
The decision to veto this amendment to the national labor 
policy marked the turning point of the Truman Administration 
to a more liberal program and proved to be a major factor 
in Harry S. Truman's startling election in 1948.
Labor was slow to match the organization and growth 
established by American industry. As the industrial giants 
arose, organized and expanded, laboring men in turn were 
forced to coordinate their actions and bargain collectively 
with these colossi to maintain and better their working 
conditions. Also, as machine technology increased, the 
worker began to lose his identity as an individual part of 
the productive process and this stimulated the need for
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organization to promote and protect his Interests. But 
the concepts of "free enterprise" and "rugged Individualism" 
had become Ingrained American traditions that retarded this 
labor regimentation. Thus the early labor movement was 
characterized by the use of government Injunction to curtail 
labor activities, with the organization of labor being looked 
upon as a type of conspiracy In restraint of trade and 
certain union practices were restricted through court Inter­
pretation of the antitrust laws. With the advent of the 
Great Depression and the New Deal, the attitude of the nation 
and the .federal government underwent a sharp change. The 
Democratic party, under the leadership of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, revised the national labor policy so as to 
stimulate the organization of labor. The Wagner Act, one 
of the cornerstones of the New Deal program, was designed 
to assist American workers In their efforts to organize and 
bargain collectively. This change In policy soon created a 
political alliance between labor unions and the Democratic 
party. Democratic administrations worked for the Interests 
of organized labor, Interpreting and administering the 
Wagner Act In such a way as to favor unions. The workers 
of the nation reciprocated by becoming an Important segment 
of this party's political constituency.
In the period between the creation of the Wagner 
Act policy and the end of World War II unionism was charac­
terized by optimism and exuberance. Membership doubled In
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these years with the CIO organizing the mass production 
industries. Although the AF of L and other craft unions had 
been developing for years, the mass production workers had 
been neglected and offered a fruitful field for unionization. 
But the period of Incubation and growth in industrial unions 
was also typified by aggressiveness. Under the Wagner Act 
labor began to realize its potential power and actions were 
committed which the public regarded as excesses. The 
tactics used to organize these new unions included such 
innovations as the sit-down strike which appeared to be quite 
extreme when contrasted with traditional labor techniques. 
Also the activities of a few union leaders whose delinquency 
was caused by lack of public responsibility and desire for 
personal power, damaged organized labor's public relations.
The climax of union aggression came in the post- 
World War 11 period. In the unstable economic conditions of 
the reconversion interim, organized labor sought to 
consolidate its wartime gains in a series of strikes, as had 
occurred in the post-World War 1 era. And, similar to the 
public reaction in that earlier epoch, public opinion turned 
against unions in this later phase of industrial strife.
In a postwar reaction, the American people regarded these 
waves of strikes as union abuses of power and a climate 
of opinion developed that was receptive to the idea of 
restricting the seemingly unfettered activities of 
organized labor.
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This nationwide hostility toward unions was exploited 
in a sustained drive by conservatives in Congress and 
American industry, led by the National Association of 
Manufacturers and the United States Chamber of Commerce, 
to reverse the Wagner Act policy established by the Democratic 
party. Industrial organizations had opposed the Wagner 
Act from its inception and conducted a continuous campaign 
to convince the American public that labor's power should be 
restricted. Republicans and Southern Democrats, whose 
constituencies were basically the agrarian, middle class 
and business groups of the nation, agreed that union 
activities should be curtailed and each session of Congress 
saw the introduction of an increasing number of bills which 
would carry out this conviction. This campaign was reinforced 
by the presentation of labor news in the nation's mass media. 
Union activities, such as the series of postwar nationwide 
strikes, were presented to the public in the form of 
sensationalism, and the actions of the few extremely 
assertive labor leaders made front-page headlines in the 
reconversion period. All these factors coalesced to 
convince the American public that the national labor policy 
needed revision.
The national labor policy was drastically modified 
by the Labor-Management Relations Act of 19^7. This law, 
passed in the heated atmosphere of a public antipathy 
toward labor and as a result of the Republicans gaining
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control of Congress for the first time since the New Deal, 
contained the principle that industrial strife needed to be 
controlled for the paramount interest of the public. It 
also embodied the implicit philosophy of management that 
labor's economic strength should be substantially weakened. 
Organized labor was henceforth to have its activities regulated 
so as to strike a new balance of power in the struggles 
between the American titans, labor and industry. For the 
first time in American history Congress had enacted permanent 
legislation specifically designed to restrain organized 
labor severely.
Labor's immediate reaction was to term the Taft- 
Hartley Act a "Slave Labor Law" and demand its repeal. But 
what appeared to be an unreasonable and groundless aversion 
to the law by organized labor was actually a deepseated 
apprehension of the future. The slave labor aspects of 
the statute failed to materialize but union officials were 
anxious lest, in a future period of possible mass unemployment, 
the Act's more injurious provisions might be employed to 
destroy unionism and free collective bargaining, as was the 
alleged intent of some of the policy's sponsors. When 
repeal proved impossible, unions gradually began to accept 
the inevitable by insisting instead on removal of the 
statute's more harmful features.
This new policy had the desirable effect of helping 
to cleanse organized labor of some of its more abusive
285
methods and procedures. However, much of this was done by 
labor Itself when It began purging Communists from seats of 
union power and restricting practices that had helped bring 
about the law. The American labor movement was forced to 
accept the restrictions imposed by public opinion on national 
labor policy, and union leaders realized the fallacy of 
their previous dependence upon the federal government for 
protection. Labor commenced to appreciate the fact that it 
could no longer disregard the welfare and opinion of the 
public or rely too heavily upon the national government for 
defense against an irate public when labor abuses were 
committed. The American labor movement began to accept its 
social responsibilities in the industrialized world. With 
the passage of time came the dawning realization that the 
so-called slave labor features had not ruined unions. 
Coinciding with this was the failure to obtain repeal of the 
Act and organized labor's attempt to revise the law to remove 
its more harmful provisions.
The Taft-Hartley Act had the very important effect 
in national politics of stimulating union political activity 
to a greater degree than ever before. In this sense the 
intent of the law's sponsors was frustrated as one of the 
Act's purposes was to reduce the political activity and 
influence of organized labor. The enactment of this statute 
brought home to labor more clearly than any previous event 
the realization that the economic gains achieved could very
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easily be lost on the political field. Although unions had 
been active in politics prior to 194%, they were stimulated 
to a much greater degree of political endeavor after the 
passage of this law. Evading the political restrictions in 
the law, organized labor began spending more money and 
campaigning in national elections with much greater 
intensity. But with the gradual realization that they were 
not going to be able to destroy the statute, workers 
concentrated their political energy more along the lines of 
preserving their gains rather than achieving new ones.
Also of importance, the Taft-Hartley Act contributed 
heavily to labor unity. The great schism of labor organi­
zations into the AF of L and CIO had resulted in such 
ruinous practices as jurisdictional strikes, unions raiding 
other unions for membership, and the two rival organizations 
many times working at cross-purposes which weakened the 
entire labor movement. The Taft-Hartley law, an attack from 
the outside, helped organized labor to comprehend its 
vulnerability and its common interests with the result that 
the AF of L and the CIO began to work more closely together, 
along with other organizations like the railroad brotherhoods, 
to achieve common ends. This cooperation was first apparent 
in the political sphere when both of the major international 
organizations accelerated their political activities. The
passage of the Taft-Hartley Act impressed labor more
deeply than ever before with the importance the political
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field held for the sustenance and growth of unionism.
This increased political activity and cooperation 
did much to obliterate old grievances and lessen tensions 
between the AF of L and the CIO. Both began to realize that 
labor unity was more important than the specific objectives 
of each union and was a necessity if organized labor were to 
withstand this and future onslaughts against the principles 
of free collective bargaining. Political collusion in turn 
led to concerted action for other common labor goals and 
culminated in the merger of the AF of L and the CIO in 1955. 
After several years of meetings and discussions organized 
labor was now united, at least on paper, as it had been 
prior to the CIO separation from the AF of L in the 1930's.
In national politics the Taft-Hartley Act is but 
one aspect, albeit a most important one, of the postwar 
conservative reaction. Truman's veto of this law was one 
of the most important domestic decisions he had to make as 
President. After considering various factors, his final 
choice lay between moving his Administration to a progressive 
course or maintaining it in the moderate channel he had been 
pursuing. He could either align his Administration with the 
popular wave of reaction and antiunion feeling and accept the 
bill, thus moving to the right, or he could move to the left, 
veto the bill, and strengthen the Democratic-labor coalition 
begun by Roosevelt. Choosing the latter course he assumed 
the New Deal progressive tradition which was to come to full
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flower in his Fair Deal program in 19^9. And in doing so, 
Truman won the continued support of most of the country's 
labor leaders.
Harry S. Truman's actions during most of his first 
Administration had lowered his popularity both nationally 
and within his party. The conservative political reaction 
of the reconversion period that gave the Republicans control 
of Congress in 19^6 and the decline in public esteem of 
Truman and the Democratic party augured well for Republican 
success in the election of 19^8. Democratic disunity, 
contrasted with Republican harmony, plus the general desire 
for a change in administration after l6 years of Democratic 
rule, seemed to assure everyone that a Republican President 
would be elected in 1948. But the Taft-Hartley dispute 
greatly influenced the outcome of this election. Using the 
Taft-Hartley Act and other actions and inactions of the 
80th Congress as issues, Truman conducted one of the most 
aggressive campaigns in American history, castigating the 
Republican attempt to reverse the New Deal. Truman's 
fighting tactics were rewarded by his winning, an upset 
victory and the Democratic party recaptured Congress, thus 
at least temporarily reversing the conservative political 
trend.
Truman had created the Taft-Hartley issue with his 
veto and used it to the fullest advantage. He is convinced 
that the Taft-Hartley issue was the main reason for his
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victory in 19^^8. While It Is difficult to ascribe the 
results of a national election to any single factor, the 
Taft-Hartley Act undoubtedly served as one of the major 
components In his surprising triumph. This was a dispute 
upon which he could become personally agitated and he 
seemed to enjoy communicating his aversion to the law to 
the electorate. He made this one of the principal Issues 
In his campaign and It was so widely and Intensely discussed 
at this time that, following his election. It was generally 
assumed that the national labor policy would be changed.
His failure to keep this campaign promise was not due to 
lack of endeavor but to Congress maintaining that his 
mandate was Invalid.
After winning the election, Truman presented the 
new Democratlc-controlled Congress with his Fair Deal program. 
This agenda consisted of the major Issues he had raised In 
the previous campaign and which he believed were the basis 
for his election, the outstanding one being repeal of the 
Taft-Hartley Act. But again the Southern Democrats joined 
the Republicans In Congress and defeated repeal of the law 
In 1949. This Issue Illustrates the operation of the double 
constituency phenomenon In American national politics more 
clearly than any other episode In the postwar era. When 
the Republicans gained control of Congress In 1946, they 
claimed the election was a command from the people to enact 
the statute since Republicans had made union abuse of power
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the principal issue in these elections. As Congress' 
constituencies are basically rooted in the agricultural, 
middle class and business groups which are fundamentally 
antiunion, and there was a great outcry from these segments 
over union activities in the reconversion period,- the 
Republicans could justifiably claim such a mandate. And the 
large majorities given the Act in Congress, especially in 
the House which is supposedly close to the will of the 
people, seemed to verify this assertion.
But Harry S, Truman, being elected President by all 
the people, could justify an edict from the country in 1948, 
However, when he attempted, with all the forces at his 
disposal, to execute his mandate the conservative elements 
in Congress, denying the validity of his claim,, were able to 
block repeal of the law. Although a sufficient number of 
Democrats were elected in 1948 to enable the party to 
recapture control of Congress, a majority of congressmen 
returned who favored the law. Organized labor could 
influence the election of the President but in the postwar 
conservative reaction the middle class, agrarian and business 
constituencies could still control the legislative branch 
from which repeal of the hated Act had to come. True to 
the interests of its constituencies. Congress refused to 
alter the curbs on union acitivities and power.
This result indicated that the Act would be 
repealed only when an overwhelming liberal victory would
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unseat a sufficient number of conservative.congressmen and 
give the moderate and liberal elements a clear congressional 
majority. But in the meantime the slave labor features of 
the statute did not materialize and labor leaders and 
politicians found it increasingly difficult to stimulate 
public opinion against it. This was borne out when the 
Democratic presidential candidate in 1952 did not even 
attempt to make the law a major political issue as his 
predecessor had done during the preceding four years. By 
1952 it was obvious that the Taft-Hartley Act was a permanent 
policy and that a grave mistake had been made in not 
accepting the modifications that could have been achieved in
1949.
After several years of protection by the national 
government the conservative postwar reaction put organized 
labor on the defensive, both on the national and state 
levels. From 194-7 on, unions were pressed, politically, 
to maintain their hard-earned gains, much less attain new 
conquests. The increased political activity of unions has 
accomplished much in political education of workers in 
preparation for elections and has increased the importance 
and the effect of organized labor in national elections.
While rank and file members vote according to their own 
proclivities and union officials cannot always deliver the 
vote in an election, the potential is present and this has 
increased union prestige and prominence, especially in
292
Democratic circles. The double constituency phenomenon In 
American politics Is becoming more pronounced. As unions 
suffer further setbacks, both nationally and on the state 
level, they Increasingly place their trust In a Democratic 
President for protection and assistance.
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